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ABSTRACT 
 
Presenting a case study of enclavisation and violence in Karachi (Pakistan) as relational 
processes, this interdisciplinary project addresses key conceptual and empirical gaps in 
the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism. The project is presented in two 
parts. In the first part, I highlight that urban residential enclaves are presently under-
theorised in the urban studies literature. Consequently, scholars and policymakers often 
problematically regard enclavisation as a response to increasing crime and violence in the 
city and not as a process that perpetuates urban violence. Engaging with relational 
theories of space, and using the concepts of assemblage and performativity, I re-theorise 
enclaves as relational and processual socio-material and socio-political assemblages best 
characterised through the arrangements through which space, security and circulation are 
governed in the city. In the second part of this project, I use this re-conceptualisation to 
review empirical evidence from three different types of residential enclaves in Karachi. 
First, I introduce my study sites by demonstrating how each residential enclave 
crystallises through differential multi-scalar relations between urban governance and 
political life. Next, I move on to show how Karachi’s enclaves are often performatively 
and discursively constructed, and are made apparent through patterns of circulation 
rather than physical form. By revealing the underlying tensions, contests and negotiations 
between variously positioned actors interacting within and between Karachi’s enclaves, I 
establish that enclaves are dynamic spaces. Moreover, in emphasising the ways in which 
processes of enclavisation shape urban socio-spatial relations and restructure wider 
relations of power and politics in the Pakistani megacity, I finally establish that urban 
residential enclaves are agential geo-political processes which perpetuate violence and 
conflict in an already divided megacity. In conclusion, I argue that this project makes 
important contributions for scholars and policymakers engaging with enclaves, urban 
governance, security and violence.  
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PART-I 
2 
 
CHAPTER 1 
ENCLAVED URBANISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENCLAVISATION 
AND VIOLENCE IN KARACHI 
In a posthumous claim released on video in November 2010, a terrorist who had 
violently detonated himself in a deadly attack on the highly securitised Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) in Saddar, Karachi stated: 
I am fit and healthy and can fight anywhere, but I have offered myself for the suicide attack only 
to defeat the enemy’s technology. The enemy has technology that can only be defeated by the 
suicide attack (Dawn News, 2011e). 
 
Figure 1: Picture of CID building after the November 2010 terrorist attack. Source: BBC, 2014. 
The fortified enclave had been securitised with razor wire on top of walls, guarded 
barriers and round the clock surveillance. It was situated within Karachi’s security red 
zone, within walking distance of strategically important buildings such as government 
offices, foreign consulates and various five-star hotels. However, given the uneven and 
often unplanned nature of urban land development in Karachi, the red zone is also 
peppered with dense irregular settlements (katchi abadis), where many of the low-income 
workers who service the global city live. The CID building was situated on a particularly 
busy intersection, at the foot of a flyover which bypasses Karachi’s oldest katchi abadis to 
connect the city centre with the financial district. The bombing of the CID building took 
place towards the end of an ordinary working day within this busy environment. CCTV 
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footage of the spectacular terrorist attack shows that the physical fortifications and 
complex security protocols were reduced to rubble in a matter of seconds (see figure 1). 
Eye witnesses reported how the enclave came under attack by a few men armed with 
guns, who paved the way for the suicide bomber. CCTV footage revealed that the 
terrorist rammed the explosive laden vehicle he was driving into the fortified and heavily 
policed gate of the enclave.  
The terrorist’s actions and his posthumous claim reveal the political agency of the 
otherwise inert infrastructure of the enclave. Firstly, the attack on the CID building 
highlights how even the most securitised enclaves remain vulnerable to acts of violence. 
Secondly, it demonstrates how such fortified enclaves may become discursive 
representations of state power, and hence objects of war, in a violent megacity. In this 
spectacular event, for example, terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) targeted the building that housed the government’s anti-terrorism investigative cell 
in response to the state-led surgical operations against TTP militants in Karachi. Thirdly, 
the aftermath of the event saw the criminalisation of ethnic Pashtun migrants who had 
recently arrived in Karachi from the war-struck regions along the Pakistan-Afghan 
border (Sahoutara, 2014).1 Following the attack, hundreds of Pashtun migrants were 
‘picked up’ by state security forces from neighbouring katchi abadis as part of on-going 
investigations (The Express Tribune, 2010). Finally, the mobilisation of violent policies 
of repression against Pashtun migrants by the state, as well as related military incursions 
into migrant enclaves, discursively produced the city’s poor ethnic enclaves as imagined 
places of criminality and terrorism (Khan, 2013; Zaman and Ali, 2013). As a result of 
this, other urban city residents increasingly viewed such enclaves as pockets of criminality 
that produced urban violence.  
This spectacular event therefore illustrates the political agency of enclaves, and brings us 
to consider how enclaves and urban violence may be related to each other. While this 
particular example focuses on a dramatic attack against a strategic enclave, it is especially 
                                                 
1The Pashtuns are an ethnic group with populations living in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, 
Pashtuns are mostly resident in the Northern and North Western regions of the country, some of which 
are tribally administered areas. Since the 1960s, Pashtuns have been migrating to Karachi to work in the 
transport, construction, and low-skilled service sectors of the economy. At present, there is a significant 
number of Pashtun population in Karachi, and this is rapidly rising due to ongoing migration from 
conflict-struck tribal regions.  
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useful for introducing this thesis, which aims to present a critical analysis of spatial 
politics in an enclaved urbanism. Although various scholars have denoted how urban 
socio-political relations are radically altered in enclaved cities (Graham and Marvin, 2000; 
Low and Smith, 2006; Davis, 1996; Lemanski, 2004; Moser, 2004; Atkinson and Flint, 
2004; Falzon, 2004), I have found current scholarship on enclaved urbanism inadequate 
for understanding enclaves as agential urban spaces that transform urban socio-political 
relations in often violent ways. Meanwhile, although the literature on urban violence 
studies socio-political violence, structural violence, criminality and terrorism through the 
lenses of marginality, social polarisation, inequality and splintering urbanism, this 
literature does not make a forceful connection between enclavisation and violence as 
relational processes (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007a; Moser, 
2004; Muggah, 2012; Wacquant, 2009; Graham, 2009). In this literature, enclaved 
urbanism is widely reviewed as a backdrop to urban violence, and enclaves are hardly 
understood as agential in producing urban violence.  
This two-part thesis therefore aims to fill this existing gap in scholarship on enclaves and 
enclaved urbanism. Overall, this project aims to present a relational analysis of spatial 
politics in an enclaved urbanism. By revealing the political agency of ordinary residential 
enclaves in Karachi, a complex Pakistani megacity of approximately 20 million people 
(Cox, 2013; Qureshi, 2010), this thesis intends to highlight how enclavisation and urban 
violence are relational processes, and how enclaved urbanism is not only a consequence 
of urban conflict and violence but is also a cause of it. In the first part of this project, I 
will address existing theoretical limitations of the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved 
urbanism, and offer a critical conceptualisation of enclaves as agential processes. In the 
second part, I will present detailed case studies of enclavisation in Karachi, through 
which I will highlight how enclavisation and urban violence are relational processes.  
Although various scholars struggle to present a clear definition of urban violence, they 
agree that it is distinguishable as a form of violence specific to the conditions and 
processes of urbanisation (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; 
Winton, 2014; O’Neill and Rodgers, 2012). In this literature, ‘urban violence’ is used as 
an umbrella term which encompasses political, social, institutional, structural and/or 
economic violence. These different forms of violence are often overlapping and 
interconnected and may be produced through structural conditions that mediate urban 
socio-political relations and processes of urban governance, or through urban spaces and 
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infrastructures. Moreover, such forms of urban violence may also have these structures, 
processes and infrastructures as their target (Moser, 2004; Muggah, 2012; 
Vanderschueren, 1996; Winton, 2004; O’Neill and Rodgers, 2012; Coward, 2012; 
Graham, 2010b; Coward, 2009). In Chapter 2, I will elaborate how such understandings 
of urban violence make it possible to consider enclaves as agential spaces that are 
productive of urban violence. However, in Chapter 2, I will also argue that such an 
analysis is presently hindered by theoretical limitations in the scholarship on enclaves and 
enclaved urbanism, and that in order to understand enclaves as spaces that are productive 
of urban violence, it is necessary to conceptualise them as socio-material processes that 
restructure relations of power and politics in the city in ways that exacerbate marginality, 
vulnerability and difference. This re-conceptualisation of enclaves allows me to offer an 
analysis of enclavisation in Karachi as an ongoing process that is generative of 
perpetuating forms of structural and socio-political violence. 
In the remaining chapters, I use the term ‘enclave’ to refer to exclusionary residential 
spaces organised through the instantiation of inside/outside relationships, and which 
restrict public access (whether this is though physical or social boundaries). I also use the 
term as a concept to refer to socio-material structures that impose immobility, social 
control and identities of self and other. In the urban studies literature, enclaves are 
described as including gated communities, ghettos, theme parks, global financial districts, 
asylum and detention centres and special economic zones (Graham and Marvin, 2001; 
Sidaway, 2007; De Cauter, 2004; Diken and Lausten, 2005). All these spaces are termed 
enclaves primarily because they share a common sociology of immobility and exclusion 
(Diken and Lausten, 2005). Such enclaves attempt to restrict, filter and monitor 
circulation through various mechanisms such as physical enclosures, technological and 
human security infrastructures and also simply by intimidation and force (Caldeira, 2000; 
Glasze et al., 2006; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Burgess, 2010; Graham, 2010). In the 
next chapter, my critique of existing scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism rests 
on the urban studies literature on residential enclaves, while in Chapter 3, my 
reconceptualisation of enclaved spaces is based on insights from scholarship on logistical 
and political enclaves (Turner, 2007; Turner, 2010; Diken and Lausten, 2005; Agamben, 
1998; Sidaway, 2007). However, in the second part of this thesis, my analysis of enclaved 
urbanism in Karachi will specifically focus on residential enclaves, such as gated 
communities, enclosed neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves. 
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In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will provide a more detailed overview of 
my interdisciplinary study of enclaved urbanism in Karachi. In the first section I will 
outline how escalating crime and urban violence in Karachi is pushing urban residents to 
live within fortified enclaves, and examine why this practice is tacitly supported by the 
city authorities. In the second section I will argue that the present uptake of enclavisation 
in Karachi is problematic, especially considering the particularities of urban life in this 
deeply divided megacity. Within this context, in the third section I will present my aims 
and objectives for this study and outline the relevance of this project for urban studies 
scholarship. In the fourth section I will explain my choice to situate this study within the 
context of cities of the global South in general and Karachi in particular. I will conclude 
this chapter by outlining the organisation of this thesis.  
Introduction to Enclavisation and Violence in Karachi 
Since the 1980s, Karachiites have lived through and survived phases of extreme 
murderous violence. Up until recently, the ongoing battle between conflicting ethno-
political groups, criminal gangs and state security forces had mostly been ‘contained’ 
within Karachi’s peripheral zones (Gayer, 2014). Consequently, news of violent clashes 
between various criminal groups, their political sponsors and the armed forces in outlying 
areas such as Lyari, Orangi or North Karachi often did little to disrupt everyday life in 
the vibrant central districts of the city, which lie within the black box in figure 2 on the 
following page. However, present day events have come to challenge this oversimplified 
popular imagery of the Pakistani megacity as a divided city where urban violence and its 
related insecurities are neatly containable. 2 Today, violence is no longer limited to 
Karachi’s politicised and criminalised peripheral zones, but has permeated the previously 
safe districts of central Karachi which are more developed and deeply integrated within 
the global economy.  
                                                 
2 Better-off Karachiites used to consider insecurity to be a condition limited to the lived experiences of the 
urban poor or to parts of the city popularly referred to as ‘north of the bridge’. The discursively 
constructed urban divide between the city north and south of Clifton Bridge signifies an oversimplification 
of characteristics particular to some zones within North and South Karachi. The central districts, which lie 
in the administrative zones of Central and South Karachi, are popularly regarded by urban residents as the 
infallible ‘global city’, where the hyper-global elite live, work and are entertained. Meanwhile, through 
frequent news of industrial action and violent clashes, North, East and West Karachi have been 
discursively constructed as the peripheral zones of production, labour, violence and dissent (Shamsie, 
2002; Asharf, 2012; Ahmed, 2013). 
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Figure 2: Spatial map of killings in Karachi. Source: Dawn News, 2011a. 
Over the last few years, new criminal actors such as jihadist groups and extortionist gangs 
have added strength to the city’s existing ethno-political-criminal nexus (Yusuf, 2012; 
Mezzera, 2011; Walsh and Rehman, 2013). With the arrival of these actors, the range of 
felonious activities that Karachiites are made victim to has widened. Today, all urban 
residents—whether they live in Karachi’s peripheral zones or the central districts—live 
under the constant threat of armed robberies, kidnap for ransom, muggings and vehicle 
snatchings. Added to this, citizens are increasingly frightened by the relentless terrorist 
attacks which target government and military offices, foreign consulates, luxury hotels 
and busy shopping districts within the administrative districts of Saddar Town and 
Clifton Cantonment (Yusuf, 2012; Anis, Anthony and Mangi, 2014). As urban violence 
related to ordinary crime, political conflict and terrorism has spiralled out of control, 
Karachi has become notorious as ‘one of the most dangerous cities in the world’ 
(Hashim, 2012; Khan, 2013; Magnier, 2013). 
In this environment of heightened insecurity, the bid to restore order and safety has had 
visible effects on Karachi’s landscape. Permanent and temporary pickets, road blocks, 
identity check posts and barriers pepper ordinary urban spaces in an enactment of what 
Graham calls ‘the new military urbanism’ (2010: xiv), describing it as a condition whereby 
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ordinary cities which are not formal sites of war are securitised through militaristic logics. 
As the images on the next page illustrate, this is increasingly becoming the case for 
Karachi too, where schools, recreational parks, offices and residential neighbourhoods 
are enacting extreme security protocols. Alarmingly, the securitisation of such spaces is 
equivalent to that of strategic urban sites in Karachi which are specifically under threat 
from terrorism. 
As a result of this, Karachiites are bunkering down in fortified enclaves, which Caldeira 
(1996: 303) describes as ‘privatised, enclosed and monitored spaces for residence, 
consumption, leisure, and work’. The securitisation of ordinary urban spaces is not 
unique to Karachi, and various scholars have highlighted how cities as diverse as Los 
Angeles and Lima, Bombay and Beirut are increasingly socio-spatially fractured. In these 
cities, a combination of factors, including historical infrastructural inequalities, 
deregulation and fragmentation of state authority, social polarisation and intensifying 
insecurity are combining to produce a splintered urban landscape. In this environment, 
urban residents are turning to live in exclusionary spaces and fortified enclaves such as 
gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves (Davis, 2002; Caldeira, 
2000; Glasze et al., 2006; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Soja, 2005; Marcuse, 1997). 
Similarly to what is found in cities elsewhere, Karachi’s enclaves are usually privately 
governed spaces that attempt to provide safety, exclusivity and order to residents living in 
an environment of fear. In such spaces, authors note that public access is restricted 
through various physical or social forms of security, while those inside are protected 
from the insecure city outside (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze, Webster, and Frantz, 
2006; Caldeira, 2000; Plöger, 2012; Paasche and Sidaway, 2010; Lemanski, 2004; Akar, 
2012). In the context of this brief introduction to insecurity and related enclavisation in 
Karachi, in the next section, I will elaborate the policy context within which this 
enclavisation was made possible and highlight why I believe that this is problematic for 
the city’s future.  
In Karachi, the above-described ubiquity of militaristic security is representative of a 
culture of security that focuses on reactive measures as opposed to symptomatic 
treatment. City governors have resignedly accepted urban violence as a complex 
condition that is largely out of their control, and they therefore consider the production 
of fortified enclaves to be a necessary stop-gap measure to ensure public security. ‘Where 
do we start from?’ says Jamaluddin, a police officer. ‘It’s difficult to clean up this mess—
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this (conflict) is a hydra-headed monster, and the political pressures don’t make the task 
easier,’ he continues, ‘Practically, we can increase security to ensure some level of order’. 
 
Figure 3: Complex security infrastructure outside the offices of Dawn Newspapers in Saddar. Source: 
Robert J. Byers/Charleston (W.Va.) Gazette, 2013. 
              
Figure 4: Community watch (in blue uniforms) in MQM dominated Azizabad, North Karachi. 
Source: Photograph by author, 2013. 
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Figure 5: The guarded gates of Bin Qasim Park, Clifton. Source: Flikr, photograph by bennylin0724, 
2012. 
 
 
Figure 6: Multiple layers of security outside the Sindh High Court in Saddar. Source: Photograph by 
author, 2011. 
11 
 
In reality, however, the task of securing the rapidly expanding megacity is beyond 
governmental capacity. Karachi’s police force is well known to be ill-trained, ill-equipped 
and understaffed (Javaid, 2013). According to Shahid Hayat, the Inspector General of 
Karachi Police, the city’s police force consists of 27,000 officers. Of these, only 4,000 are 
actively policing in the field at any given time. Of the remaining personnel, around 9,000 
officers are diverted to provide protection duty to VIPs such as politicians, judges or 
businessmen. The remainder undertake non-policing duties. Given these circumstances, 
senior police officials explain that the policy of allowing privately securitised enclaves to 
flourish rests on the premise that citizens have the right to live secure lives in an 
otherwise insecure city. ‘It is not an ideal system’, says Imtiaz, a security consultant at the 
Home Office, ‘but at the moment we are facing a crisis. By helping themselves, those 
who can afford it (private security) are helping us. We can divert resources to where they 
are most needed.’  
The official consensus on allowing enclavisation to flourish is also a reaction to pressure 
from urban economic elites (Zamir, 2014; Zaheer, 2011). As Karachi contributes a 
quarter of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, and its industries produce 30 percent 
of Pakistan’s industrial output, the city’s economy is crucial to Pakistan’s financial 
survival. Similarly, Karachi’s port and its other businesses help generate more than half of 
the central government’s tax revenues and 70 percent of national income tax revenue 
(Budhani, Gazdar, Kaker and Mallah, 2010). In this context, the cost of economic 
disruption caused by events of mass violence and the ensuing insecurity is significant. A 
single day of suspended economic activities in Karachi can cost up to $10 billion in lost 
trade and industrial revenue (Yusuf, 2012). In this context, business lobby groups have 
become active players in influencing urban security policies and have convinced the 
government to allow privately securitised and policed enclaves in business and financial 
districts (Express Tribune, 2014c). By extension, these lobby groups have also set up civil 
society organisations such as the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), which both 
encourage and offer support for enclavisation in middle-class and affluent residential 
areas. 
However, the city government’s encouragement of enclavisation in Karachi is selective. 
Although implicitly supported in middle-class and upper middle class localities, officials 
do not tolerate similar processes of enclavisation in many of the city’s lower income 
neighbourhoods, and especially not in the many irregular settlements (katchi abadis) where 
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approximately half of the urban population resides (Hasan and Mohib, 2003). In these 
politically charged and often volatile katchi abadis, enclavisation and security are organised 
in various, often informal, ways. In some katchi abadis, residents organise collective 
enclosure, community watches and patrols to keep out threatening outsiders. In others, 
residents subscribe to protection rackets organised by members of ethno-political 
organisations or criminal gangs. In yet others, prominent community leaders provide 
protection to their community members through inter-community dialogue and 
negotiation.3 When I broached the topic of enclavisation in katchi abadis with Imtiaz, his 
response was forceful: ‘We are trying to open up these no-go areas in katchi abadis—they 
are known to harbour non-state miscreants. They (the katchi abadis) are contributing to 
the problem of insecurity, and a military operation is the only solution.’ 
Clearly, the right to ensure personal safety through collectively organised enclosure is a 
privilege not granted equally to all Karachiites. While officials consider enclavisation in 
middle class and affluent residential areas to be an act of necessity, enclavisation in katchi 
abadis is criminalised. In such spaces, enclavisation is considered to be a territorialisation 
activity carried out by illicit groups aiming to challenge state authority and spread 
violence and terror in the city. This bias is tied to the particular political history of 
Karachi, where members of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM, a militant ethno-
political party) have in the past entrenched themselves in low income and lower-middle 
income neighbourhoods, creating no-go areas for police and security forces (Gayer, 
2014). Operating from within their enclaves, MQM members fought a protracted war 
with other political groups throughout the 1990s in a bid to gain political influence in city 
and national politics. In the early 1990s, MQM enclaves were ‘opened up’ after a 
protracted brutal military operation which helped weaken the party’s political 
organisation (Gayer, 2012; Gayer, 2014; Khan, 2010).  
Despite this past history of enclavisation as an antecedent to urban violence in Karachi, 
in the present climate of insecurity, police officials continue to support the process in 
most residential neighbourhoods in the city. Today, such enclaves are allowed to exist 
                                                 
3 At present, such enclaves do not fully fit into the popular categories of residential enclaves, i.e. gated 
communities, enclosed neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves. However, as I will argue through my 
reconceptualisation of enclaves (in Chapter 3), such katchi abadis can be understood as enclaved spaces 
especially as they embody several characteristics of enclaved spaces. Katchi abadis are often discursively 
produced and privately governed and guarded spaces of exception. 
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because of the MQM’s co-option by the provincial and national government and due to a 
general understanding of present-day urban violence as an all-pervasive, uncontrollable 
force that is no longer simplistically tied to ethno-political contests in the city. Although 
police and security officials clearly imagine that present day enclavisation in most planned 
neighbourhoods is distinguishable from its historical form, they do not feel the same way 
about enclavisation in the city’s informal katchi abadis. Yet, as I will explain in more detail 
below, such a view is problematic, as is the present policy of encouraging enclavisation as 
a response to widespread insecurity.  
The Problematic Uptake of Enclavisation in Karachi 
Thus, the proliferation of fortified enclaves in Karachi is tied to a crisis of urban security 
governance in an increasingly violent city. In this section, however, I will elaborate on 
why the current opinion of fortified enclaves as an effective response to urban insecurity 
is problematic—especially considering the realities of everyday life, governance and 
politics in complex urban systems such as Karachi. This problematic became obvious to 
me following my preliminary field visit to Karachi, when I was able to critically reflect on 
my literature review on enclaved spaces through personal encounters with Karachi’s 
enclaves and in the process finding unaccounted complexities. 
Firstly, and most significantly, I found that the present uptake of enclavisation by 
Karachi’s policymakers signals an environmentally deterministic view of fortified 
enclaves, which is reflected in the writings of scholars dealing with the phenomenon. The 
emphasis on gates, walls, razor-wire, checkpoints and barriers is suggestive of an 
understanding that physical fortification is effective in isolating spaces and protecting the 
‘inside’ from the ‘feral city’ outside (Davis, 1990; Rodgers, 2006; De Cauter, 2004). This 
treatment of enclaves as producing binaries of inside and outside is also mirrored in 
scholarship on enclaved urbanism, where the term ‘enclave’ is often used synecdochically 
to explain encapsularisation, segregation, urban fragmentation and a general 
‘disembedding’ of the city (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Landman and Schönteich, 2002; 
Rodgers, 2004; Lemanski, 2004).  
I find such a view of enclaves as capsular spaces debatable, especially as it fails to 
consider the impossibility of total isolation and security in lived enclaves. A wide range of 
activities and ongoing labour is necessary, not only to sustain everyday life within the 
enclave, but also to uphold enclosure. This became visible to me during a visit to the 
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Karachi Sheraton Hotel (pictured below), a fortified enclave in Karachi. There, I 
encountered Aslam, a private security guard employed to carry out the monotonous 
labour of monitoring all pedestrians who crossed the electronic security gates in order to 
enter the hotel. Although Aslam played a key role within the security architecture at the 
Sheraton, his very presence in the hotel demonstrated that the process of upholding the 
enclave necessarily produced interactions and interconnections between the inside and 
outside of fortified enclaves. Many of the staff members who worked at the Sheraton—
including Aslam—lived in nearby irregular settlements (katchi abadis). As I mentioned 
earlier, affluent urban residents and city officials largely consider such katchi abadis to be 
zones of criminality. In essence, despite active measures being taken to clearly separate 
the enclave inside from the city outside, it was impossible to enact total separation. In 
order to ensure the smooth functioning of enclaved spaces, a range of circulations and 
interconnections between those inside and those outside was necessary. To me, this 
impossibility of total isolation through enclavisation demonstrates the futile nature of the 
exercise. 
 
Figure 7: Karachi Sheraton Hotel. Source:  Sheraton Karachi, 2012. 
Secondly, and relatedly, by focusing on the everyday and processual elements of 
enclavisation, i.e. on Aslam’s role in upholding the enclave boundaries, I was able to find 
that it was in fact impossible to impose total security through enclavisation. The present 
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view of enclaves taken by officials and enclave managers overlooks the more negotiated 
and discursive aspects of security and enclosure. This omission also characterises the 
urban studies literature, where boundedness emerges as a key signifier of enclaves and 
enclaved urbanism (De Cauter, 2004; Atkinson and Blandy, 2009). As a result, the 
enclave as ‘concept’ often becomes significantly inflexible and fixed. This is especially so 
when the term ‘enclave’ is used as a descriptor for architectures of enclosure, 
incarceration and securitisation. Through this onto-epistemological treatment, the 
meaning of the term conflates with the function of the space.  
By considering walls, gates, and security guards to be effective measures to restrict urban 
circulations, proponents of enclavisation overlook the often performative functions of 
security. Recalling Aslam’s role in screening pedestrians who cross the security gates of 
the Karachi Sheraton Hotel, I realised that although Aslam played a small part in the 
impressive socio-technical infrastructure of security at the Sheraton, his role was integral 
to the discursive creation of the impregnable enclave. Aslam was supported by a range of 
other security workers, some of whom operated the electronic security barriers to allow 
cars through, while others walked around with sniffer dogs and radioactive scanners and 
yet others sat in control rooms looking out for suspicious activity. Through their 
repetitive gestures of militaristic security protocols, Aslam and his colleagues contributed 
to the range of discursive practices put in place by the hotel management to provide 
guests with an assurance of impregnable security in a volatile environment.  
Yet, because security in the enclave was performatively produced, I also realised that it 
was open to subversion. For example, in moving through the Sheraton’s security 
protocols, I found that Aslam’s routine motions of asking people to show their bags to 
check for any dangerous objects left much to be desired in terms of providing effective 
security. As I passed through the pedestrian security gates without a proper check, I put a 
direct question to Aslam: ‘How did you know I wasn’t carrying any explosives?’ Aslam 
gave a resigned reply, saying ‘my presence here shows how strict the Sheraton’s security 
is. Even if I don’t fully check people’s bags [...] I take a cursory look anyway. I really have 
no way of stopping a blast. That is all up to Allah!’ 
Finally, I found the official view of physical enclavisation as a panacea or silver bullet 
response to urban insecurity in Karachi to be extremely problematic. This uptake rests on 
an understanding of enclaves as inert infrastructures which effectively impose security 
and immobility through their physical characteristics. However, as I will argue in more 
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detail in chapters 2 and 3, this view demonstrates obliviousness to the osmotic, contested 
and negotiated nature of enclaved spaces and the processual, political and agential nature 
of urban infrastructures (Bennett, 2005; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008). Moreover, as 
I will argue in detail in Chapter 2, this view fails to consider that a policy of encouraging 
enclavisation may be productive of the very conditions against which enclaves are 
prescribed. For example, as I will highlight in chapters 3 and 7, the processes of 
bordering in enclaved spaces exacerbate social differences and alter urban political 
relations in ways that engender urban violence. Furthermore, as I will highlight in 
chapters 4 and 8, the processes of enclavisation fragment governmental authority in 
potentially disastrous ways.  
In this way, Karachi’s officials also fail to consider how the production of such enclaves 
may create structural conditions or change urban socio-political relations in ways that 
could inflame socio-political violence in Karachi. This is especially relevant when 
considering the present policy stance towards ‘selective’ enclavisation. By supporting the 
production of elite enclaves while vehemently opposing the production of enclaves by 
disenfranchised urban groups, policymakers show an failure to understand how the latter 
are often produced in response to structural inequalities that emerge from the 
instantiation of the former (Moser, 2009; Chatterjee, 2009). In effect, current attitudes 
ignore the relational nature of urban space, i.e. the idea that urban space is a product of 
complex multi-scalar relations and interconnections (Massey, 2005). Such 
conceptualisations, which I will elaborate in more detail in Chapter 3, will help in 
understanding how residential enclaves are co-constituted and self-perpetuating spaces. It 
also forces us to consider how processes of enclavisation in one part of the city may be 
productive of structural inequalities and social difference—conditions which often push 
crime and violence (Winton, 2004; Muggah, 2012). 
While my experiences in the field forced me to challenge the predominant ways in which 
enclaves were reviewed in broader urban studies scholarship, as well as the ways in which 
the concept was taken up by Karachi’s residents and governors, I turned to reflect on 
broader implications of enclavisation as an activity that may magnify existing ethno-
political and socio-spatial tensions in Karachi, a megacity that is already conflict prone. In 
thinking this through, I began to wonder why, despite the fact that residents were 
bunkering down within secure enclaves, urban violence related to ethno-political conflict, 
terrorist attacks and ordinary crime continued to paralyse everyday life in Karachi with 
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more intensity and force. Statistical reports highlight that between 2010 and 2013 
kidnappings increased by 55 percent, and other incidents of crime such as vehicle 
snatching, telephone snatching and robberies increased by 50 percent (Cplc.org.pk, 
2014). Meanwhile, in the same period the number of violent killings related to ethno-
political violence and terrorism spiked. In 2013, the homicide rate in Karachi was 15.5 
per 100 000 people, compared to 9.9 per 100 000 people in 2010.4 I found that this 
dramatic rise in urban violence, which occurred in spite of continuing urban fortification 
and enclavisation, demanded closer scrutiny. It hinted at a possible causal relationship 
between enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi.  
This thesis is therefore based on the argument that enclaves and the city are related to 
each other—especially as they are co-constituted in multiple ways through urban socio-
political relations. Based on my preliminary experiences of interacting with city 
governors, enclave managers, residents and workers in Karachi’s enclaved spaces, as well 
as on the contextual understanding which I gained of politics and governance in Karachi, 
I found the socio-political dynamics of enclavisation to be an often ignored aspect in the 
literature on enclaves and enclaved urbanism. I also found that paying closer attention to 
the complexities of inside-outside relationships, paradoxes of security/insecurity and the 
political subjectivities produced through everyday interactions between residents, workers 
and visitors living and moving within and between enclaved spaces is perhaps essential if 
we are to understand the form and function of enclaved spaces, as well as being highly 
relevant to the generation of a critical conceptualisation of enclaves. Similarly, I felt that 
it was possible to consider enclavisation and urban violence as relational processes and to 
hold processes of enclavisation and enclaved urbanism responsible for escalating urban 
violence. I will explain this in more detail in the following section, where I will clearly 
outline the aims and objectives of this project. 
Aims, Objectives, and Key Contributions 
Nuanced accounts disclose that socio-spatial inequalities, difference and fear of the other 
are pronounced in enclaved cities (Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003; Glasze et al., 2006; Low 
and Smith, 2006). In some cases, scholars hold the geography of exclusion accountable 
for perpetuating novel forms of apartheid (Lemanski, 2004; Dawson, 2006). In enclaved 
                                                 
4 Based on author’s calculations from various sources. 
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African cities, for example, authors highlight how the production of gated communities 
is tied to the ghettoisation of the poor in ways that mirror colonial projects of 
segregation and social control (Jürgens and Landman, 2006; Dawson, 2006). Other 
studies focus on political and governmental aspects of enclaved urbanism, concluding 
that processes of creating and upholding enclaved spaces spatialise governmentality 
(Sidaway, 2007; Turner, 2010; Caldeira, 1996). Meanwhile, scholars such as Caldeira 
(2000) and Alsayyad and Roy (2006) also highlight how processes of enclavisation 
restructure state-society relations by displacing the social contract between citizens and 
the state. In such cases, these authors suggest that individuals or governing bodies who 
watch over residents’ interests in enclaved spaces may emerge as authoritative actors who 
may begin to threaten state authority in enclaved cities (De Souza 2009; Fregonese, 
2012). However, despite elaborating the effects of enclaved urbanism on urban socio-
political relations, current scholarship on enclaves fails to forcefully interrogate enclaves 
as relational processes that continuously interact with wider socio-political structures and 
shape urban power and politics in ways that perpetuate urban violence.  
As I will outline in more detail in the following chapter, in accounts of spatial politics in 
enclaved cities, enclaves remain unproblematised and are treated as the ‘place’ from 
which urban social and political relations extend outwards (Atkinson and Blandy, 2005; 
Glasze et al., 2006). In the same literature, there is an over-determinism around the 
physicality of enclaves and enclaved spaces are not conceptually understood as processes 
that may be agential. The ‘blackboxing’5 of enclaved spaces is further made complete as 
the term ‘enclave’ is synecdochically used by scholars to explain encapsularisation, 
segregation, urban fragmentation and a general ‘disembedding’ of the city (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; Landman and Schönteich, 2002; Rodgers, 2004; Lemanski, 2004). 
Consequently, the descriptive treatment of enclaves reifies them as homogenous, insular, 
incarcerating spaces (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006; Landman, 2006; 
Landman, 2004; Rodgers, 2004). As a result, the varying textures of governance and 
                                                 
5 ‘Blackboxing’ is an abstract notion used by Bruno Latour to describe the social processes that make 
scientific and technical works invisible because of their success. Blackboxing results in the creation of an 
artefact that seems static or closed from the outside. Latour explains how technologies are blackboxed: 
‘When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and 
outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, 
the more opaque and obscure they become’ (Latour, 1999: 304). 
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socio-political lived realities within enclaved spaces tend to be overlooked, as does the 
processual nature of enclaves.  
This analytical blind spot is also mirrored in current scholarship on enclaves and 
enclaved urbanism. In this scholarship, enclaves are currently studied merely as 
consequences of escalating urban violence and not as agential processes that are 
productive of urban violence. In Chapter 2, I will expand this argument in detail, 
highlighting how the literature on enclaved urbanism conspicuously ignores the agential, 
relational, processual and geopolitical nature of enclaved space. This literature rests on 
analytical weaknesses which can be remedied if enclaves are conceptualised through 
concepts of relationality, performativity and assemblage. Such a view necessitates that 
urban space is considered to be multi-scalar, processual and mutable, and not fixed in any 
way. Moreover, a relational view of space forces us to consider that processes of enclave-
making may be consensual as well as contested. Hence, it becomes possible to 
understand the activity of enclavisation as inherently political and power-laden (Massey, 
2005; Murdoch, 2005). Based on the earlier elaborated evidence of enclavisation in 
Karachi, and in the context of the above-mentioned gaps in scholarship on enclaved 
urbanism, the overall aim of this project and its related key objectives are as follows: 
Overall aim: 
 To develop an understanding of enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi as 
relational processes.  
Key objectives: 
 Firstly, to highlight key gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism which 
currently inhibit the generation of an understanding of enclaves as spaces that are 
productive of urban violence.  
 Secondly, to re-conceptualise residential enclaves as relational, dynamic, political 
and socio-material spaces that have flexible and negotiated boundaries and are 
always in process. 
 Thirdly, to develop an understanding of enclaves as agential spaces that 
restructure urban governance, politics and socio-political relations. 
 Finally, to present empirical evidence on enclavisation in Karachi in order to 
elaborate how processual enclaves intersect with complex urban systems to 
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generate inequalities, marginalities and disjunctive forms of citizenship in ways 
that reproduce patterns of violence and victimisation in the city.  
As an interdisciplinary exercise, this thesis will make important theoretical and empirical 
contributions to existing scholarship on gating, fortification, urban conflict, violence and 
everyday life in contemporary cities. These are summarised below: 
 Firstly, using concepts of assemblage, materiality and performativity, the project 
will open up residential enclaves to critical scrutiny for urban studies scholars, 
allowing them to consider the agential and political nature of otherwise ordinary 
spaces of residence. This would be especially useful for scholars engaged with 
enclaved urbanism (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006; De Cauter, 
2004; Graham and Marvin, 2001), as well as for others who study insecurity, 
citizenship, governance and everyday life in contested and divided cities (Soja, 
2005; Caldeira, 2000; Holston, 2009; De Souza, 2014; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b).  
 Secondly, by analysing enclaved spaces as infrastructures that exacerbate the 
underlying conditions of structural and socio-political violence, I will add to 
critical scholarship on the role of infrastructures as mediators and mediums of 
urban violence (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Graham, 2010; Coward, 2009). In 
fact, I will add to this literature by demonstrating that infrastructures are not only 
channels for urban violence, but are also agential in producing it.  
 Thirdly, by situating my research within a thriving Pakistani megacity that is 
otherwise marginalised in urban studies research, the empirical details presented 
in this project and the resulting analysis will present valuable possibilities for 
scholars engaged in advancing scholarship on postcolonial and comparative 
urbanism (Robinson, 1996; Roy, 2009b; Simone, 2009).  
Having highlighted the aims, objectives and key contributions of this thesis, in the 
following section I will I explain my empirical emphasis on cities of the global South and 
my rationale for using Karachi as a case study. Following this, I will conclude this chapter 
by outlining my approach to studying enclaves as processes and as spaces that not only 
emerge as consequences of the escalating insecurity and violence in Karachi but which 
are also productive of these same conditions. 
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Why Cities of the Global South and Why Karachi? 
In the past decade, critical urban research has been involved with the project of ‘post-
colonising’ urban theory and developing new geographies of theory (Roy, 2009b; 
Robinson, 2006). This critical orientation stems from the recognition that cities of the 
global South have been historically marginalised in urban studies. At the same time, there 
is also a realisation that whilst the global urban future lies in cities of the global South 
(Dawson and Edwards, 2004), urban theory has largely focused on issues that are 
removed from the real world imperatives of planning, governing, managing and living in 
these cities (Simone, 2009; Watson, 2009b; Lindell, 2008; Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Roy, 
2009b; Roy, 2011b).  
This critical project is also a political agenda and a postcolonial critique of the global 
cities literature. Robinson (2006) leads the argument by suggesting that the global cities 
literature discursively ‘others’ megacities of the global South by assessing them through 
developmentalist criteria, or reifies them as un-modern places beyond the ‘developed' 
world. Such an act silences the diversity of urban life and fails to acknowledge other 
categories and ways to be urban which are thriving in cities of the global South 
(Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2009; Roy, 2011). In response, Robinson (2006) calls attention 
to the varied geographies of the cities of the global North and South, arguing that all 
cities need to be treated as what Amin and Graham (1997: 411) refer to as ‘ordinary 
cities’. Robinson describes ordinary cities as ‘[…] diverse, differentiated, and contested, 
shaped by processes stretching far beyond their physical extent, but also by the complex 
dynamics of the city itself’ (Robinson, 2006: 10). 
My own focus on cities of the global South, and on Karachi in particular, is both a 
dedication and a contribution to this shift in critical urban studies research. I promote the 
case of ‘ordinary cities’ by choosing Karachi—a complex, dynamic, and diverse 
megacity—as a site for theory production and analysis. However, I also choose to focus 
on Karachi for particular conceptual and methodological reasons. First of all, given that 
in Karachi the global city is entrenched within the subaltern city, it is an ideal place from 
which to theorise the enclaved city in totality—as a constellation of processual, relational, 
mobile and unequal spatialisations.  
Secondly, a focus on Karachi in particular, and cities of the global South in general, 
expands the scope of the study of enclaves beyond experiences and contexts particular to 
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cities of the global North. For example, criticisms of the splintering urbanism thesis 
acknowledge the currency of the concept but warn against generalising the processes of 
urban fragmentation and enclave production (Coutard, 2008). A view from cities of the 
South provides a contextualised flavour of enclaved urbanism in cities with differential 
state spatialisations (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Brenner, Jessop, Jones and MacLeod, 
2003), alternative modes of governance (Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Roy, 2011b) and 
varying forms of citizenship (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Holston and Appadurai, 2003; 
Caldeira, 2000). 
Thirdly, by presenting an in-depth case study of Karachi, a thriving yet often disrupted 
megacity within what is popularly conceived as a ‘fragile’ state, I offer a vantage point 
from a city which is off the academic map of urban studies. Despite various portrayals of 
urban life and urbanisation in the city (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; 
Hasan and Mohib, 2003), Karachi, the world’s seventh largest urban agglomeration (Cox, 
2012), is yet to receive the paradigmatic status in critical urban studies enjoyed by other 
megacities in the subcontinent such as Delhi, Calcutta and Mumbai. While Karachi has a 
unique status in local and global politics, there are noticeable gaps in the scholarship on 
urban political life in the city beyond accounts of ethno-political conflict or informality 
and urban life (see Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2011; Gazdar and Mallah, 
2013; Gayer, 2007; Gayer, 2012).  
Outline of the Thesis 
The narrative that follows is divided in two parts. In the first part, I will elaborate a 
theoretical framework within which I can ground my analysis of enclaves as spaces that 
perpetuate urban violence. In the second part, I will present detailed case studies of 
enclavisation and enclaved urbanism in Karachi and illustrate how enclavisation and 
urban violence are relational processes. 
Each chapter in part one makes a contribution to the development of a critical 
conceptualisation of enclaves as agential and processual spaces. In Chapter 2, I critically 
review the literature on enclaves, enclavisation and urban violence in order to 
demonstrate how it may be possible to understand urban violence as an outcome of 
enclavisation. After introducing the key characteristics of urban violence and outlining 
the dominant frameworks for its study, I will explain how current conceptualisations 
inhibit the study of enclaves as spatial processes that are productive of this phenomenon. 
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In the remainder of the chapter, I will present a detailed critique of existing theorisations 
of enclaves. I will highlight how the current methodological, conceptual and empirical 
engagement with enclaves across the urban studies literature limits analysis of enclaves as 
contextually relevant processes that restructure urban-political relations in ways that 
perpetuate urban violence.  
Taking this argument forward in Chapter 3, I use relational theories, assemblage theory 
and the theory of performativity to critically re-conceptualise enclaves as processual and 
socio-material assemblages (McFarlane, 2011a; Massey, 2005). The main argument 
throughout this chapter is that enclaves are relational processes that are produced 
through a combination of factors, including social interactions, political space, discursive 
acts and the instantiation of inside/outside relations. Such a conceptualisation forces us 
to move beyond fixations on urban form, while also revealing the dynamic and fluid 
nature of enclaved spaces. Moreover, such a conceptualisation allows us to consider the 
agential and political nature of processual enclaves, especially as it reveals how processes 
of enclavisation are productive of identities, subjectivities and political exception. 
Therefore, understanding enclaves in this way brings us closer to studying enclaves as 
spaces that perpetuate urban violence.  
Having laid the conceptual groundwork in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I present a framework 
for reviewing processes of enclavisation with reference to wider urban political processes 
related to governance and statehood in contemporary cities. At the same time, I also 
provide a more detailed background of processes of governance and urban politics in 
Karachi. This relational comparison of processes of enclavisation in different settings is 
an attempt to contextualise the production of enclaved space within particular historical 
and socio-political contexts in Karachi and in cities which share similarities with Karachi 
(Ward, 2010). In the process, I demonstrate how the production of enclaved spaces in 
cities of the global South is intricately tied to power and politics, thereby drawing 
attention to the political nature of enclaved spaces. In the process, I emphasise the ways 
in which actors governing enclaved spaces interact with practices of government and 
hence produce an understanding of enclaves as significant geo-political spaces. As a 
result, the arguments presented in Chapter 4 suggest a framework for analysing relations 
of governance and urban political life in enclaved cities so as to explain how relational 
enclaves are productive of urban conflict and violence. 
24 
 
In Chapter 5, I provide a methodological overview of this project in light of my 
theorisation of enclaves and urban violence as relational processes. I explain the 
relevance of relational theory to presenting enclaves as vibrant processual constellations 
of physical space, politics and social relations, all of which exist in a permanent state of 
negotiated tension between openness and closure, inside and outside, security and 
insecurity (Bennett, 2010; McFarlane, 2011a; Massey, 2005; Amin and Graham, 1999). I 
then justify and outline my research design, which uses ethnography as a method to 
collect data from case study sites. Using Karachi as my case study, I use ethnographic 
methods to study the inter-relationships and interconnections within and between three 
residential enclaves which lie in close proximity to each other. Very briefly, these are 
Askari III, a gated community developed on Cantonment land; Clifton Block 7, an open 
plan residential neighbourhood governed by the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) 
which is now privately secured and enclosed by a residents’ association; and Sultanabad, a 
katchi abadi which is largely perceived as a no-go area, but is further divided into ethnic 
enclaves, many of which are formally enclosed or discursively constructed as spaces of 
danger. I have chosen these three sites because they broadly characterise the different 
forms of residential enclaves widely referred to in the literature, and also because they are 
in close proximity to each other. All three enclaves are located in areas broadly 
considered ‘south of the bridge’. 
Part II is organised in three chapters. Each of these chapters draws evidence from my 
fieldwork in Karachi to illustrate how enclaved spaces are multi-scalar processes that 
spatialise urban socio-political relations in various ways, as well as showing how 
processes of enclavisation are generative of urban violence. In Chapter 6, I introduce the 
case study sites of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, while tracing the processes 
of enclavisation in these. I highlight how each enclave is produced through the 
intersection of contemporary and historical processes of urban fragmentation, 
privatisation, securitisation and political exceptionalism in Karachi. Through this focus 
on processes of enclavisation, I highlight how each enclave is uniquely different to the 
other, as it crystallises varied experiences of urban political life in Karachi. Overall, this 
chapter provides an understanding of governance and politics in Karachi, while also 
introducing Karachi’s enclaves as spaces that are relational to urban politics and 
governance. 
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In Chapter 7, I delve into the relationship of enclavisation with circulation, security and 
identity. Here, I examine the ways in which the discursive and performative practices of 
securitisation within enclaved spaces relate with existing imaginative geographies of self 
and other. After examining the processes of bordering and securitising in Askari III, 
Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, I suggest that registers of inclusion and exclusion shape 
the permeability of urban borders. Using personal observations and interviews with 
people governing, living and working in each of the three field sites, as well as with those 
performing security, I demonstrate that the production of enclaved spaces is generative 
of tensions between space, security and circulation. The evidence presented in Chapter 7 
thus suggests that identity is tied to relations between enclavisation and circulation, and 
that enclaves have fluid borders which regularly shift and blur to accommodate or 
exclude people. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter is reflective of my critical 
conceptualisation of enclaved spaces (in Chapter 3). Furthermore, by emphasising how 
processes of enclavisation are productive of marginalities and political subjectivities, this 
chapter provides an essential background for the next chapter, Chapter 8, which analyses 
enclavisation and urban violence as inter-related processes. 
Chapter 8, the final empirical chapter, develops an analysis of urban violence in Karachi 
as an outcome of enclavisation. In order to do this, the chapter builds on the connections 
between enclavisation, governance and urban violence which were theorised in the first 
part of this thesis. Firstly, it suggests that as spaces that project homogeneity, enclaves 
themselves may become sites that attract terror and violence. Hence, enclaves become 
paradoxical sites of security and insecurity. Secondly, by demonstrating how processes of 
enclavisation in Karachi are generative of identities of self and other, Chapter 8 highlights 
how enclaves are productive of racialised and criminalised identities of people and place. 
In connection to this, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that processes 
of enclavisation exacerbate the vulnerabilities of marginalised populations, making them 
both victims of state terror and vigilante justice. Finally, following from an understanding 
of urban violence as an interrelated process that produces chains and spirals of violence, 
Chapter 8 argues that processes of enclavisation can be held directly responsible for 
producing concatenations of violence. The arguments presented in Chapter 8 are 
therefore instrumental in exposing the agency of urban space in perpetuating conflict and 
violence in Karachi. 
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In the concluding chapter, I return to the aims and objectives outlined in this 
introductory chapter, and demonstrate how the arguments presented in each chapter 
meets them. Next, I outline the conceptual, empirical, and practical contributions of this 
project as well as on avenues for future research. Firstly, I suggest that my novel 
conceptual framework within which to understand enclaves analyse them as relational 
and processual spaces opens up the agenda for renewed critical scrutiny on enclaved 
urbanism. By focusing on how enclaves embody collective social and political values; 
how they materialise fear, insecurity, social difference and uneven development; and how 
they spatialise power, governmentality and inequality, I have highlighted how enclaves are 
indeed paradigmatic spaces that remain under-studied. Taken as such, enclaves may 
become a domain of renewed interest for scholars working on securitisation, innovative 
practices of urban governance, state spaces and citizenship, and/or urban conflict and 
violence. Such a nuanced study of enclaved urbanism is especially relevant since the 
proliferation of enclaves is visibly shaping urban landscapes across contemporary cities 
(Caldeira, 2000; Graham and Marvin, 2000; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Shatkin, 2007; 
Neil and Smith, 2006; Glasze, Webster and Frantz, 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; 
Graham, 2010). 
Secondly, I argue that my focus on processes of enclavisation in cities of the global South 
furthers the project of ‘worlding cities’ (Robinson, 2006). In focusing on Karachi, I have 
offered insights into a city which remains off the ‘academic map’ despite being an 
important world city. Furthermore, the in-depth case studies presented would allow 
further comparative work by scholars wishing to engage with issues related to urban 
governance, socio-spatial relations, citizenship and conflict in similar contexts. This is 
especially timely as influential urban studies scholars are now concerned with ‘post-
colonising’ urban theory and developing new geographies of theory (Roy, 2009b; 
Robinson, 2006). There is also a realisation that, whilst the global urban future lies in 
cities of the global South (Dawson and Edwards, 2004), urban theory has largely focused 
on issues that are removed from the real world imperatives of planning, governing, 
managing and living in such cities (Simone, 2009; Watson, 2009b; Lindell, 2008; Gaffikin 
and Perry, 2012; Roy, 2009b; Roy, 2011b). 
Finally, and most significantly, in explicating the political and agential nature of enclaved 
spaces, I demonstrate how this project is of significant relevance for policy makers and 
urban planners working across socio-spatially polarised, unevenly developed, and 
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fragmented cities. I forcefully argue that in cities such as Karachi, academics and 
policymakers alike should consider how processes of enclavisation restructure power and 
politics in the city and beyond in ways that cause instability, insecurity, and 
concatenations of violence.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ENCLAVES, ENCLAVISATION, AND ENCLAVED URBANISM WITH 
RELEVANCE FOR URBAN VIOLENCE 
Enclave: A small piece of territory that is culturally distinct and politically separate from 
another territory within which it is located. [...] The term is increasingly used to refer to a city 
neighbourhood displaying distinctive economic, social and cultural attributes from its 
surroundings. (Flint, 2009: 191) 
Presented in the dictionary of human geography, the above definition of an enclave 
offers a broad-brush understanding of enclaves as territorial spaces that are socio-
culturally, economically and politically distinct from their surroundings. In urban studies 
scholarship, however, residential enclaves are also defined by their capacity to restrict 
circulation through physical fortification and practices of enclosure (Davis, 1990; 
Caldeira, 1996; Ellin, 1997; Flusty, 1994). Increasingly, the term enclave is used to denote 
segregated spaces which are delinked from the wider city through premium 
infrastructural networks, exclusive politico-legal arrangements with city governments and 
a sociology of exclusion which attempts to create separation between those inside and 
outside (Glasze et al., 2006; Diken and Lausten, 2005; Atkinson, 2008). The most 
common types of residential enclaves studied within urban studies are gated communities 
and enclosed neighbourhoods (Landman, 2000; Low, 2003; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; 
Glasze et al., 2006; Lemanski et al., 2008; Ploger, 2010), while some authors also 
highlight ethno-racial enclaves, favelas and no-go areas as types of enclaves (Caldeira, 
2000; Marcuse, 1997) 
Many scholars describe the contemporary urban condition—characterised by the 
proliferation of enclaves—as enclaved urbanism (Wissink, 2013; Douglas, Wissink and 
Van Kempen, 2012; Sharma, 2010). In their discussions, these authors demonstrate how 
such a form of urbanism denotes socio-spatial segregation, fragmented and splintered 
infrastructural development and ambiguous planning and governmental regimes (Roy, 
2011a; Douglas, Wissink and Van Kempen, 2012). In such respects, enclaved urbanism is 
understood to be productive of inclusions and exclusions, connections and 
disconnections and differentiated notions of citizenship (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; 
Graham and Marvin, 2001; Soja, 2005).  
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However, as I have briefly outlined in the introductory chapter, despite presenting 
detailed accounts of the politics of space and governance in an enclaved urbanism, these 
scholars do not sufficiently interrogate urban violence as a continuum tied to 
enclavisation. In this chapter, I will elaborate this proposition in more detail by arguing 
that analysis of enclaves as spaces that perpetuate urban violence is inhibited because of 
weaknesses in present theorisations of enclaved spaces. I will make this argument by 
presenting a critical review of scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism in light of 
the literature on urban violence.  
To do so, in the first section I will introduce key definitions of urban violence and 
outline frameworks through which it becomes possible to study urban violence as a 
phenomenon that is tied to enclavisation. In the second section I will highlight existing 
weaknesses in the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism which inhibit the 
conceptualisation of enclavisation and urban violence as relational processes. Keeping in 
mind these critical gaps in the literature on enclaves and enclavisation, in the third section 
I will outline the ways in which existing gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism 
and urban violence can be bridged through a reconceptualisation of enclaves and 
enclavisation. These critiques therefore form a basis for the next two chapters, where I 
re-theorise enclaves as processual spaces that are directly responsible for escalating urban 
violence in Karachi. 
Definitions and Key Concepts of Urban Violence 
Scholars studying urban violence across anthropological, sociological, political and 
criminological disciplines find it to be an extremely complex phenomenon that is difficult 
to define and delimit. Across this literature, the category of urban violence encompasses 
forms of violence that is enacted in cities and produced through processes of city-making 
and urbanisation (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Moser, 2004; Winton, 2004; Muggah, 
2012). Such violence may be manifested directly through brutal force, causing physical or 
psychological harm, or indirectly through structural conditions which may lead to direct 
violence (Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Moser and McIlwaine, 
2004).  
Based on this general definition of urban violence, the diagram below is representative of 
prevalent understandings of urban violence as a dynamic, multi-scalar, and interrelated 
process. This diagrammatic representation of urban violence rests on a literature review 
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which illustrates that underlying structural and material conditions are productive of 
concatenations of violence in megacities (Auyero, Lara, and Berti, 2014; Scheper-Hughes, 
2004; Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006; Winton, 2004; Rodgers 
and O’Neill, 2012). The resultant urban violence may play out as social, economic, 
institutional, political, structural and/or infrastructural (outer circles in figure 8), and may 
be manifested in a variety of ways (outer boxes in figure 8). Moreover, as the overlapping 
circles and multi-directional arrows in figure 8 represent, emergent forms of urban 
violence may be interrelated, and also may affect urban socio-political relations in ways 
that cause other forms of urban violence.  
 
Figure 8: Overlapping and Interconnected Forms of Urban Violence. Source: Based on various sources 
including Moser (2004); Muggah (2012); Beall et al. (2013); Rodgers and O’Neill (2012). 
For example, scholars studying urban violence in divided megacities have demonstrated 
that state policies which result in inequality, exclusion and deprivation are a type of 
violence against urban residents (structural violence), as well as a key underlying factor in 
other forms of urban violence (Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Winton, 2004). In Latin 
American cities, for example, Koonings and Kruijt (2007; 2009), De Souza (2009) and 
Jütersonke et al. (2009) highlight how political abandonment from formal authorities 
opens up space for violent urban actors such as gangs or mafia groups to legitimise 
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themselves as providers of institutional support to otherwise marginalised urban 
residents. In such instances, non-state actors may appropriate legitimacy by developing 
infrastructures such as low cost housing for otherwise ignored populations or by 
providing access to security and justice for the disenfranchised (Budhani et al., 2010; 
Jütersonke et al., 2009; Kooning and Kruijt, 2009). Moreover, evidence from Latin 
American, Middle Eastern and African megacities has suggested that the resulting 
fragmentation of state authority often results in conflict amongst competing state and 
non-state political actors and institutions (Fregonese, 2012; Beall et al., 2013). Ensuing 
contests of control between different actors trying to establish authority further escalate 
urban violence, which may be manifested as politico-institutional violence (Winton, 2004; 
Beall et al., 2013; De Souza, 2009; De Souza, 2014; Muggah, 2012).  
Meanwhile, since this violence usually plays out amongst marginalised communities or in 
places where they interact, reports of violence and crime discursively represent the urban 
poor or particular ethno-racial groups as violent urban actors (Vanderschueren, 1996; 
Caldeira, 2000). As social anxieties amongst urban residents are heightened, empirical 
evidence suggests that powerful urban groups perpetuate socio-political violence by 
organising themselves as vigilante groups, or they may push state authorities to crack 
down on ‘troublesome communities’ (Moser, 2004; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006; Winton, 
2004; Schuberth, 2013; Robins, 2002). In such situations, structural violence ceases to 
simply be a type of violence, as it is also a condition that develops concatenations of 
violence, or what Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) have famously termed chains, 
spirals and mirrors of violence. 
This brief introduction to urban violence illustrates the complex nature of the 
phenomenon, and is therefore suggestive of the difficulty of teasing apart types of urban 
violence in order to establish causalities within particular contexts. Despite this difficulty, 
it is possible to study urban violence (as a category that encompasses political, social, 
institutional, structural and economic violence) through ecological frameworks of 
analysis. Such frameworks review urban violence as a multi-scalar process that is 
contextually produced through socio-political relations at the individual, interpersonal, 
institutional and structural level (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). In effect, ecological 
frameworks of analysis pay attention to the underlying structures of political power and 
urban socio-political relations in megacities (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004, 2006; Scheper-
Huges and Bourgois, 2004; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012). Analysing urban violence 
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through ecological frameworks also reveals that people not only experience violence 
through changes in the underlying structures of power and control, but also through 
differences in their identity position in relation to these changes. In this way, studying the 
interrelationship between structure, identity and agency in cities is an appropriate 
framework of analysis for studying urban violence (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006).  
In light of these frameworks of analysis, it becomes possible for me to consider how the 
widespread proliferation of enclaves in Karachi may be productive of urban violence. To 
do so, it will be important to study how enclaved spaces—as socio-material 
infrastructures—may affect social and political relations in cities. Here, I build on 
Rodgers and O’Neill’s (2012) argument that urban infrastructures are both material 
channels of structural violence and instrumental mediums of urban violence (Rodgers 
and O’Neill, 2012). The authors argue that infrastructures demarcate urban connections 
and disconnections, shape urban circulations and establish literal as well as figurative 
inclusions and exclusions within the city (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012).  
The above-mentioned arguments are based on relational concepts within poststructuralist 
geography, whereby material infrastructures are understood as ecological, agential and 
political processes (Star, 1999; Bennett, 2005; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Graham, 
2010b). Such a conceptualisation reveals the political nature of infrastructures, 
showcasing how infrastructures are agential in shaping urban socio-political relations 
(McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Graham, 2010b). This agential capacity of 
infrastructures in producing urban violence is presented by Rodgers and O’Neill (2012) 
in their introductory chapter in the Ethnography special issue on infrastructural violence 
(volume 13, issue 4), and is further revealed by other authors contributing to the special 
issue. Using empirical examples, various authors illustrate how the development of 
premium infrastructural networks, such as highways or spaces of off-shore extraction, 
operationalises structural violence (Apello, 2012) and socio-political violence (Rodgers, 
2012). Moreover, the authors also highlight that such infrastructures produce unequal 
power-geometries (Massey, 1994; 2005) of connections and disconnections which, in 
turn, generate structural conditions such as inequalities, exclusion, and marginalisation 
(Apello, 2012; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Auyero and de Lara, 2012). As I have 
highlighted earlier through a comprehensive review of literature on urban violence, such 
structural conditions are well known to be productive of various other forms of urban 
violence (Winton, 2004; Muggah, 2012; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006)  
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Taken together, these accounts open up the possibilities of developing causalities 
between enclavisation and urban violence. However, although these accounts are valid 
contributions, they lack one important element in that they still do not reveal the agential 
nature of infrastructures, that is, the ways in which socio-material infrastructures are 
actively responsible for changing the underlying relations of urban governance, power 
and political life. In this project, I aim to establish causalities between urban violence and 
enclavisation by building on these accounts of infrastructural violence. Overall, this is 
firstly to consider enclaves as spaces that are productive of structural inequalities; 
secondly to consider how enclaves are shaped by as well as shape urban socio-political 
relations to create identities of self and other and exacerbate social difference; and thirdly 
to demonstrate that enclaves are agential in skewing urban governance structures so that 
relations of urban power and politics shift in ways that exacerbate urban violence. 
However, as I will briefly outline below, various theoretical and conceptual weaknesses 
within the scholarship on enclaves currently restrict analysis of enclaves as agential 
political spaces that exacerbate inequalities and social difference or change socio-political 
structures in ways that are productive of urban violence. I will highlight these criticisms 
in more detail in the next section. 
Weaknesses in the Conceptualisation of Enclaves as Political Processes 
In this section, I will argue that theoretical gaps in the literature on enclaves 
conspicuously inhibit us from considering the political and processual nature of enclaved 
spaces, and hence from understanding enclaves as spaces that are agential in perpetuating 
urban violence. I will do this by presenting a critique of the literature on residential 
enclaves and enclaved urbanism. My critiques highlight first how methodological 
shortcomings limit generating an in-depth conceptualisation of enclaves, second how 
enclaves are presently theorised as fixed and static urban spaces, third how there is a 
failure to conceptualise enclaves as a variety of urban forms characterised through socio-
political characteristics, and fourth how the North American gated community is used as 
a heuristic device for conceptualising enclaved spaces and for understanding processes of 
enclavisation across a variety of contexts. I present these critiques in more detail below.  
34 
 
Methodological and Conceptual Conundrums  
Firstly, I faced difficulties conceptualising enclaves as agential spaces after realising that 
enclaves are often synecdochically treated as spatial forms that characterise certain 
phenomena without nuanced engagement with theorising enclaves or problematising the 
descriptive features of enclaved spaces. In important contributions to the literature on 
enclaved urbanism, various authors present enclaves as paradigmatic spaces for the study 
of broader phenomena such as the unequal spatialities of globalisation, the politics of 
space, fear of crime or the changing relations of urban governance (Alsayyad and Roy, 
2006; Lemanski, 2007; Caldeira, 2000; Low and Smith, 2006; Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
However, in so doing, these authors start by descriptively characterising enclaved spaces 
as physically fortified and impregnable spaces without problematising enclaves 
conceptually.  
For example, widely cited works by Blakely and Snyder (1997), Marcuse (1997), Low 
(2003) and Caldeira (2000) remain the ground-breaking research which inspires scholars 
working on enclaves across the world. The key characterisations of enclaved spaces 
which these authors have referred to—i.e. fortification, spatial segregation, private 
governance and exclusivity—are taken up by researchers working on various aspects of 
enclaves and enclaved spaces. In sociological accounts of gated enclaves across different 
contexts, authors mostly define such spaces through standardised sets of characteristics 
or simply by processes which denote spatial segregation. For example, researchers either 
define the key features of enclaves and enclaved spaces through their physical form, such 
as gates, walls and security architectures (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Landman, 2000, 
Lemanski, 2004; Falzon, 2004), or they focus on enclaves as spaces that denote socio-
spatial segregation in an environment of insecurity (Dawson, 2006; Lemanski, 2004; 
Rosen and Razin, 2000; Landman, 2006; Coy and Pöhler, 2002). While there are nuanced 
discussions over the political exercise of spatial segregation in enclaved cities (Waldrop, 
2004; Lemanski, 2004), and research on the politics of exception or spatialised 
governmentality in enclaved cities (Diken and Lausten, 2005; Glaszenson and Blandy, 
2006; AlSayyad and Roy, 2006) may be helpful in understanding the political nature of 
enclaved spaces, these accounts still treat enclaves as the backdrops for wider social 
processes and do not analyse how enclaves are processual spaces that are continuously 
shaped through urban socio-political relations, and in turn also shape urban relations. 
35 
 
Therefore, there is little focus on developing a critical agenda for studying enclaves and 
enclaved urbanism. While these are extremely useful contributions in themselves, by not 
problematising ‘enclosure’ as a socio-material exercise that takes place at the points of 
entry to the enclave, and instead taking up an environmentally deterministic view of walls 
and gates, scholars tend to reify enclaves as static spaces. As a result, this treatment has 
created a fixed and static notion of enclaves—as mere backdrops against which social 
relations play out.  
There is therefore a complete neglect of the dynamism that is inherent in enclaved 
spaces. This is something I found especially limiting after reflecting on my fieldwork in 
Karachi, which led me to consider how enclaves take shape in different ways because 
they spatialise varying experiences of citizenship and divergent arrangements of spatial 
governance. I also found that enclaves continue to be shaped through everyday 
interactions with urban processes and urban life, and that the ‘boundaries’ of residential 
enclaves were not always physical, nor were they fixed. Instead, gated enclaves were often 
more ‘open’ than they seemed, while other relatively accessible looking ethnic enclaves 
may become impossible to access at certain times of day or during certain events in the 
city. As I will explain below, this methodological weakness of ignoring urban circulations 
limits analysis by supressing the political agency of enclaved spaces.  
‘Disembeddedness’ and the Neglect of Urban Circulations 
Secondly, the political agency of enclaves is stunted by an over-emphasis on fortification 
and disembeddedness as key features of enclaves, and a disappointing neglect of urban 
circulations. In mainstream urban studies literature, enclaves are primarily defined 
through an environmentally deterministic uptake of physical characteristics, premium 
networked space and spatial bypass and extraterritoriality. In such literature, enclavisation 
is explained through themes such as military urbanism, splintering urban infrastructure, 
urban fragmentation and political exceptionalism in an environment of increasing 
inequality and insecurity (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2010; Atkinson and 
Blandy, 2006; Davis, 1990). Moreover, there is also a strong emphasis on enclaves as 
spaces of political exception, which are organised around the sociology of the ‘camp’ 
(Diken and Lausten, 2005, Alsayyad and Roy, 2006, Agamben, 1998). Taken together, 
these understandings discursively produce meanings of enclaves which emphasise 
political, social, and structural secession from the broader urban fabric. 
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This conceptual weakness has its roots in popular uptakes of the influential accounts of 
residential enclaves provided by Blakely and Snyder’s (1997) concept of gated 
communities and Teresa Caldeira’s (1996) theorisation of fortified enclaves (1996; 2000). 
Blakely and Snyder (1997) describe such enclaves as both old (retrofitted) and new 
residential developments that are privately governed and physically enclosed, while 
subjecting users to rules and regulations that regulate membership. The authors further 
suggest that there are varying types of gated communities which offer either one or a 
combination of functions, such as exclusive lifestyles, prestige or fetishised security. 
Meanwhile, Caldeira uses the term ‘fortified enclave’ to encompass all types of residential 
enclaves which are ‘privatized spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work’ 
(Caldeira, 1996: 303). She describes fortified enclaves as socially homogenous private 
properties for collective use, which ‘cultivate a relationship of rupture and denial with the 
rest of the city and with what can be called a modern style of public space open to free 
circulation’ (Caldeira, 2000: 258).  
In defining these enclaves, Blakely and Snyder (1997) and Caldeira (1996; 2000) therefore 
focuses on segregationist tendencies which are imposed by design. Access is restricted 
through walls, gates and empty spaces that discourage pedestrian circulation. Security is 
buttressed with round the clock private security systems, guards and CCTV cameras that 
control and surveil the area. In divided cities, where such enclaves are located with close 
proximity to marginalised neighbourhoods, these gated communities and fortified 
enclaves are designed as self-sufficient, inward-facing private spaces which offer enough 
amenities to allow withdrawal from the rest of the city. These conceptualisations of 
enclaves have led scholarly engagement with residential enclaves—especially that on 
variations of gated communities across different political and cultural contexts (Hook 
and Vrdoljak, 2002; Landman, 2006; Low, 2001; Falzon, 2004; Pow, 2011). 
This neglect of urban circulations is further perpetuated through analysis of secessionary 
territorial enclaves that are inter-connected with other such enclaves through privatised 
premium infrastructural networks (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Sidaway, 2007). Such 
enclaves create what Graham and Marvin term ‘spatial bypass’, i.e. the potential for some 
to pass seamlessly from one place to the other. Various authors attribute the production 
of elite fortified enclaves in global cities and insecure cities to the networked possibilities 
created through splintering urbanism (De Cauter, 2004; Atkinson, 2008; Rodgers, 2004). For 
example, Rodgers (2004; 2012) presents the case of enclavisation in Nicaragua in an 
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environment of widespread insecurity tied to political and gang violence. Rodgers (2004) 
explains how urban elites are pushed into fortified enclaves and are further 
‘disembedded’ from the city as they live their everyday lives within insular and networked 
enclaves, and that this ‘disembeddedness’ is made possible through processes of 
splintering urbanism (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Similarly, in sociological accounts of 
elite lifestyles, Atkinson and Blandy (2009) describe new emerging forms of enclaves 
which rest on the gated community model, but are instead mobile and not rooted. The 
authors introduce The World, a luxury residential cruise liner which forms a nomadic 
enclave for those wishing to live outside the unpredictable city. Atkinson and Blandy 
(2009) refer to enclaves such as The World as mobile forms of secessionary life, which 
allow the ‘super-affluent’ to live within networked extra-territoriality.  
These descriptions effectively allow us to consider encapsularisation and 
‘disembeddedness’ as key characteristics of enclaved spaces. However, I would argue that 
such an understanding is deeply flawed. Thinking through the example of Karachi’s 
Sheraton hotel, which I presented in the introductory chapter, it becomes obvious how 
these accounts fail to recognise the various circulations, interconnections and interactions 
between labour, goods and infrastructure which are integral for the smooth functioning 
of such hyper-elite networked spaces.  
Consequently, a focus on circulatory life is lost and instead replaced by a static focus on 
urban form. As boundedness emerges as a key signifier of enclaves and enclaved 
urbanism, the enclave as ‘concept’ often becomes very immobile and fixed. This is 
especially so when the meaning of the term ‘enclave’ is fixed through the architectures of 
enclosure, incarceration and securitisation. The processual nature of urban life, 
characterised by a varied range of urban circulations, contestations and negotiation 
between the inside and outside of such enclaves, tends to be overlooked (cf. Simone, 
2009; Fawaz and Akar, 2012; Tanulku, 2013), as does the transient and ever evolving 
nature of dwelling (Hailey, 2009). This neglect of urban circulations not only leads to a 
failure to understand the dynamic and transient nature of enclaves and enclaved spaces, 
but in so failing it supresses the potential for the political nature of enclaved spaces to be 
analysed. As I will highlight further in the next chapter, enclaves are subjectively 
materialised and their degrees of openness and enclosure vary depending on who 
encounters them. Moreover, practices of regulating circulation are inherently political, as 
they are productive of identities of self and other and subjectivities of inside and outside. 
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Addressing this conceptual weakness and ‘unblackboxing’ enclaves therefore helps reveal 
the agential and political nature of urban space. 
Failing to Look Beyond the Gated Enclave  
My third criticism of scholarship on enclaves is that it is dominated by discussions of 
gated enclaves—whether these are gated communities, fortified enclaves or enclosed 
neighbourhoods. As a consequence, scholars contributing to this literature do not 
present analysis of other variants of enclaved spaces—such as ethno-racial enclaves or 
cultural enclaves—as being of a similar type. Instead, other residential enclaves, such as 
squatter settlements, slums and ghettos, are referred to merely as ‘other spaces’ in 
contrast to which gated communities emerge (Lemanski et al., 2008; Le Goix and 
Webster, 2008). Such a treatment tends to discursively produce biases regarding the type 
and function of different enclaves. 
For example, in many cases, Blakely and Snyder’s account of gated enclaves has led the 
discussion on gated communities across the Americas and beyond (Low, 2001; Calderia, 
2000; Waldorp, 2004; Rosen and Razin, 2009). Authors working in the cities of the global 
South use concepts and frameworks developed in this literature for analysing gated 
communities within their local contexts. In these accounts, various kinds of gated 
communities are portrayed by authors as defensive spaces established for elite comfort 
and consumption in response to the unruly and unpredictable ‘outside’ (Falzon, 2004; 
Caldeira, 2000; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Pow, 2011). However, the literature on ethnic 
enclaves in irregular settlements stands in strong contrast. In such contexts, less affluent 
enclaved spaces are widely described as no-go areas, spaces of marginality and 
lawlessness which are beyond the control of the state (Davis, 2002; Rodgers, 2005; 
Yassin, 2010). Instead, I would argue that both enclaves are ‘ordinary’ (Robinson, 2006: 
1), and both equally characterise, as well as emerge in response to, insecurity. 
Moreover, I find that this discursive bias in the literature on enclaves also tends to 
suppress the idea that such enclaves may emerge in response to socio-spatial expulsions 
and political exclusions that are common in enclaved cities. Therefore, failures to look 
beyond the gated community and to other forms of enclaves stunt analysis of enclaves as 
contextually produced political processes and of processes of enclavisation as a political 
activity. Instead, paying attention to gated communities and cultural enclaves across 
different contextual settings will allow us to critically conceptualise enclaves as relational 
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spaces that emerge in response to changing contextual realties of urban planning, 
governance, and socio-politics.  
For example, authors studying enclavisation in cities with stark communal and sectarian 
differences suggest that gated enclaves may emerge to support ethno-racial segregation as 
a means of organising community protection and identity (Chatterjee, 2008; Yassin, 2010; 
Rosen and Razin, 2008). Similarly, authors studying enclosed neighbourhoods suggest 
that these emerge in cities where residents either feel unprotected by the state or mistrust 
the effectiveness of state security (Ploger, 2007; Lemanski, 2004). Such enclaves are 
similar to gated communities as they are physically enclosed in order to restrict access. 
Yet, they differ from gated communities because the roads within these neighbourhoods 
are developed as public property, and often remain public property, serviced by the city 
authorities (Landman, 2006). Ploger (2006) uses examples from Lima to highlight that 
this spatial practice is not limited to the affluent or well off, but is uniform across all 
income groups (Ploger, 2006). In the case of Lima, Ploger highlights how poorer urban 
residents often enclose their neighbourhoods informally in response to the inadequate 
and unequal security provision by the state which makes lower-income groups more 
susceptible to crime and violence (Ploger, 2012). However, the author highlights that in 
order to be successful in creating an enclosure, the neighbourhood has to be socially well 
organised and the community has to have a high degree of social cohesion (Ploger, 2006; 
Ploger, 2012). 
Meanwhile, in violently divided cities there are other variants of enclaves which are hard 
to categorise within the dominant categories of gated communities fortified enclaves or 
enclosed neighbourhoods. This is highlighted by Peteet (2011), who traces complexities 
in defining the spaces of confinement for politically marginalised populations who 
nevertheless occupy a pivotal position in the local economy in Israel/Palestine. The 
resulting space is explained as a de-territorialised mix of ghetto, gulag and enclave, where 
residents are incarcerated but at the same time feel protected from the violence they may 
encounter ‘outside’ (Peteet, 2011). Similarly, ethnic enclaves in Beirut also reflect the 
central role played by inter-ethnic violence in creating ethnically homogenised space. In 
Beirut, enclavisation occurred following the Lebanese civil war between the various 
sectarian communities, which left Beirut divided between Christian and Muslim enclaves 
in the east and west of the city. The ‘enclave’ in this context is defined as socio-political 
and territorial control of a physically demarcated place (Yassin, 2010). It denotes a 
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physical partition through various materials (such as walls, sandbags and buses), 
reinforced by security structures like checkpoints and snipers (Yassin, 2010).  
The cases of Beirut and Israel/Palestine demonstrate how enclaves may also emerge 
through violent means of homogenising space. However, not all ethnic enclaves might 
emerge this way. Literature on informal settlements and slum housing demonstrates that 
homogenous enclaves within low-income settlements emerge in response to a lack of 
state support in accommodating poor urban migrants (Dupont, 2011). As I will show in 
the second part of this thesis, such enclaves also exist in Karachi, whereby urban life is 
often mediated through community and kinship ties. New immigrants to the city rely on 
kinship networks to operate in and integrate into the city, or simply live together to 
benefit from the social capital of cultural cohesion (Nijman, 2010; Gazdar, 2005; Budhani 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, as I will further elaborate in the next section, processes of 
migrant settlement may often legitimise non-state actors and may empower them in ways 
that may threaten state interests (Fregonese, 2012). Such ethnic enclaves may therefore 
spatialise alternative systems of governance and authority (Fregonese, 2012; Yassin, 
2010). Although such enclaves may not be strictly gated or bounded, they become 
apparent and distinct through the collective cultural practices of the community or 
through political cohesion (Sharma, 2003; Chatterjee, 2008). The socio-spatial form of 
such enclaves allows key community leaders to exercise extreme forms of social control 
over residents, particularly women and minorities (Khan, 2007; Nijman, 2010).  
The above examples show that moving away from the heuristic of gated community as a 
form of enclaved space forces us to look beyond physical form and broaden our 
conceptual focus on enclaves. In addition, paying attention to alternative forms of 
enclaves also opens up space to think about how such enclaves may affect urban 
relations and urban politics in potentially violent ways. 
Flattening Out Enclaves and Resulting Analytical Losses 
My fourth criticism of present scholarship is related to my previous argument. It rests on 
the suggestion that the current literature on enclaves and enclaved urbanism relies too 
heavily on concepts and themes identified through a study of enclaves in cities of the 
global North (see for example Glasze et al., 2006; Le Goix and Webster, 2008; Lemanski 
et al., 2008). This literature on gated enclaves in cities of the global South often uses the 
North American ‘gated community’ as a heuristic device for studying the production of 
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enclaved spaces, the politics of space in residential enclaves and urban socio-political 
relations in an enclaved urbanism across a wide range of cities and subject areas. 
However, I argue that this focus flattens out the contextual nuances of enclavisation, and 
fails to consider enclaves as spaces that are produced through multi-scalar and relational 
processes. This failure results in analytical limitations for studying the politics of enclaved 
urbanism, or enclavisation and urban violence as relational processes. 
In particular, present conceptualisations of enclaved and enclaved spaces presented me 
with difficulties in analysing Karachi’s enclaves. I was left wishing for a more suitable 
framework through which I could capture enclaves as relational to contemporary and 
historical processes of urbanism and urban politics in Karachi, where, similarly to many 
other cities of the global South, the realm of urban planning and governance is 
splintered, negotiated and contested (Shatkin, 2014; Watson, 2009). As I will highlight in 
more detail in Chapter 4, in Karachi, urban spatial development and socio-spatial 
relations are assembled through intersections of contemporary and historical processes 
of urbanism. These are linked to the city’s postcolonial history of uneven infrastructural 
development, the prevalence of informality as a mode of governance, ethnic diversity and 
rapid population growth, the culture of political clientelism and the fragmented nature of 
state-power (see for e.g. Hasan, 2004; Gayer, 2014; Budhani et al., 2010). Furthermore, as 
I will explain in detail in Chapter 4, by focusing on these contextual and relational 
processes of enclavisation, it will become possible to consider that enclaved spaces are 
produced through particular modalities of state power, through changing rationalities of 
governance in postcolonial cities and through the interplay of structural conditions and 
local cultural and socio-political relations. As a result, by conceptualising enclaves as 
topological processes it may become possible to consider the agential and geopolitical 
nature of residential enclaves.  
In conclusion, then, the critiques presented in this section reveal the need to develop a 
project that presents a clearer conceptualisation of enclaved spaces. Moving beyond 
physical features as defining characteristics, such a conceptualisation should rest on the 
multiple processes through which enclosure is enacted and performed. More importantly, 
it should reflect the varied cultural histories, state spatialisations and planning histories of 
postcolonial cities of the global South. Equally significantly, a critical conceptualisation of 
enclaved spaces needs to attend to urban circulations. It needs to pay attention to the 
porosity and continuous interconnections between enclaves and the city ‘outside’. 
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Conceived this way, enclaved spaces would be understood through various characteristics 
including and not limited to urban form. The resulting enclaves would be considered 
dynamic, contested, differentiated, and relational processes. In the next chapter, I will 
take up the project of conceptualising enclaves in this manner. But first, in the next 
section I will review the arguments made in this section in relation to the earlier 
elaborated literature on urban violence in order to show how it is possible to establish 
causalities between enclaves and urban violence. 
Enclaves, Enclaved Urbanism, and Urban Violence: Possibilities of Establishing 
Causality 
As I have highlighted throughout this chapter, although various authors detail the politics 
of space in enclaved urban forms, the existing discourse on enclaves and enclaved cities 
does not adequately address urban violence as a consequence of enclave creation in cities 
of the global South (Low and Smith, 2006; Burgess, 2010; Glasze et al., 2006). Empirical 
accounts referring to continuing crime and violence in enclaved spaces remain focused 
on explaining conflict as a result of tensions in public space and displacement of crime 
(Lemanski, 2004; Breetzke, Landman and Cohn, 2014) without elaborating how urban 
conflict and violence is an outcome of changes in underlying structures of power and 
politics in an enclaved urbanism, or a reflection of the political agency of enclaves.  
Furthermore, throughout the critical review of literature in the earlier section, I have 
argued that scholars working on enclaves and enclaved urbanism could suggest a more 
powerful connection between enclavisation and violence by elaborating the agential 
nature of enclavisation in shaping power, politics and patterns of governance as well as 
social relations in enclaved cities. In this regard, discourse on enclaved urbanism could be 
enriched from empirical evidence from violent megacities of the global South. If patterns 
and processes of enclavisation are paid attention to, it will become much easier to 
develop a relational understanding of enclaves and violence.  
This argument can be elaborated with reference to empirical details presented in two 
books edited by Koonings and Kruijt: Fractured Cities: Social exclusion, urban violence 
and contested spaces in Latin America and Megacities: The politics of urban exclusion 
and violence in the global south. The various contributors to Fractured Cities and 
Megacities pay attention to conditions of criminality in favelas and slums in relation to 
institutional and governmental failures in a context of growing urban insecurity. The 
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authors outline that state failures to provide urban residents with security opens up space 
for armed actors and violence brokers to establish power and authority (Koonings and 
Kruijt, 2007; Moser, 2009; Rodgers, 2007). Meanwhile, the absence of effective systems 
of policing and justice push affluent and poor urban residents into supporting vigilante 
systems of policing and justice (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007a; Pansters and Berthier, 2007; 
Mcllwaine and Moser, 2007). In such cities, fear of crime and violence pushes urban 
residents into various forms of fortified enclaves, whether these are no-go areas which 
keep out repressive and corrupt state security forces or elite fortified enclaves which 
create distance from the feral city outside (Rodgers, 2009; McIlwaine and Moser, 2007). 
In effect, the emerging fractured urban landscape spatialises contested state power, 
marginality and fear of crime and violence (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007a). 
In these accounts of violently divided cities, the above-mentioned scholars frequently 
draw attention to the fragmentation of the cityscape into segregated territorialised spaces 
(Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; 2007). The authors make reference to violence as an 
outcome of changing governance structures and political processes that emerge to 
uphold privately secured neighbourhoods—whether these are favelas, slums, or gated 
communities (Kruijt and Degregori, 2007; Kruijt and Koonings, 2007). However, they 
fail to analyse how the production of enclaved spaces in particular mediates urban socio-
political relations through these structures in ways that perpetuate urban violence. 
Treating enclaves as socio-material processes that spatialise order and governmentality 
could make it possible for us to fill this analytical gap and consider how privately 
governed spaces could restructure urban power and politics in ways that may be 
productive of political and institutional violence. For example, various scholars have 
already paid attention to ways in which the deregulation of urban security governance 
may legitimise forms of vigilante justice or create groups that may challenge state 
authority in potentially violent ways (Fregonese, 2012; Schuberth, 2013; Benit-Gbaffou, 
2008a). 
Meanwhile, it is also possible to consider causalities between enclavisation and urban 
violence if we consider how micro-level processes of enclavisation build up to affect 
wider political and socio-economic power structures. For example, as I will highlight in 
the next chapter, by conceptualising enclaves as osmotic spaces that are performatively 
produced through repetitive processes of bordering, it may become possible to consider 
how processes of enclavisation are productive of identities of self and other. Such 
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processes of enclavisation may therefore establish identities of criminality, or they may 
racialise certain populations as dangerous in ways that encourage ethnic and communal 
violence. Furthermore, such on-going processes of enclavisation also discursively 
produce identities of place in enclaved spaces, and enclaves may become known as socio-
politically homogenous spaces. In such instances, enclaves may also become the targets 
of ethno-political or state violence in violently divided cities (Chatterjee, 2008; Thomas, 
2000). 
Furthermore, focusing on the processes of creating enclaves and macro-processes of 
enclavisation, it becomes possible to understand how, as spaces that instantiate 
inside/outside relations, enclaves could be agential in exacerbating urban marginality and 
social difference, and hence structural violence. Returning to the concepts and theories 
outlined in the first section of this chapter, various scholars have argued that such 
manifestations of violence are not isolated or containable. Instead, urban violence occurs 
in chains and spirals. Therefore, as a process that triggers various types of urban violence 
it may be possible to study enclavisation as being productive of chains and spirals of 
violence in various ways across different contexts. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have expanded on my argument that present scholarship on enclaves 
and enclaved urbanism does not adequately interrogate urban violence as a continuum 
tied to enclavisation. After describing urban violence as a multi-scalar process that is 
contextually produced through socio-political relations at the individual, interpersonal, 
institutional and structural level (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006), I have argued that present 
conceptualisations of enclaves hinder us in considering enclaves as spaces that actively 
perpetuate urban violence. In order to support this argument, I have highlighted how the 
political agency of enclaved spaces is supressed by present methodological, conceptual 
and empirical shortcomings in scholarship on enclaves. In the process of this critique, I 
have presented potential ways in which enclaves could be understood as agential political 
spaces, and the related possibilities of establishing causalities between enclaves and urban 
violence. However, I have argued that in order to study enclaves as agential spaces that 
perpetuate urban violence, it is imperative to re-conceptualise enclaves as relational 
socio-material processes that are continuously in the making, and that are both shaped by 
as well as shape urban socio-political relations. With this in mind, in the next chapter I 
will turn to the conceptualisation of enclaves as relational processes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUALISING ENCLAVES AS RELATIONAL PROCESSES 
In the previous chapter, I outlined that theoretical gaps in current scholarship on 
enclaves prevent us from developing a critical understanding of enclaves as spaces that 
interact with wider urban processes. I have argued that in order to analyse how enclaves 
may be productive of urban violence, it is therefore essential to reconceptualise enclaves 
as relational and socio-material spaces that take shape from governmental and political 
processes, while also influencing relations of urban governance and socio-politics. With 
this in mind, in this chapter I will reconceptualise enclaves. Using poststructuralist 
theories of relational space, discourse and performativity, I will explain how enclaves are 
dynamic and agential spaces, made up of relations between human and non-human 
actants.  
The first step for reconceptualising enclaves is to explain the site of enclaves, i.e. the 
‘place’. In the first section, I will therefore start by introducing relational theories of 
space, before moving on in the second section to explain how I will apply relational 
theories to conceptualise enclaves as complex socio-spatial assemblages of form, 
function and action. In the third section, I will use this theoretical framework to 
elaborate how enclaves assemble as fluid, negotiated, contested, political and relational 
processes. To do this, I will outline the various processes, relations and materials through 
which enclaves are assembled, spatialised and materialised, and with what political 
effects. These include processes of governing circulation, discursive practices of security 
and enclosure, political processes of bordering, and multi-scalar relations of urban 
governance. Building on this, in the final section, I will present my argument that 
enclaves are processual spaces that restructure urban socio-political relations and state-
society relations. I will conclude by arguing that considering enclaves as relational 
processes makes it possible to understand how enclaves are geopolitical spaces that are 
productive of urban violence in extremely polarised cities. 
Theorising Relational ‘Enclaved Space’  
The starting point for re-conceptualising enclaves is to develop an onto-methodological 
understanding of enclaved space as relational space. Such a view stems from the idea that 
space only exists in relation to the objects, events, and processes that define it (Harvey, 
1996). Within this context, place formation—which is the physical and material 
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experience of temporal and spatial ordering—is a ‘permanence’ within the flow of 
processes that create space (Harvey, 1996). Harvey elaborates that such permanences are 
temporal in nature, and are replaced when new relations form. This idea is taken further 
by Graham and Healey (1999), who explain that space exists through relations amongst 
the objects it contains, reflecting their variations over time. Thus, space is ‘relational’ 
because it stems from the relations produced by objects, events and processes stretched 
across various temporal and spatial scales. The resulting landscape is conceptualised as a 
multiple and heterogeneous time-space process, wherein diverse spatio-temporalities 
coexist (Amin and Graham, 1999; Massey, Allen and Pile, 1999). Massey further 
elaborates the notion of relational space by defining space as a product of interrelations: 
‘as constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately 
tiny’ (Massey, 2005: 9). Secondly, she explains space as being characterised by 
multiplicity: ‘as the sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist; as the sphere therefore of 
coexisting heterogeneity’ (Massey, 2005: 9). And lastly, she contends that space is always 
under construction: ‘it is always in the process of being made. It is never finished; never 
closed’ (Massey, 2005: 9).  
In this context, considering enclaves as relational spaces would require elaborating how 
they are produced though ongoing multi-scalar processes. Such processes include 
broader institutional, socio-economic and socio-political processes of place-making (such 
as uneven urban infrastructural development, changing ethnic and class relations, 
fragmentation of governmental authority) and ongoing relations between and amongst 
urban residents, urban governors, enclave residents, workers and managers of enclaved 
spaces. Conceptualising enclaves as spaces that are produced through these micro and 
macro processes of place-making will allow for a holistic view of enclaved space as a 
temporal permanence which exists within a dynamic social, economic, political and 
institutional context. Moreover, it will allow us to consider how enclaves take shape in 
ways that are subjective to those encountering it, and therefore understand that enclaved 
spaces are mutable as well as transformative. 
Therefore, moving away from notions of space as a static container and towards a 
relational understanding of space as a product of sets of relationships opens up room to 
conceive the political nature of space as an arena within which power is distributed. In 
this vein, poststructuralist theorists highlight that understanding space relationally allows 
us to consider the play of power and politics in urban spaces. Given that ‘permanences’ 
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develop through some interactions and not others, it is possible to suggest that the shape 
of place or resulting space emerges through a particular arrangement of multi-scalar socio-
spatial and socio-political relations. In this way, the production of relational space 
involves either alignments between sets of relations or exclusions and rejections of sets 
of multi-scalar relations (Murdoch, 2006). Such arrangements are in turn generative of 
further inequalities and contestations. For example, Amin and Graham (1999) highlight 
how emerging interactions and interrelations in one place cause various connections and 
disconnections elsewhere. 
This understanding illustrates how particular spatial arrangements are entangled with 
relations of power. Massey (1991) develops this argument further, outlining that when 
socio-spatial and socio-political relations meet in space, they produce power-geometries. 
She argues that:  
Different social groups and individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows 
and interconnections. This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who doesn’t, 
although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation to the flows and 
the movement. Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated 
mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, 
others don’t; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned 
by it (Massey, 1991: 25–6). 
Given these guiding concepts of relational space, understanding enclaved spaces as 
relational would allow us to tune into the inherent interconnectedness of urban enclaves 
with the other spaces, actors, and events in the city. This conceptualisation therefore 
holds promise for un-blackboxing spatial arrangements of power, politics and identity 
within enclaved spaces and understanding how these project outwards to the rest of the 
city. Moreover, considering urban enclaves as ‘permanences’ that emerge from the 
interactions of wider urban processes such as security, governance, politics and 
circulation forces us to consider enclaves as temporal processes which are dynamic and 
constantly in flux. I will elaborate this in more detail below. 
Assemblages as a Suitable Analytic to Study Relational Enclaves 
From the various (and often contradictory) relational theories that now pepper the 
landscape of geography and urban studies (Jacobs, 2012; Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane 
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and Swanton, 2013), I have chosen to approach relational enclaves through the concept 
of assemblages. In its simplest sense, the concept of ‘assemblage’ comes from the idea 
that the social world is not rooted in a fixed or stable ontology, but rather is constituted 
through a complex mosaic of configurations, which in turn play a role in shaping other 
configurations (Law, 2004; DeLanda, 2006; Bennet, 2010). Stemming from a rough 
translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘agencement’, assemblage is a 
combination of arrangement and agency (Palmas, 2007). In her ground-breaking work 
describing the agency of the electricity grid during the North American blackout, Bennett 
(2005) describes an assemblage as an anti-structural, historic, circumstantial and ad-hoc 
emergence that is decentred, temporal, topographical and continuously in flux. She 
further explains that it is both materially and discursively constructed, and is made up of 
both human and non-human actants (Bennet, 2005). 
The concept of assemblage is currently gaining popularity in geography and critical urban 
studies for its ability to trace processes of socio-material transformations by grasping the 
multiple, relational and processual nature of urban space (McFarlane, 2011a; Anderson 
and McFarlane, 2011). The oft-cited debates on urban assemblages throughout various 
issues of the journals City and Area (McFarlane 2011a; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011) 
demonstrate the multiple (and sometimes contradictory) applications of assemblage 
theory as either descriptor or concept or ethos of engagement. Despite the novelty of 
these applications and their uses, the concept of assemblage has been criticised for being 
too broadly framed and hence indeterminable (Brenner et al., 2011). Its use as an idea, 
concept, imaginary, process, orientation, methodology etc. is critiqued for reducing its 
capability as a focused theory (Brenner et al., 2011; Jacobs, 2012).  
However, I would argue that this open-to-interpretation quality of the concept is 
advantageous. The concept allows us to grasp the meaning of objects of analysis, as well 
as providing us with a lens to analyse otherwise complex processes. Therefore, I will not 
add more arguments to the debate, but instead will position myself within the debate as 
someone who uses the concept of assemblage primarily as an ‘ethos of engagement’ 
(Anderson et al., 2012: 175) to study complex urban processes. According to Anderson 
et al. (2012), assemblage as ethos firstly ‘attends to the messiness and complexity of the 
phenomenon’ (175), secondly, it offers a way into studying an open ended, process based 
understanding of a complex phenomenon. And finally, assemblage as an ethos of 
engagement is oriented towards the instability of interactions (Anderson et al., 2012. 
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Given these ideas, I find the concept of assemblage to be useful for unpacking as well as 
for becoming attuned to the complex, varied and dynamic nature of enclaves. As I have 
outlined in the previous chapter, this will be essential for studying Karachi’s enclaves as 
self-perpetuating spaces that are both consequences and causes of urban violence. 
In this sense, thinking enclaves through assemblages allows me to capture a sense of 
structure/order, as well as a notion of movement/agency that emerges from such an 
order. This provides a way to examine the intermingling of heterogeneous actors, 
materials and agencies; but also the various forms of actions that result from this. For 
example, in the case of Karachi’s enclaves, I found that using the analytic of assemblages 
allowed me to highlight how enclaves in Karachi are related to the history of urban 
spatial development, the contemporary crisis of security and infrastructure and 
differentiated forms of urban citizenship. At the same time, by investigating as 
assemblages the various parts that make up Karachi’s enclaves, I am able to understand 
how each enclave emerges as a unique assemblage of social interactions, material 
infrastructures, performative discourses and political space. Finally, in attuning to this I 
am able to unravel the agential and political capacity of enclaves as assemblages. I will 
expand on the advantages of conceptualising enclaves through assemblages in more 
detail below. 
Conceptualising Enclaves through the Concept of Assemblages 
Firstly, thinking of enclaves through assemblages allows me to advance a 
conceptualisation of enclaves that is topological, i.e. constituted by relations that are 
natural and social rather than nested in territorial or geometric structures (Murdoch, 
2005; Amin, 2002). So, for example, the concept of assemblages would help me review 
the production of enclaved space through the lens of various historical and 
contemporary processes of spatial segregation which may be tied to conditions such as 
globalisation, re-scaled state power, transnational capital and culture, crises of governance 
and increasing social difference. Moreover, in necessarily reviewing spaces as topological, 
the concept of assemblages allows a relational notion of power to be developed. For 
example, Allen and Cochrane (2010: 1073) suggest that ‘topological thinking suggests 
that the powers of the state are not so much “above us” as more or less present through 
mediated and real-time connections, some direct, others more distanciated’. Applying this 
practice to understand enclaves would therefore mean looking beyond territory and form 
to include the intermingling of wider temporal and spatial scales with everyday practices 
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that create and recreate enclaves, and to consider how such practices shape relations of 
urban power and politics. This conceptualisation will allow me to move beyond 
environmental determinist accounts of enclavisation and instead comprehend enclaves as 
materialisations of inside/outside relationships based on discourses and performativity, 
political processes, imaginative geographies, subjectivities, identities and institutional 
structures. 
Secondly, conceiving enclaves as socio-material assemblages allows me to think of them 
as constellations of everyday social and political relations and sets of performative 
practices which combine to discursively produce the enclave as a restricted and exclusive 
space. Enclaves can thus be thought of as discursively produced spaces where discourse 
can be understood as ‘a specific series of representations and practices through which 
meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political 
and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’ (Bialasiewics et al., 2007: 406). The 
concept of assemblage is especially useful in considering enclaves as discursively 
produced spaces, because it offers a way of thinking beyond the separation of material 
and discursive realms, and allows us to consider how meaning and matter may be co-
constituted (Aradau et al., 2014). This leads us to believe that repetitive representations 
of enclosure and security through various socio-political and socio-material practices may 
stabilise over time to performatively produce enclosure (Bialasiewics et al., 2007). While I 
will elaborate this in more detail in the next section, in this brief section, I want to simply 
suggest that a focus on assemblages makes it possible to consider that enclaves become 
apparent through the everyday political arrangements, meanings, identities, and social 
relations that emerge from everyday (discursive) practices such as rules of conduct, 
visuality of barriers and gates, narratives of risk for ‘outsiders’, wall markings/notices etc. 
The focus on the ‘everyday’ is also equally significant as ordinary enactments that are 
contingent to context help shape ideas such as place, power, subjectivity, identity, and 
resistance (Anderson and Harrison, 2010). 
Thirdly, thinking of enclaves through assemblages would draw attention to how enclaved 
spaces are characterised by flux. Flux here connotes a sense of constant change. This 
stems from the idea in non-representation theory that humans interact with their 
environment through a constant relation of modification and reciprocity, and ‘action’ is a 
relational phenomenon that loops back as interaction (Anderson and Harrison, 2010). 
Thus, the physical space of enclaves (i.e. their environment, built form and borders), and 
52 
 
the materialisations of social space (i.e. the notion of insider/outsider, safety/threat, 
friend/enemy) all interact together in various ways to produce and reproduce enclaved 
space in various manifestations and forms. Enclaves therefore remain continuously in a 
state of becoming, or as the title of this PhD suggests, in process.  
For example, as I will elaborate in more detail in Chapter 7, in the gated communities I 
visited in Karachi I found that the gates were usually open during the day, when guards 
filtered circulation. While residents were allowed through based on stickers on cars, 
visitors were screened through practices of profiling. Yet, in doing this, guards were 
often found responding to the gender and class positions of visitors. Similarly, in 
enclosed neighbourhoods, street closures that enclosed whole streets provided security to 
all lane residents. However, not all lane residents were ‘members’, because a few did not 
regularly pay the Residents Association managing enclosure their membership dues. Such 
‘non-members’ were often excluded by other practices such as refusal of help for solving 
municipal problems etc. Therefore, it was evident that everyday practices of living 
combined with external conditions that surround enclaved space constantly mediate to 
shift the status quo. The heterogeneity of identities of residents is a significant source of 
this change. It is their everyday practices of living in and performing enclaved space on 
one hand; being subjugated while subjugating ‘others’ on the other hand, which means 
that enclaved spaces remain in a flux rather than being static.  
Finally, conceptualising enclaves as socio-political and socio-material assemblages will 
allow me to consider them to have agency over urban socio-political relations. Given that 
the whole is considered greater than the sum of its parts, and thinking of the ways in 
which the infrastructures, social relations and discursive practices which combine to 
create enclaves may interact to produce political and structural inequalities and 
marginality, we are forced to consider how enclaves as assemblages can shape urban 
politics and social relations in potentially violent ways. Therefore, as I will explain in 
more detail in the final section below (and in Chapters 4 and 8), such a conceptualisation 
will demonstrate that enclaves are geopolitical actors that discipline populations and 
reconfigure power and politics in the city in violent ways, and with violent outcomes. 
Having explained how using the concept of assemblages is helpful for theorising 
enclaved spaces, in the next section I will focus on the processes, physical and non-
physical characteristics, and socio-political relations through which enclaves come into 
being. 
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Assembling Enclaves as Socio-Material Processes 
In this section, I will specifically outline the processes, relations and materials through 
which enclaves are assembled, spatialised and materialised. I demonstrate firstly that 
enclaves materialise processes of governing circulation and as such exist along a spectrum 
of openness and enclosure; secondly that enclaves are performative spaces that are 
discursively produced; thirdly, that enclaves are spaces of subjectivities that produce 
notions of inclusion and exclusion; and fourthly, that enclaves spatialise a sociology of 
exception and operate through high degrees of social control. Together, these dynamics 
combine to highlight how enclaves are complex socio-material processes which are 
inextricably tied to political relations of governance, power, subjectification and 
difference. 
Enclaves as Fluid and Osmotic Assemblages: Materialising Processes of 
Governing Circulation 
Firstly, I will suggest that that enclaves materialise through the socio-spatial and political 
processes which govern circulation. Therefore, rather than keeping the focus on physical 
boundaries as key identifying features of enclaved space, it becomes possible to identify 
enclaves through patterns of circulation. Un-bounded enclaves may thus be identifiable 
when a number of passage points become visible where mobility and immobility is 
negotiated. This focus on negotiable passage points also opens up space to understand 
that enclaves are fluid spaces that are characterised by varying degrees of openness and 
enclosure.  
According to Aradau and Blanke (2010), contemporary practices of securing populations 
through managing circulation have their precedents in changes in town planning in the 
eighteenth century. Foucault (2009) outlined that the central problem for governance of 
the open city was that of ‘organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, 
making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good 
circulation by diminishing the bad’ (Foucault, 2009: 18). Foucault further describes 
security as a practice that emerged within this milieu when governors were tasked with 
ensuring the smooth running of social, economic and political life while reducing 
dispersed threats entering and circulating in the city. As the literature on global politics 
demonstrates, circulation is once again a central problem in governing security. Today, 
various kinds of enclaves (residential, commercial, and biopolitical) are becoming 
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common forms of organising urban life in an increasingly open and interconnected 
world, one that remains characterised by uncertainty and insecurity (Reid, 2006; Bauman, 
2000; Appadurai, 1996; Turner, 2010). 
In this context, emerging enclaves exist as spaces that govern circulations in an 
increasingly interconnected world where borders are de-territorialised. However, Shamir 
(2005) names the current framework of governing circulation as ‘the global mobility 
regime’, explaining that this is premised on a paradigm of suspicion and actively and 
systematically seeks to contain social movement within and across borders in order to 
facilitate globalisation. Replicating physical state borders, various authors find that 
logistical enclaves, airports and check posts become essential passage points for this 
global mobility regime (Shamir, 2005; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Turner, 2010). 
Yet, sociological critique of this global mobility regime suggests that it cannot be 
conceived without paying attention to the temporal ‘moorings’ that accompany mobilities 
(Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006). Here, ghettos, gated communities, prisons, asylum 
detention centres and refugee camps are listed as various types of moorings (Shamir, 
2005; Turner, 2010). Such moorings are a spatial by-product of a ‘paradigm of suspicion’, 
which uses various technologies and risk assessment techniques to regulate circulation 
within a contained environment, or to contain risky elements within spaces of 
consumption (Shamir, 2005; Turner, 2010). In these spaces, authors outline how controls 
over free circulation are enacted through regulatory systems such as ID cards, entry 
passes, profiling etc.  
However, I would argue that in order to regulate circulation, enclaves do not necessarily 
have to be physically enclosed or fortified. It is possible to replicate features of discipline, 
security and immobility in such spaces without heavy emphasis on walls and gates. For 
example, Bottomley and Moore (2007) suggest that contemporary advances in 
architectural practices and security technologies mean that discipline and social control 
can be organised through diffused and dematerialised processes. This leads the authors to 
suggest that in the fortressed city governance can shift focus from walls to membranes. 
The very word membrane is used by Bottomley and Moore (2007) to emphasise the 
osmotic nature of the boundaries of such fortressed spaces: the virtual fortress is 
described as a temporary and mobile structure, which can be switched on and off to 
discriminate between the friend and enemy. This is made possible through supporting 
technologies of identification such as biometric border technologies that recognise whom 
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to allow entry into the country and whom to deny it. Or in the case of enclaved spaces, 
this could translate to resident ID cards that determine inclusion in enclaved spaces 
(Tawil-Souri, 2012).  
These interdisciplinary accounts are useful to add variety to dominant interpretations of 
enclaves which focus on their enclosed, fixed, static nature. By understanding enclaves as 
paradoxical spaces of fixity and mobility, it becomes possible to consider that residential 
enclaves have varying degrees of openness and closure. Such a conceptualisation will help 
us overcome the analytical limitations posed through the current literature on gated 
communities (Caldeira, 1996; Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003), which essentialises the 
impregnable walls of the enclave and therefore ignores the negotiated nature of enclave 
boundaries and the permeability of walls. Moreover, blackboxing the continuous and on-
going processes of enclosure in such spaces de-politicises enclaves, shifting attention 
away from the politics of security and bordering within enclaved spaces. In the next 
section, I will pay detailed attention to the various processes and practices that converge 
to ‘assemble’ enclaves, and in so doing, I will delve into the political and agential nature 
of enclave infrastructures. 
Enclaves as Performative Spaces: Discursively Formed and Productive of 
Identities  
In the previous section, I established that enclaves materialise processes of governing 
circulation and, as a result have osmotic borders. In this section, I build on this 
conceptualisation of enclaves as fluid and dynamic spaces while shedding light on the 
materiality of enclaves. Here, I move forward from my earlier critique of the over-
emphasis on physical fortification and boundedness as a key feature of residential 
enclaves, and build on the argument introduced in the previous chapter that enclaves are 
discursively and performatively materialised through processes of securitisation and 
bordering and practices of differentiation.  
Performativity in particular is the construction of an identity that is contextual, 
fragmented and continually constructed. The concept of performativity is taken from 
Judith Butler, who outlines the way in which gender identity congeals over time through 
repetitive enactments, bodily gestures and movements that are structured within 
regulatory frameworks (1990; 1993). Thus, Butler theorises gender as a form of identity 
that is not a ‘being’, but rather is a ‘doing’. However, this ‘doing’ exists within a 
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regulatory framework which has assigned certain actions to a particular gender. For 
example, Butler describes ‘girling’ as a process that reiterates performances of action, 
behaviour, costume and features that are commonly associated with female. Moreover, 
these performances are recognisable as those of ‘girling’ through discourses generated by 
various institutions within the regulatory framework, such as the medical sciences, which 
biologically define male and female, or other state institutions such as marriage laws that 
categorise subjects into male and female. The theory of performativity places primacy on 
discourse as the space within which subject formation takes place. Discourses are 
therefore said to be performative: they open up the realm of materialisation. In this way, 
discourses are also mediums—spatial, visual, or linguistic—through which personhood is 
embodied, identities take shape or subject positions can be negotiated. 
Butler’s concept of performativity is important for theorising enclaved spaces for two 
main reasons. Firstly because it opens up a framework within which to consider how 
enclaves may take shape through discursive practices. For example, the stylised 
performances of processes of enclavisation—such as laying down architectures that 
represent fortressed spaces (gates, walls, surveillance cameras, barbed wires), and 
enacting border control practices (checking of visitors’ ID cards, issuing entry stickers to 
members)—exist within a regulatory framework which recognises such repetitive acts as 
those of enacting a border, and hence of filtering circulation. Through these acts, we can 
argue that the gated enclave is discursively created as an exclusive space. In the case of 
architecturally ‘open’ ethnic enclaves or no-go areas in irregular settlements, instead of 
these visible architectures of security and walling in, other repetitive visual and linguistic 
acts help mark territories as exclusive enclaves. These may include for example political 
graffiti on walls and flags displaying sectarian and ethno-political affiliations on house 
tops. These symbols combine to produce identities of such places as sanctuaries for 
ethno-political or sectarian groups, which may not be as welcoming or open to others. In 
some cases, signs warning outsiders to steer clear or outright intimidation towards 
outsiders also produce such spaces as enclaves. These couple with media representations 
of danger and violence affiliated with certain ethno-political or sectarian groups or 
certain classes. Therefore, the concept of performativity helps us to consider how 
repeated practices and processes that generate discourses of identity, homogeneity and 
securitisation coalesce over time to performatively produce exclusive spaces which may 
have visible or invisible walls, gates and boundaries. In such instances, enclaves become 
apparent at crossing points or at the instantiation of inside/outside dichotomies. 
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Secondly, and following from this, the concept of performativity also helps reveal the 
politics of identity and subjectivity in discursively produced enclaves. It helps unpack 
how the processes through which enclaves emerge as exclusive spaces may be generative 
of identities of self and other, and of political subjectivities. Using performativity as a lens 
therefore widens our scope to understand the political functions that accompany 
bordering practices and boundary making processes in enclaved spaces. However, as 
Butler (1993) explains, the fact that effects are produced through repeated iterations and 
citational practices shows that there is no singular moment in which subjects are created. 
Instead, the repeated stylisations of exclusivity may coalesce over time to produce 
identities of place, as well as produce those excluded from such places as the unwanted 
and undesirable. As I will elaborate in Chapter 8, over time such activities may be 
productive of the racialisation and criminalisation of certain populations, which may also 
render certain enclaved spaces as targets of terror or police repression. In this vein, 
Butler’s concept of performativity has been applied in critical geography and cultural 
studies when weaving together the notions of space, place and identity (Nelson, 1999; 
Keith and Pile, 1993; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992), and in international politics by scholars 
who study the spaces of performative security (Campbell, 1998; Bialasiewics et al., 2007; 
Aradau, 2010; Weber, 1998). Moreover, the theory is also increasingly popular in 
theorising borders and bordering practices and security practices in Critical Border 
Studies (Tawil-Souri, 2012; Johnson et al., 2011).  
The concept of performativity is therefore important for our discussion of enclaves for 
three reasons. In the first instance, it draws attention to the fact that enclave borders are 
discursively produced. This is helpful in bringing to light how everyday practices of 
security and exclusivity in enclaved spaces are enacted through repeated performances, 
and hence performativity creates the geography of enclaves. Related to this, and 
secondly, when read through bordering practices, performativity draws attention to the 
political implications of enclavisation as a process that creates subjectivities of inside and 
outside, of self and other, and is generative of identities of place and people. Lastly, 
performativity generates a more fluid and dynamic theorisation of enclaves. As explained 
previously, the notion of boundaries being fluid, shifting and osmotic is best captured 
within the essence of performativity. Similarly, the shifting subject position and blurring 
identity between inside/outside are also best captured by performativity. Such notions 
help move towards a processual understanding of enclaved spaces, while opening up 
58 
 
space for considering enclaves as agential spaces that restructure urban socio-political 
relations in potentially violent ways. 
However, although the concept of performativity is useful in locating and unpacking the 
boundary/border of enclaves, we are still left with fundamental questions about what the 
border looks like, where it is located, who creates it, who operates it and how it 
restructures socio-political relations at various spatial scales, both within and beyond the 
city. In critical border studies, these questions are answered innovatively through an 
analysis of subjectivity and identity. Although most of this literature is focused on 
sovereign national borders, it still provides extremely relevant concepts for analysis of 
intra-urban borders and for understanding how these are distributed within an enclaved 
urbanism. I will elaborate this in more detail below.  
Enclaves as Spaces of Subjectivities: Problematising the Boundary of the Enclave 
In this section, I will delve into the instantiation of inside/outside relationships in 
enclaved spaces in order to explain how enclaves are subjectively constituted spaces. In 
making this argument, I will use concepts and debates that are popular in critical border 
studies. To start with, I will outline the very basic features of (sovereign) borders in an 
elementary sense. Firstly, they perform the state in terms of authority and right to 
exercise coercion. Secondly, they are regulatory conduits of movement. Thirdly, they 
demarcate the spatial limits of citizenship rights and duties. Finally, they are instruments 
for classifying people and institutions for determining inclusion within and exclusion 
from political and social communities (Cox, 2004; Weber, 1998). Moving forward from 
these basics, the reconfiguration of territorial authority and rights following globalisation 
has resulted in the deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of states (Sassen, 2008). 
Borders are thus no longer fixed lines on the map—they have become increasingly 
dispersed, diffused, and polymorphic (Balibar, 2002). This forces the notions of de-jure 
authority, mobility, citizenship and territory and the criteria of inclusion and exclusion to 
be re-thought.  
Using the example of sovereign borders, Salter (2012) highlights how the dispersal of 
bordering practices beyond the site of the border raises questions about where exactly 
the border lies within the reconfiguration of territory, authority and rights in a globalised 
world. He argues that conceiving the physical border as a line that divides the internal 
and external is irrelevant, instead suggesting the suture as a more appropriate expression 
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of the border (Salter, 2012). The suture stitches together and yet separates the inside and 
the outside, and more importantly it defines the border itself as a space that exists 
between two spheres of possibility. Salter (2012) describes the transit space of the border 
as a space heavy with meaning, as it defines the subject and also establishes the sovereign.  
The everyday practices of border crossings are meaningful in the sense that they reflect 
the varied differential enactments of both subjectivity and sovereignty (Salter, 2012). In 
the same vein, the border itself has been described as a fundamental political institution, 
as bordering practices are markers of subjectivity and identity which delineate the inside 
and outside; self and other; risky and safe (Amoore, Marmura, and Salter, 2008). This is 
useful to know, as such theorisations of borders help identify ‘where’ the border is 
emplaced within enclaves. They therefore help in turning attention away from physical 
sites—such as gates and walls—which are presently essentialised as enclave borders. 
Instead, in understanding and defining enclaves, scholars such as myself will be able to 
focus on issues such as subjectivity, identity and inclusion/exclusion as concepts through 
which enclavisation and enclaved spaces are made apparent.  
In order to understand the materiality of the enclave ‘border’, it therefore becomes 
relevant to unpack the subjectivities emerging from the situated practices of those 
performing the border and those crossing it. Such an analysis of everyday practices is also 
increasingly popular in critical border studies, where scholars find that the performativity 
of the border is made evident through security practices and everyday border crossings. 
Through his ethnography of everyday border crossings along the Kenyan-Ugandan 
border, Allen (2012) highlights how the border is in fact materialised as a bureaucratic 
process. Locals regularly cross the border to visit relatives, shop and hide from the 
authorities (in the case of criminals). They invariably circumvent formal processes of 
border crossing by negotiating procedures for short-term access to places across the 
border with personnel performing the border (Allen, 2012). This shows the porosity of 
the border, as well as emphasising that the border is a set of bureaucratic processes rather 
than an arrangement of check-posts. A focus on the everyday therefore shows the border 
as a dynamic process that is shaped and reshaped according to local and personal 
expectations and perceptions (Allen, 2012).  
Similarly, in a study of intra-urban borders in Istanbul, Karaman and Islam (2012) show 
how the infrastructure of bordering rests on physical impediments, gatekeeping practices, 
warning signs, but most importantly on a consolidated sense of community. These 
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practices are plural in the sense that they exist on both sides of the border. Identity 
creation and differentiation occurs both inside and outside, and factors such as 
architecture and spatial pattern of building combine with narratives and cultural practices 
to create a right to the city as well as a right to difference (Karaman and Islam, 2012). In 
such a case, the consolidated sense of community and identity is what materialises ethnic 
enclaves. In a widely different scenario, Tawil-Souri (2012) highlights how intra-urban 
borders become de-territorialised through everyday technologies of categorisation and 
surveillance. The author draws attention to the ID card regime as a bordering practice 
which aims to limit the mobility of Palestinian/Arabs while freeing the mobility of 
Jewish/Israeli populations in Israel. By doing so, she draws attention to urban enclave 
borders as being virtual and dispersed in the everyday life of urban residents (Tawil-
Souri, 2012). 
Everyday practices of border crossing and the theatrical rituals of border security 
therefore offer a lens to unpack the materiality of enclaves. This critical conception of 
borders is extremely useful for analysing the boundaries of urban residential enclaves. It 
gives primacy to the notion of a border that is established at the point of crossing. I 
argue that this also gives meaning to the border as a site heavy with political meaning. As 
both a physical site, as well as sets of practices which establish both sovereign and 
subject, borders and bordering processes become integral to re-territorialising urban 
space. The notions of citizenship rights, inclusion and identity become determined 
through these processes, as do notions of power, governmentality and sovereignty.  
With these concepts in mind, I contend that conceptualising enclaves as sites that 
establish inside/outside relationships through practices and processes of bordering is  a 
first step towards envisioning urban enclaves as fragmentary spaces that have agency in 
shaking up the status quo through reconfiguring the power and rights of urban residents. 
The boundary (whether material or virtual) of such enclaves is considered the frontier 
that determines the inclusion and exclusion of people inside and outside the enclave and 
as the site where security and insecurity intersect. This inevitably makes the border of 
such enclaves a highly politicised site, giving the people/infrastructures/systems that 
perform the boundary significant power over populations. Having described the political 
nature of enclave borders, I will now explain the political space of enclaves themselves, 
and will elaborate on the sociology of enclaved spaces. 
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The Juridico-Political Space of Enclaves and the Sociology of Exception  
Fourthly, in considering the political space and sociology of enclaves, I would like to 
focus on how enclaves generate a distinct juridico-political space through which they 
operate. Literature on governance across a wide variety of residential enclaves across 
different contexts suggests that enclaves tend to be managed through formally or 
informally constituted governance structures that displace state authority and establish 
high degrees of social control over enclave residents (Fregonese, 2012; Alsayyad and Roy, 
2006; Galsze et al., 2006). For example, in gated communities or common interest 
developments, such governance is usually constituted through a formal charter (Glasze et 
al., 2006). In other types of enclaves, such forms of authority may surface through the 
operation of power and social control tied to processes of enclave formation and 
securitisation (Benit-Gbaffoou, 2008a; Caldeira, 2000). For example, through his study of 
neighbourhood enclosures in Lima, Ploger (2006) highlights that such practices follow 
from the homogenisation of political space within enclaves.  
The unique political space of enclaves thus becomes very important for a comprehensive 
understanding of the concept. After analysing economic enclaves such as logistical sites, 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and sites of resource extraction operated by multi-
national corporations, Sidaway (2007) asserts that enclaves imitate features of ‘formal 
territorial enclaves’, which are described as ‘a detached part of a country surrounded by 
another state’ (Sidaway, 2007). The geo-political nature of enclaves is further illuminated 
by Alsayyad and Roy (2006) who argue that gated enclaves and informal settlements 
materialise the ‘powers of freedom’ (i.e. a form of governing that pre-supposes the 
freedom of the governed), and they signify the ‘multiplication and fragmentation of 
sovereignty’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006: 8). In this way, gated communities can be thought 
of as technologies of spatiality, subjectivities and sovereignty (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). 
As state-society relations between enclave residents and the state come to be mediated 
through governing authorities within enclaved spaces, Alsayyad and Roy (2006) highlight 
that the production of such spaces raises alarming questions for issues of citizenship and 
democracy (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Caldeira, 2000).  
Having established that enclaved spaces are inevitably political in nature, the particular 
politics of space in such enclaves remains poorly explored—especially with relevance to 
cities of the global South. In the interdisciplinary literature on enclaves, the distinctive 
juridico-political structure of enclaved spaces is likened to that of Agamben’s (1998) 
62 
 
paradigm of the Nazi concentration camp, which is a particular territorialised political 
space that subjects its inhabitants to an extreme form of vulnerability that arises from the 
enactment of the ‘state of exception’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Diken and Lausten, 2005; 
Turner, 2010; Peteet, 2011). 
Though gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods, slums, ghettos and favelas do not 
duplicate the extremities of the Nazi concentration camps, Diken and Lausten (2005) 
nevertheless argue that sociology in these spaces follows the ‘logic of the camp’, arguing 
that ‘camps’ are spatio-temporal entities which signify a position/doctrine. The authors 
further explain how difference between those inside camp spaces is less consequential 
than between those inside and outside. Yet, in being constituted against negativity, the 
camp creates a sense of ‘other’, or a form of ‘outside’. In this way, the camp produces as 
much order as disorder.  
Finally, Diken and Lausten (2005: 18) argue that the camps are ‘social and (bio)political 
orders producing subjectivities’, especially as the objective of producing order 
necessitates the production of various processes, rules and regulations which aim at 
controlling populations. In such spaces, therefore, discipline creates sovereignty by 
generating zones of exception through confinement, where ‘freedom of movement 
coexists with fixation, and in this situation it becomes difficult to tell the difference 
between “free subject” and “inmates”’ (Diken and Lausten, 2005: 74). Such a 
conceptualisation of enclaves shows how enclaves embody subjectivities of exclusion and 
inclusion, inside and outside, and security and terror. 
Having illustrated the political nature of space in the enclave, the sociology of enclaved 
spaces can be paralleled to the sociology of the camp, which is inherently based on 
attempts at high degrees of social control, denial of political rights, extreme vulnerability 
and violence (Diken and Lausten, 2005). Enclaves are attempts to enforce immobility on 
those considered criminals as well as to create barriers against the surrounding ‘criminal 
places’. In megacities in the global South, the proliferation of enclaves is explained as a 
reaction to rising levels of urban violence and crime in the face of growing scepticism 
about the government’s ability to provide security and policing (Caldeira, 2000; Koonings 
and Kruijt, 2009; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a).  
In the emerging ‘vigilantopolis’ (Davis, 1999: 391), the poor and less powerful are widely 
subjected to suspicion, control and repressive state policies. These mechanisms of 
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dealing with urban crime and violence further skew structures in unfavourable ways for 
the urban poor: conditions of extreme deprivation result in strained social relations due 
to contests over space, the reliance on crime and drugs for income and reliance on 
informal networks for security and contract enforcement (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009). In 
such conditions, the poor tend to suffer from violence in two ways: inter-communal 
personal violence and also from state-led violence. The extreme vulnerability created by 
such a combination often plunges the urban poor into a continuum of violence. In the 
final section below, I will expand on this argument in more detail, where I explain how 
enclaves can be understood to be agential in perpetuating urban violence. 
The Agency of Enclaves: How Processual Enclaves are Productive of Urban 
Violence 
In this section, I will bring together the different concepts presented in the last section in 
order to build an argument to suggest that enclaves are agential processes that are 
productive of urban violence. My conceptualisation of enclaves as relational assemblages 
is essential to this understanding, as it allows focus on how securitised enclaves are 
produced through the interaction of a range of actors—public and private—and on how 
power continuously shifts between these actors (Allen and Cochrane, 2010; Allen and 
Cochrane, 2007; Allen, 2011). Here, I argue that just as enclosure, intra-urban walling and 
gating and the splintering of urban security are viewed as losses or weakening of state 
sovereignty (Brown, 2010; Ramadan, 2013; Tawil-Souri, 2012; Benit-Gbaffou et al., 
2012), the processes of walling and generating enclosure may be studied in relation to the 
shifting relations of power, subjectivity and identity in the city.  
Controlling patterns of circulation through regulatory practices and architectures of 
security creates an unequal power-geometry, especially as some people are included while 
others are excluded (Massey, 1993). In the process, the architectures of the fragmented, 
splintered and securitised city create subjects and reproduce difference. Building on my 
arguments in the previous chapter, I would like to suggest that enclaves can be held 
responsible, as multi-scalar and relational socio-material processes that govern 
circulations, for restructuring relations of power in the city as well as for affecting urban 
socio-political relations. In speaking of gated communities, for example, Graham (2010) 
notes that ‘gated communities embody ideas of securocratic war just as powerfully as 
does the militarisation of international boundaries, but they operate at a different and 
complementary scale’ (Graham, 2010: 107). By his reference to securocratic war, Graham 
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extends Feldman’s (2004) concept of securocratic warfare to the production of enclaved 
spaces. Feldman (2004) introduces securocratic warfare as consisting of open-ended, 
deterritorialised campaigns for public safety. He argues that such wars do not have an 
identifiable enemy, nor are they easily locatable, but they are instead focused on 
countering territorial transgression and contamination, often through the production of 
cultural imaginaries. Therefore, Graham argues that seemingly innocuous gated enclaves 
are productive of generating discourses of risk and insecurity in ways that may criminalise 
certain populations. 
Similarly, the practices and technologies of surveillance which are critical for 
enclavisation also lead to the identification and generalisation of deviant behaviour 
(Bottomley and Moore, 2007). In extreme cases, Graham (2010) highlights how complex 
technologies of surveillance are deployed in securitising urban spaces. Some technologies 
integrate face-recognition software, while others are operated through intelligent systems 
that track particular behaviours, movements and objects. Together, these warn security 
guards and officials of people who fit the profile of previously programmed ‘faces of 
terror’ (Graham, 2010). Though ordinary residential enclaves of the global South may not 
deploy such complex technologies, as I will demonstrate in more detail in the empirical 
chapters, the repeated practices of bordering lead to profiling which fetishises the ‘other’ 
and deepens racist paranoia. In this sense, enclaves can also be characterised as 
producing racialised identities.  
The above parallel invokes the notion of gated communities (or other securitised 
enclaves) as a materialisation of ‘othering’. Both boundaries—local and international—
are architectures of exclusion which attempt to keep out what is deemed risky and 
offensive. Evidence from enclaved cities suggests that the privatised space and security 
inside the enclave is often deregulated, and in extreme cases may also lie beyond state 
control (Glasze et al., 2006; Ploger, 2012; Fregonese, 2012). Meanwhile, governance of 
security outside these enclave ‘borders’ mostly falls within the ambit of the civilian and 
military security structures (Graham, 2010). As I will highlight further in the next chapter, 
in such a situation the national security apparatus is supplemented or partially replaced by 
the development of a security system that is decentralised and involves the participation 
of individuals and private firms (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b).  
For example, gated communities have been portrayed by various scholars as ‘armoured 
enclaves’ of the middle class—securitised through patrols by civil police auxiliaries, state 
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of the art technologies or even private security companies (Robb, 2007; Graham, 2010). 
On the other hand, enclaves in favelas and other marginal spaces may not be out rightly 
recognisable as fortified and militarised enclaves, though they may be equally inaccessible 
for the public. In such cases, privately organised non-state actors securitise and govern 
the enclave through fear and violence. For example, de Souza (2014) provides examples 
from Rio de Janeiro to describe how urban militarisation is ubiquitous in the 
‘phobopolis’ (extremely fear-struck cities). He further explains how ‘micro-local warlords’ 
(de Souza, 2014: 161) have territorialised marginal urban spaces from where they 
challenge state monopoly over violence and subject residents to coercion. While the 
affluent feel safe in gated communities, the freedoms of association and movement are 
severely restricted for the urban poor resident in settlements controlled by criminal gangs 
and mafias. 
Therefore, it is evident that it not just the gated community that is an exclusionary 
securitised space. The condition runs across all enclaved spaces: ghettos and enclosed 
neighbourhoods as well as gated communities. Such spaces are also characterised by a 
high degree of social control and discipline, and hence they are acknowledged as spaces 
that spatialise governmentality (Merry, 2001). Spatial governmentality refers to the 
governing of populations through the control and regulation of space (Merry, 2001). The 
referent object of this form of governmentality is a population of people identified as 
exhibiting offensive or potentially dangerous behaviour, and the space of operation is 
physical action, legislation, architectural design and/or security practices that isolate the 
dangerous or protect the vulnerable (Merry, 2001). This follows from the Foucauldian 
notion of governmentality as the art of government which includes a wide range of 
technologies and techniques of control applied to various objects. These range from the 
control of self through disciplinary practices to the control of a population through bio-
political practices.  
Various authors have described how enclaves spatialise governmentality. Merry (2001), 
for example, describes how states produce social order by structuring urban space in 
ways that isolate risky populations through exclusion from particular spaces, while at the 
same time establishing rules of conduct in such spaces (Merry, 2001). As a technology of 
government, governmentality structures behaviour and subjects users of space to a high 
degree of social control. However, in studying practices of spatial governmentality in 
post-apartheid Cape Town, Robins (2002) highlights how the exercise of spatial 
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governmentality rests with state as well as non-state actors. Sharing examples from the 
emergence of fortified enclaves—elite gated communities as well as low income 
enclaves—Robins (2002) highlights that in enclaved cities punishment and discipline are 
often enforced through community based organisations which enact community policing 
to securitise themselves in the absence of state presence (Robins, 2002). This attention to 
the exercise of spatial governmentality as resting with state as well as non-state actors is 
significant for opening up space for discussion to understand notions of power and 
subjectivity in cities of the global South, where sovereignty is a hybrid concept and non-
state actors play significant roles in structuring urban power and politics (Fregonese, 
2012; Yacobi, 2012). 
Keeping this in mind, I would argue that using Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
can help in decentring the state as the omni-powerful political actor in enclaved cities of 
the global South, and can help us understand the multi-directional and relational notion 
of power. Such an understanding of power emerges from Foucault’s definition of 
governmentality as: 
…the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as 
its target population, as its principal form of knowledge [...] political economy, and its essential 
technical means [...] apparatuses of security (Foucault, 1991b: 102). 
Thus, power is not just placed in the hands of the state, but more in institutions that 
produce power/knowledge. As I explained earlier, enclaves are performative spaces and 
hence have been understood as institutions that produce discourses. In this way, it is 
possible to understand that enclaves exercise power through their discursive practices. 
Moreover, going over my reconceptualisation of enclaves as processual spaces, I have 
illustrated how enclaves are agential spaces that restructure urban socio-political relations 
and relations: by creating a space of exception, structuring civil order, practicing 
bordering, delimiting rights and access to insiders through inclusion; enclaves themselves 
seem to embody characteristics that perform sovereignty. Furthermore, the 
administrative bodies, community organisations and resident committees that underpin 
such enclaves thus hold political power which subjugates their residents. In this way, 
enclaves are identified as agents of power who wield control over residents in ways that 
replicate the state’s authority. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have developed a critical conceptualisation of enclaves using theories of 
relationality, assemblage and performativity. This framework has allowed me to 
conceptualise enclaves as relational spaces that are in continuous process, ‘assembled’ 
through the interactions and relations between material infrastructure, discursive 
practices, socio-spatial relations and socio-political relations. As a result, I have been able 
to theorise enclaves as dynamic and fluid spaces. Once produced, enclaves do not remain 
static ‘containers of space’. Instead, I have argued that enclave boundaries are osmotic 
and temporal—they shift and blur to accommodate and/or exclude people in different 
ways. Hence, this conceptualisation of enclaves allows us to review enclaves as spaces of 
negotiations, contestations and subjectivities. Moreover, by focusing on the distinctive 
politics of enclaved spaces I have been able to highlight how enclaves may re-organise 
socio-political relations and governance in ways that exacerbate marginalities and 
inequalities. Therefore, by reading enclaves through the analytic of assemblages, I am 
able to provide an alternative to the existing fixed and static descriptions of spaces. 
Moreover, I am able to outline key characteristics of enclaved spaces which focus 
precisely on the processual, relational and agential nature of enclaved spaces.  
Through this reconceptualisation of enclaves as agential urban processes, I have covered 
significant ground in responding to the criticisms of existing scholarship on enclaves and 
enclaved urbanism which I outlined in the previous chapter. In Chapter 2, I outlined that 
such criticisms limited a comprehensive analysis of enclaves, as agential spaces not only 
emerge in response to increasing urban violence, but also perpetuate such violence. 
While my conceptualisation of enclaves has brought me a step closer to such an analysis, 
I have yet to respond to a major criticism of existing scholarship on enclaves. That is, I 
have yet to contextualise my study of enclavisation and violence in Karachi within the 
local context, and to further elaborate how relations of governance and urban political 
life structure enclavisation, and contests of power in global south cities. I will address this 
analytical shortcoming in the following chapter, where I will elaborate how enclaves 
restructure relations of power and politics in cities with violent effects. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENCLAVISATION, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS IN CITIES OF THE 
GLOBAL SOUTH 
In this chapter, I will build on my conceptualisation of enclaves as dynamic political 
processes by demonstrating how enclaves are constituted through multi-scalar relations 
of governance and politics and by elaborating how related enclaves both territorialise as 
well as restructure urban political relations in cities such as Karachi. Linked to this 
objective, I will present two key arguments. The first is that enclaves spatialise 
fragmented forms of urban governance, differentiated forms of citizenship and 
disjunctive state-society relations. Secondly, I argue that as a result of these processes, 
enclaves restructure relations of power and politics within complex urban systems in 
ways that produce contests of control and hence urban violence.  
To make these arguments, in the first section I will contextualise processes of 
enclavisation through an analysis of relations of urban governance and related urban 
politics in cities such as Karachi. In the process, I will highlight how enclaves, which are 
borne out of these relations, spatialise fragmented forms of urban governance and 
disjunctive forms of citizenship. This background will be helpful in understanding the 
multi-scalar and contested relations of power and politics in enclaved cities, a topic which 
I will focus on in more detail in the second section. In the second section, I will present 
evidence from Karachi and other global South cities to highlight how enclaves manifest 
fragmented and hybridised forms of sovereignty and power, and how such power 
relations interact within an urbanism. Moreover, I will demonstrate that in an enclaved 
urbanism, the resulting negotiations and contestations of power between competing state 
and non-state political agents are often generative of conflict and various forms of urban 
violence.  
Before moving on, I would like to highlight that my analysis in this chapter is grounded 
in the specificities of urban governance and politics in cities of the global South. This is 
mainly to keep in line with my earlier outlined arguments (see chapters 1 and 2), which 
made the case for the need to analyse processes of enclavisation within contextually 
specific histories and trajectories of urban planning, politics and governance structures. 
Throughout this chapter, I will therefore make reference to the literature on processes of 
urban planning, governance and politics in Karachi. Where relevant literature is not 
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available, I will provide evidence from cities of the global South that are comparable to 
Karachi. 
Enclavisation, Governance, and Politics in Cities of the Global South  
In the absence of a detailed study of urban governance in an enclaved urbanism, in this 
section I will draw on the literature on global cities and postcolonial urbanism in order to 
outline processes of urbanisation and urban politics in contemporary cities of the global 
South (Shatkin, 2014; Weinstein, 2014; Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Alsayyad and Roy, 
2006; Watson, 2009a; Roy, 2009a). I find this literature useful for understanding how 
relations between multi-scalar processes of urban spatial planning and urban 
development are tied to relations of power and politics in the city. Even though enclaves 
are not the primary focus of this scholarship, these authors do make tangential reference 
to the socio-spatially divided nature of such cities, thus making this literature appropriate 
for contextualising analysis of enclavisation and violence in enclaved cities such as 
Karachi. 
In the above-mentioned scholarship, various authors highlight that urbanisation is 
structured through multi-scalar interactions between multiple governance actors and 
differentiated planning trajectories. In Indian cities, for example, Benjamin (2000) and 
Dupont (2011) show how urban spatial planning and development is often negotiated 
between urban business and political elites, middle class elites and slum-dweller 
associations. Yet, given that all these groups have different interests, Shatkin (2014) 
highlights that the realm of urban planning and governance in such cities is contingent, 
highly contested and inevitably political in nature.  
For example, the emerging urban middle class in India has been the subject of much 
political-economic scholarship on urban power relationships and planning orientations. 
Urban planning in India is documented as having shifted from social-oriented goals that 
support the urban poor to an elite revolt that favours growth oriented policies (Baviskar, 
2003; Ghertner, 2011). In such cities, spatial planning is no longer inclusive, and is 
instead tied to dreams of making Indian cities ‘world class’ (Dupont, 2011; Ghertner, 
2011; Schindler, 2014b). In this literature on Indian urbanism, there is evidence of 
increasing socio-spatial segregation and the often violent displacement of the urban poor 
(Baviskar, 2003; Roy 2011a, Dupont, 2011). Such expulsions compound existing socio-
spatial inequalities, which are tied to the legacies and traditions of colonial planning 
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(Nijman, 2010; Coutard, 2008; Jaglin 2008; Dupont, 2004). Scholars note that the 
resulting urban landscape is deeply divided—politically and spatially—between the 
affluent and poor urban residents, who are entrenched in gated communities and urban 
slums respectively (Dupont, 2011; Falzon, 2004). The resulting orientation of planning 
therefore often operates at the expense of the interests of the urban poor (Benjamin, 
2000; Baviskar, 2003). 
On the other hand, I would like to draw attention to the literature on subaltern urbanism, 
which challenges the assumption that the urban poor are powerless to shape their urban 
environments. This literature focuses on how the urban poor are increasingly prominent 
actors in relations of urban governance, especially as they participate in urban planning 
decisions through vote bank politics or a politics of patronage and state-clientelistic 
relations (Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2004). For example, Benjamin 
(2000) highlights how disenfranchised urban residents who have access neither to the 
formal planning system nor to resources which they can use to influence it may still have 
a voice. We also know this from the case of Karachi, where successful entrepreneurs 
from within marginal neighbourhoods who are able to influence how people vote 
develop crucial links with councillors and lower level bureaucrats at the municipal 
government in order to negotiate for civic services on behalf of fellow slum dwellers 
(Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013). The ensuing politics of patronage is of 
course tied to individuals rather than parties, but it nevertheless offers marginal 
populations access to local government (Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin, 2008). 
Such trends and patterns are also noticeable in many other contemporary postcolonial 
contexts (Simone 2011, Watson 2009b, Lindell, 2008; Roy and Alsayyad, 2004). 
Scholarship on contemporary urbanism suggests that, in cities as diverse as 
Johannesburg, Jakarta, Cairo and Beirut, failures in urban governance force citizens to 
collaborate and build ephemeral relations in order to navigate and negotiate insecurities 
in their everyday lives (Simone and Fauzan, 2012; Bayat, 2012). Such practices of 
collaboration both support and supplant existing processes and relations of urban 
governance. In enclaved cities especially, home-owner associations, civil society groups, 
political patrons and community organisations often emerge as governance actors which 
increasingly mediate relations of governance and politics between the state and urban 
residents. 
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Building on this evidence, I would argue that enclavisation is made possible through the 
existing complexities of relations of urban governance and politics in global south cities, 
while at the same time, processes of enclavisation restructure state- society relations. For 
example, scholars are increasingly reviewing enclavisation as an outcome of deregulation 
and of the neoliberal rationalities of urban governance (Shatkin, 2007; Dick and Rimmer, 
1998). Yet, such rationalities of urban governance may problematically empower non-
state actors who appropriate responsibilities which are traditionally associated with the 
realm of the state. Roy (2009a) elaborates this through the examples of civil society 
organisations such as Hezbollah and SPARC in Beirut and Mumbai respectively. She 
highlights how each organisation engages in practices of ‘civic governmentality’ by 
providing an infrastructure of mediation with the state, engaging in technologies of 
governing and promoting norms of self-rule. In providing examples from Hezbollah’s 
role in Beirut, Fregonese (2012) too argues that such processes of governance change the 
existing balance of power between state and non-state actors, and shift the social 
contract. Fregonese (2012) argues that by providing space to organisations such as 
Hezbollah to provide urban services in Beirut, the Lebanese state operates under a 
condition she terms as ‘hybrid sovereignties’, whereby powerful non-state actors 
effectively appropriate state functions and hence command legitimacy and power. 
Similarly, in the South African context, such forms of neoliberal governance also extend 
to urban security governance, whereby municipal governments relinquish powers of 
spatial governmentality to private actors and institutions (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2012; 
Murray, 2004). In South African cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Maputo, 
such arrangements of governance are institutionalised through legal regulations, thus 
formalising the previously informal or tacit security governance arrangements between 
the state and private sector actors. While they regulate processes of enclavisation, 
institutionalised forms of enclavisation also allow space for civil society to respond 
privately to urban insecurity. 
However, as a process that empowers non-state actors, the devolution of spatial 
governmentality from state actors to civil society often restructures relations of power 
and politics in potentially problematic ways (Fregonese, 2012; De Souza, 2014). This is 
especially the case where the privatisation of security governance is not regulated. For 
example, various authors document the privatisation and splintering of security provision 
in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro for example (Clarno and Murray, 
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2013; DeSouza, 2014; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b). In this regard, actors such as private 
security companies, community watches, vigilante groups and criminal networks emerge 
to fill the security gap left by inadequate public policing and security provision (Benit-
Gbaffou, 2008a; Putzel and Di John, 2012). Such alternative security practices and 
enclosures are often organised by quasi-private or private management structures though 
illegal or extra-legal practices (Lemanski and Oldfield, 2008; Landman and Schonteich, 
2002). Yet, such forms of innovative governance are ethically questionable, as they 
reproduce the vulnerabilities and restrict the freedoms of certain groups at the behest of 
others. This is especially troubling when considering my arguments in the previous 
chapter, where I demonstrated how related processes of securitisation and bordering are 
productive of unequal power relations.  
The above-mentioned accounts suggest that in contemporary cities of the global South, 
enclaved spaces territorialise diverse regimes of governance. Moreover, it becomes 
evident that the production of enclaves in cities of the global South—when viewed in 
relation to the multiplicities and various modes of governance—is in fact an arena of 
political relations. Reviewing enclavisation as tied to such relations and processes of 
governance and urban political life, it becomes possible to conceive how enclavisation is 
tied to the spatialisation of differentiated forms of citizenship. In many cases, processes 
of enclavisation may be linked to the various ways in which citizens engage with the 
public sphere, especially in cities where the public sphere itself is not singular. This 
relates to Holston and Appadurai’s (1996) concept of disjunctures in citizenship, and 
Chatterjee’s differentiation between civil and political society. 
Holston and Appadurai (1996) elaborate how cities are strategic sites for the 
development of citizenship. The authors explain that, as lived spaces of nation-states and 
sites where emergent forms of statehood take shape, cities are arenas through which 
multiple associations form and people with differing civic, civil and cultural rights 
converge to engage with the state (Holston and Appadurai, 1996). The authors therefore 
contend that the socio-spatial inequalities and the range of cultural diversity in cities 
create disjunctures between formal and substantive forms of citizenship. Whereas formal 
citizenship is tied to membership of the nation-state, substantive citizenship corresponds 
to the array of political, social, cultural and socio-economic rights. Chatterjee (2004; 
2008) also discusses how the rationalities of government and forms of political 
engagement in the Indian context are different for the poor and the middle class. He 
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differentiates civil society from political society, presenting the former as the domain of 
middle-class who seek to align themselves with normative models of bourgeois civil 
society and hence represent capitalist interests. On the other hand, he describes political 
society as comprising the urban and rural poor who make demands on the state based on 
a violation of the law. More specifically, Chatterjee (2008) explains that political society 
holds a differentiated position in state-society relations:  
Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn are governed, not 
within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather 
through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct 
political negotiations. (Chatterjee, 2008: 57)  Yet, I would argue that processes of 
enclavisation are also productive of fractures in state-society relations, and hence re-
structure the realm of power and politics in the city. AlSayyad and Roy (2006) succinctly 
summarise how processes of enclavisation mediate with power and politics in the city. 
They argue that the enclaved city represents a form of ‘medieval modernity’, whereby 
citizenship is no longer individual and rational, but is instead tied ‘to either patronage (as 
in the bishop) or to associational membership (as in the guild) and in both cases it is 
fundamentally about protection’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006: 3). AlSayyad and Roy (2006) 
further highlight that such forms of state-society relations restructure relations of power 
and politics, as these devolved citizens are governed by norms which are often contrary 
to national law. Relatedly, the resultant logic of rule also affects urban political 
geography. The authors stipulate that the resultant city ‘comes to be articulated in what 
Holston and Appadurai (1999, p. 13) have termed a “honeycomb of jurisdictions”, a 
“medieval body” of “overlapping, heterogeneous, nonuniform, and increasingly private 
memberships”’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006: 3). 
Therefore, considering how disjunctures in urban governance, planning processes and 
urban political life restructure state-society relations, it becomes possible to argue that 
enclaves spatialise multi-scalar relations of governance and politics in cities, and that they 
restructure relations of power and politics. In the next section, I will elaborate how this 
understanding of restructured relations of power and politics in enclaved cities is helpful 
for considering the relationship between enclavisation and urban conflict and violence. 
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Fragmented Sovereignty and Contested Power: Enclaved Spaces as Contradictory 
Sites of Marginality, Empowerment, and Conflict  
The evidence presented in the previous section demonstrated that enclaves are produced 
through negotiated relations of governance and politics in cities. Through this 
understanding, we can also consider enclaves as sites that influence relations of power 
and politics in the city. In this context, it is important to relate enclavisation to issues of 
fragmented sovereignty and contested power. Such an analysis will help highlight how 
enclaves are significant geopolitical actors that reconfigure power and politics in the city. 
Keeping this in mind, in this section I will develop an analysis of relations between 
enclavisation, power and sovereignty in cities of the global South, which will be 
instrumental in understanding violence and conflict in the city.  
Using examples from enclaved cities of the global South, I have previously argued that 
enclaves are sites of contested urban politics and fragmented governance. To unpack 
state-spaces in such sites and cities, I turn to the critical literature on state spatialisations. 
As Brenner, Jessop, Jones and McLeod (2003) define it, state spatiality refers to the 
‘complex expression of ongoing processes and practices of socio-spatial regulation at 
various scales’ (Brenner, Jessop, Jones and McLeod, 2003: 7). Spatial processes in turn 
refer to ‘metaphors and practices that constitute assemblages of political power in and 
through geographical space’ (Gazit, 2009: 85). This conception of space highlights its 
political value, as it is in fact an active variable in the manipulation of politics, the 
assertion of power and the manifestation of authority (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002). This 
relates well to the earlier outlined descriptions of politics of enclavisation and of enclaved 
spaces in cities of the global South, where it was obvious how enclaves emerge as 
inherently territorial spaces which are configured along complex state and non-state 
power structures. Moreover, the fact that processes of enclavisation subjugate ordinary 
residents to (often extra-legal) regulations set by non-state actors make it evident that 
processes of enclavisation are entangled with relations of power.  
Reading power through the concept of assemblages, various scholars highlight that 
power and political agency are often not just limited to the realm of the state. Instead, 
they argue that power is often negotiated and renegotiated (Lindell, 2008; Sassen, 2008; 
Allen and Cochrane, 2010). These arguments are based on Michael Foucault’s notion of 
power (Foucault and Faubion, 2002), where it is described not as an object of possession 
but as an all-compassing, ubiquitous and pervasive force that is linked to the art of 
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dispersed government. Resultantly, power as Foucault describes it has no obvious 
location(s) or centre. Instead, it is internalised by subjects, who both exercise power and 
are subjugated to it. Foucault further explains that resistance and domination are hybrid 
and mutually constituted, and that power is made apparent at points of resistance 
(Foucault and Faubion, 2002). 
Having explained the notion of power, and keeping in mind how processes of 
enclavisation are both products of and productive of multi-scalar and multi-sited 
relations of power and authority, it is important to understand how enclaved spaces 
interact with the state, and with what results. To do so, it is necessary to understand the 
relations of power between cities and states. Before I turn to the task of generalising 
these for cities of the global South, I will present evidence from the literature on state 
power in Pakistan. This will be helpful both in contextualising my empirical observations 
in the second half of this project and in presenting a deeper understanding of state-
spaces in global cities such as Karachi. 
State Spaces and the Politics of Power in Pakistan 
Alavi (1972) contends that state power in Pakistan is dispersed and contested between 
the military, the bureaucracy and democratic institutions. The Pakistani state was not 
born from grassroots movements within its own territory, but from the struggle for an 
independent Muslim nation by Jinnah’s Muslim League, ‘a coalition of individuals, 
factions and segmented political interests belonging mostly to the landlord stratum’ (Ali, 
2002: 46). Consequently, at the time of independence, Pakistan was an ‘overdeveloped’ 
state, as the military and bureaucracy were stronger than the indigenous bourgeoisie who 
form the elected ruling classes (Shaikh, 2010; Alavi, 1972). To this day, the military and 
bureaucracy co-exist as autonomous and coercive arms of the state, and they often 
intercede in democratic politics in ways that undermine the civilian government (Rizvi, 
1998; Shaikh, 2009). Overall though, the military remains the most powerful of all 
government institutions, and it is a key strategic, political and economic player in 
Pakistan (Siddiqa, 2007; Rizvi, 1998; Hoffman, 2011). 
In Pakistan’s 67 years since independence, democracy has never really taken hold. In 
2008, for the first time in the country’s political history, a democratically elected 
government was able to complete its term without being forcibly removed through a 
military coup or falling through political conflict causing dissolution of the parliament. 
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The fact that Pakistan has spent more than three decades under military rule is also 
widely acknowledged to have weakened civil society and political institutions in the 
country (Shaikh, 2009; Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004; Jones, 2009). The constantly shifting 
tide of power between civilian and military governments, and between one 
democratically elected government and another, has meant that governance is often 
managed through arrangements which supersede state instability (Gardezi and Mumtaz, 
2004; Shaikh, 2009; Gazdar, Kaker and Khan, 2010). As a result, international hegemonic 
powers, global financial institutions, landed and business elites, prominent bureaucrats 
and retired civil and military officers all play key roles in brokering power and politics in 
Pakistan (Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004; Shaikh, 2009; Gazdar et al., 2010).   
Within this broader political environment, urban governance has become extremely 
volatile. As successive governments experiment with different local government 
structures—from centralised to devolved forms of power—major urban centres such as 
Karachi become political battlegrounds for various actors vying for a take in power 
(Gayer, 2014). As a consequence, as illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2 below, present day 
urban governance is a tangled web crossing various scales of government. Municipal and 
land development functions in Karachi are formally divided between local, provincial and 
national governments. Meanwhile, the military, state monopolies and business elites also 
exercise control over these functions within the megacity (Ahmed, 2010).  
Government Land Development Authority 
Percentage of 
Land Owned 
Percentage by 
level of 
government 
Local Government Lyari Development Authority 5.6 
40.4 Local Government Malir Development Authority 3.9 
Local Government Karachi city government 30.9 
Government of Sindh Sindh Industrial Trading Estate 0.6 
38.9 Government of Sindh Government of Sindh – other land 17.7 
Government of Sindh Kirthar National Park 20.6 
Federal Government Railways 0.4 
5.2 
Federal Government Port Qasim 1.5 
Federal Government Karachi Port Trust 2.8 
Federal Government Federal Government – other land 0.5 
Pakistan Military Defence Housing Authority 5 
7.1 
Pakistan Military Cantonment Boards 2.1 
Private Private – other 3.9 5.7 
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Private Cooperative Housing Societies 1.8 
Various 
Allocated lands (education, 
industrial etc.) 
2.7 2.7 
Table 1: Percentage of urban land controlled and administered by various land development authorities in 
Karachi. Source: MPGO-CDGK, 2007 p. 3. 
 
Function Jurisdiction Government 
Name of Authority/ 
Department performing 
function 
General administration 
All districts of 
Karachi 
City Government 
(KMC) and Govt. of 
Sindh  
Administrator KMC and Chief 
Secretary Sindh Government 
administration of 
Justice 
Sindh province Govt. of Sindh 
Various courts headed by the 
Sindh High Court 
Policing Sindh province Govt. of Sindh 
Home Department and 
Karachi Police 
Land development, 
housing, and physical 
planning 
All districts of 
Karachi 
Govt. of Sindh; various 
local authorities; private 
sector 
City Government offices; 
Defence Housing Authority; 
Cantonment Boards; other 
societies and private 
development agencies 
Bulk water supply 
All districts of 
Karachi 
Govt. of Sindh; various 
local authorities; private 
sector 
Karachi Water and Sanitation 
Board 
Electricity Sindh province Federal Govt. 
Karachi Electric Supply 
Corporation; Water and Power 
Development Authority 
Gas Sindh province Federal Govt. Sui Gas Southern Company 
Public transport 
All districts of 
Karachi 
Federal Govt. and 
private sector 
Private sector; Pakistan 
Railways; Karachi Urban 
Transport Corporation 
Port development 
All districts of 
Karachi 
Federal Govt. 
Karachi Port Trust; Port 
Qasim Authority 
Industrial estates 
All districts of 
Karachi 
Govt. of Sindh and 
Federal Govt. 
Sindh Industrial Trading 
Estate; Export Processing 
Zone Authority; Pakistan Steel 
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Taxation: property, 
customs, income, and 
sales  
Sindh Province 
Govt. of Sindh (property 
tax); Federal Govt. 
(others) 
Excise and Taxation 
Department, GoS; Federal 
Board of Revenue, GoP 
Taxation: water, fire, 
conservancy, and 
other municipal taxes 
All districts of 
Karachi 
Various local authorities 
KMC; private sector; 
Cantonment Boards 
Table 2: Distribution of urban governance functions in Karachi by level of government. Source: Ahmed, 
2010 p.127. 
These complex structures of governance essentially ‘hedge’ authority in Karachi. Given 
that urban governance is fragmented between local, provincial and national governance 
agencies, different institutional actors claim control over certain functions of urban 
governance at all times. As I have demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4 below, different 
political parties are usually in power at different levels of government. The Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP), for example, all have considerable weight in politics and governance in the 
city, and they often use this as a point of negotiation for bargaining over political 
settlements with the federal government (Budhani et al., 2010).  
 
Year 
Karachi Sindh Pakistan 
2001-2002 Jamat e Islami6 Military Govt. Military Govt. 
2002-2004 Jamat e Islami PML Q and MQM PML Q 
2005-2007 MQM7 PML Q and MQM PML Q 
2008-2010 MQM PPP and MQM PPP 
2011-2012 Administrator PPP and MQM PPP 
2013 to date Administrator PPP and MQM PML N 
Table 3: Political parties in power at the local, provincial and national levels. Source: Authors’ compilations from various 
sources 
 
Political Party 
Political History Party Appeal 
PPP Formed in 1967 Province: Sindh and Punjab. 
                                                 
6 Since local elections were declared ‘non-party elections’, the Jamat e Islami was not ‘directly’ in power. 
The Al-Khidmat Group won the local government elections, but since it was patronised by the JI, the JI 
can be said to have been in power 
7 Similarly, the MQM-supported Haq Parast Group was in power. 
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Ideology: socialist-
nationalist under 
founder, became centre 
left after 1988 
Electoral Victories: 1971, 1977, 
1988,1993,1997 and 2008 
Appeal: Rural and urban poor, or 
progressive middle-class 
 Religion: Plural 
Supports the Baloch gangs in Lyari 
(Karachi) 
Ethnic: Sindhi and Baloch 
 
PML Q and PML N 
Formed in 1948 (bifurcated from 
the All India Muslim League after 
the creation of Pakistan). 
Province: Urban and rural Punjab 
and Sindh, Balochistan (PML Q) 
Ideology: centrist 
conservative party 
Now known as PML Q, the party is 
made up of prominent politicians, 
usually rural landlords, who attract 
votes regardless of party affiliation.  
Appeal: urban and rural poor, 
conservative middle class 
  After 1988, PML Q was popularly 
known as the ‘establishment’ party 
for its role in bringing military 
governments to power and being 
the ‘democratic face’ of military 
government. After further splits in 
the following years, in 1988, PML N 
became the most popular breakaway 
faction 
Ethnic: various 
  Province: Urban and rural Punjab 
  
Appeal: Widely popular across 
Punjab province, very popular 
amongst conservative middle class, 
religiously oriented voters, and the 
business class 
 Religion: Plural 
    Ethnic: Punjabi 
MQM 
Formed in 1985, as Muhajir Qaumi 
Movement 
Province: Sindh 
Ideology: politicisation 
of ‘Muhajir’ ethnic 
identity 
Internal split over name change and 
wider mandate in 1997. Now known 
as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement 
Appeal: urban low and middle 
income groups in Sindh, young 
disenfranchised youths 
 Religion: 
Occasionally Sectarian 
(Shia) 
Has a well-known 'militant wing' 
operative in Karachi 
Ethnic: ‘Urdu-speaking’ migrants 
    
 
MMA Formed in 2002. Province: NWFP and Balochistan 
Ideology: centrist, 
Coalition of six religious parties, 
including Jamate Ulema Islami and 
Jamat e Islami 
Appeal: Conservative urban voters 
Islamic religious 
ideology, ultra 
conservative, 
economically socialist 
  Ethnic: Various 
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Religion: Occasionally 
Sectarian (Sunni) 
JUI 
Formed in 1945 in a split from 
Jamiat ul Ulema Hind, which was 
founded by the ulema of the 
Deoband Movement in pre-
partition India. 
Province: NWFP and Balochistan 
Ideology: Islamic 
religious ideology, 
mostly coalition party, 
pro-democracy 
Appeal: Urban and rural religious 
Muslim nationalists 
 Religion: 
Occasionally Sectarian 
(Sunni) 
Ethnic: various, majority Pashtun in 
Karachi 
ANP Formed in 1986 after a merger of 
the National Democratic Party and 
other groups. 
Province: NWFP, Balochistan, 
FATA, Western Punjab, Karachi 
Ideology: Leftist, 
Pashtun nationalist 
Appeal: Pashtun nationalists, widely 
popular in urban NWFP and Karachi 
 Religion: 
Occasionally Sectarian 
(Sunni) 
Has a well-known 'militant wing' 
operative in Karachi 
Ethnic: Pashtun 
Table 4: Major political parties in Karachi and Pakistan. Source: Authors’ Compilation from Various 
Sources. 
Each political party mobilises mass support through well documented politics of land 
settlement, patronage and vote bank politics in Karachi (Gayer, 2014; Budhani et al., 
2010; Hasan et al., 2013). In this megacity of 20 million people, where more than 50 
percent of the population live in marginal slums, land settlement processes are heavily 
politicised as well as ethnicised. Interviews with prominent urban planners, activists, and 
government officials reveal that informal land developers settle precarious migrants in 
the city on illegally subdivided land, while promising them security of tenure on the basis 
of rent extraction and political loyalty. This ‘protection racket’, itself a profitable 
business, is supplemented by political power on the basis of which informal land 
developers develop links with political party bosses, the police and municipal 
government officials.  
The emerging vote bank politics is also common in Indian megacities (Benjamin, 2008; 
Schindler, 2014b), and it coalesces earlier described ‘political society’ (Chatterjee, 2004). 
Gayer (2014) describes the volatility in Karachi as a direct outcome of such urban 
politics, where different ethno-political parties territorialise land and develop ‘turfs’ 
within the various ethnic enclaves in the city. Competition over rent extraction, political 
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influence or even contests between local and provincial/federal governments escalate 
urban conflict and violence. Such conflict often also challenges state authority, especially 
as politicised enclaves often emerge as no-go areas for state security forces (Gayer, 2014; 
Gazdar and Mallah, 2013).  
Gayer (2014) further argues that the political patrons of such enclaves orchestrate 
violence to destabilise the federal government in the manner of an ‘ordered disorder’ 
(Gayer, 2014: 210). Gayer (2014) explains that such an ordered form of disorder is only 
possible in countries like Pakistan, where forms of state power are decidedly non-
Weberian, and where elites play a significant role in brokering settlements. The structures 
of local government and state power are such that they can be held hostage to political 
mobilisation by powerful ethno-political parties. Given this evidence, post-colonial state 
spaces can be envisioned as scrambled webs of power between state, bureaucracy, 
powerful political actors, NGOs and criminal groups. Despite being an overdeveloped 
state, certain regions and cities in Pakistan (including Karachi) exhibit the political logic 
of ‘fragmented sovereignty’ i.e. conditions where the state exhibits ‘multiple, localised, 
and temporal cores of power’ (Gazit, 2009). 
While this is true of the particular multi-sited and multi-scalar relations of state power 
and politics in Karachi, evidence from similarly contested African and Middle Eastern 
cities also shows how non-state actors and local power brokers can acquire state-like 
functions and consequently appropriate sovereignty (Gazit, 2009). Evidence from Beirut, 
for example, suggests how religiously and politically oriented civil society groups provide 
residents with protection and settlement, and thus eventually earn legitimacy and displace 
traditionally existing state-society relations (Yassin, 2010; Fregonese, 2012). This 
effectively challenges state authority in urban centres, thereby propelling conflict and 
terror. Although not productive of similar violent outcomes, in Indian cities too, the 
appropriation of governance functions by community leaders, businesses, NGOs and 
other civil society mediatories is a common way in which sovereignty in cities of the 
global South is graduated from the state. Such patterns are traced by various authors who 
review participatory governance (Zerah, 2009: 874) or even urban informality and 
changing forms of citizenship (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Benjamin, 2008) in 
contemporary cities of the global South. I will explain the relevance such state spaces and 
politics of power have for enclaved cities in more detail below. 
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Relations of Power between Enclaves, Cities, and the State 
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned context of state spaces and the politics of power 
in Karachi, I will now discuss what this means for a study of enclaved urbanism more 
generally. In this section, I will elaborate how relations of power are mediated through 
enclaves and are restructured through changing structures of urban governance in 
enclaved cities. Here, in the absence of relevant detailed research on Karachi, I will use 
examples from other cities of the global South to supplement my arguments related to 
Karachi. 
For example, Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer (2012) trace the dynamic interaction 
between various community-based security initiatives and the state in South African 
cities. Here, communities have converged, institutionalised and then politicised over 
security initiatives. Initiatives to ‘discipline’ populations soon became a flashpoint for 
political contestation with the state. In elite and middle class areas, road closures 
generated a discourse on security models, criminality and apartheid before eventually 
being legalised after structural changes in urban governance. Community security 
initiatives became co-opted to the political agendas of the African National Congress 
(ANC) and other parties, and have since been constantly reshaped and redefined because 
of shifting relationships between the state and communities.  
Enclaves are thus strategic geopolitical sites that materialise civic life as well as projecting 
civic politics. Moreover, enclaved spaces re-territorialise state spaces and relate to urban 
and national politics through various associational relations. The force and direction of 
political agency depends on the unique cultural and socio-political context of enclaves, as 
well as the overall polity within which they operate. As demonstrated earlier, in 
postcolonial countries power is dispersed between competing state institutions and 
powerful local or global non-state actors. Moreover, as outlined earlier, even though 
some of the processes of enclavisation are enacted illegally or extra-legally, informality is 
also a modality of power (Roy, 2005; Roy, 2009c). Here, informality does not suggest 
state weakness but, insofar as it is produced by the state itself, is a function of 
governmentality, as it allows the manipulation and control of subject groups (Alsayyad, 
2004). Yet, as examples of civic engagement from global South cities suggest 
(Goodfellow and Titeca, 2012; Tanulku, 2012) this power can also be manipulated by 
ordinary urban residents who organise themselves as collective political agents.  
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Moreover, other examples from the scholarship on global South urbanism suggest that 
even though informality has long been championed as the habitus of subaltern urbanism, 
it is as much within the purview of the rich as it is of the poor (Ranganathan, 2011; 
Ghertner, 2008). Yet, in the case of Karachi’s enclaves, selective legitimising practices of 
informal spaces highlight state biases. The political choices of the state are highlighted 
when urban elites are allowed to privatise public space and restrict circulation through 
informal practices, while ‘slums’ are controlled through military operations carried out 
against non-state actors. Such interactions of state power within the informal spaces of 
the rich and poor further highlight how a politicised politics of land development, capital 
accumulation and value creation emerges. However, as I will elaborate further in Chapter 
8, the selective co-option of certain groups over others may perhaps denote a purposeful 
creation of ‘grey areas’ that can be manipulated for making political settlements 
(Yiftachel, 2009). In such instances, graduated and hybrid sovereinities may destabilise 
the central state, but may also be a modality of its power.  
Moreover, even though I will not elaborate this further within this research, it is 
important to note that in its attempts to consolidate power, making strategic alliances 
with some actors and rejecting others may be a strategy that the state employs to keep 
powerful non-state actors under control. This has been true in Karachi in the past, where 
political settlements with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), for example, have 
been a very important factor in securing a democratic majority at the centre. At other 
times, however, the MQM has been subject to violent military operations after it 
threatened to destabilise the federal government by inciting inter-party violence and 
conflict in Karachi. Keeping a relational view of power in mind, in such a political 
environment, enclaves could be understood as spaces that do not only devolve state 
power, but also project power outwards to affect urban and national politics. I will 
expand this theme in more detail below, where I will outline how political relations in 
enclaved and fractured state spaces result in conflict and violence. 
Fragmented State Power and Violence in Enclaved Cities 
Thus, as state space and political power are fragmented, and power and governance 
functions are shared by non-state actors, the resulting contestations between competing 
political agents often leads to violent conflict (Gazit, 2009; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007b). 
This is especially evident in the megacities of the global South, where competing claims 
by various political actors can lead to violent contestation and recurring civic conflict 
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(Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2013). Such civic conflict is often tied to the unequally 
accrued effects of globalisation (Appadurai, 2006). Beall et al. (2013) present a scalar 
notion of civic conflict, defining it as a reactive violent expression of social, political or 
economic grievances against state or non-state actors with the purpose of reconfiguring 
power relations. Amongst other forms, it may include terrorist violence, gang warfare or 
violent organised crime. Although reactive in nature, civic conflict may overlap with civil 
conflict if it involves a higher degree of organisation, stronger economic interests and the 
presence of state elements.  
However, I would like to argue that in megacities of the global South such as Karachi, 
such scalar categorisations of conflict are not useful. This is because in Karachi, local, 
national and international actors all compete for power. Furthermore, in cities such as 
Karachi, it is hard to differentiate between civil, civic and sovereign conflict (Gayer, 
2014). For example, in 2008, local Pashtun settlers in Karachi’s low income ethnic 
enclaves who had grievances over the unequal distribution of civic resources in the city 
increasingly pledged allegiance to the Pashtun Nationalist Party (ANP). In 2008, the 
ANP was part of the coalition government, and as a function of that had control over 
some urban services, such as water provision. The ANP is opposed to the MQM (then in 
power at the local government level). In an attempt to show its power, the MQM 
launched a campaign against the Pashtun dominated slums. This demonstrates how civic 
conflict co-opts sovereign conflict and shows how shifts in loyalties between political 
actors can lead to political abandonment, violence and conflict. Therefore, in cities such 
as Karachi where political authority is fragmented and politicised, violence is not just 
played out on the turf, but also through policies which render other groups more 
vulnerable (Gayer, 2014; Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013). The political 
nature of enclaved spaces is hence critical. By re-orienting structures of power and 
authority, enclaves can be argued to create conditions under which conflict festers and 
violence is perpetuated. 
This violence is exacerbated by the political sociology of enclaved urbanism. Examples 
from low income enclaved spaces demonstrate how powerful actors use violence as a 
basis for creating order and discipline while seeking to build on their de-facto power 
through engagement with policy makers and urban politics (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009). 
In such instances, for example, community organisations that emerge as neighbourhood 
watches can easily morph into violent, ethnocentric bodies (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2008). 
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The situation may worsen in cases where residents lose trust of the formal policing 
system. Given that the literature on fragile cities highlights how non-state actors who 
command authority may appropriate the juridical functions of contract enforcement or 
sentencing for crime (Pillay, 2008; Budhani, Gazdar, Kaker and Mallah, 2010), it becomes 
more important to consider how processes of enclavisation may heighten vulnerabilities 
and marginalities in enclaved spaces, as well as propelling similar processes of 
enclavisation in other parts of the city.  
In such an urbanism, as I will further elaborate in Chapter 8, the relationships between 
enclavisation and violence are therefore often circular. Processes that seek to install 
governmentality, discipline and control over populations often do so with violent 
outcomes. The growth of such processes is often linked to increasing insecurity at the 
domestic and international levels, tied to the increasing mobility of the urban poor and 
democratisation of their rights. The megacity is both a place where violence is structurally 
played and a potential site of ideologically/politically motivated ‘urban insurgency’. 
Enclaves are thus attempts to enforce immobility on those considered criminals, as well 
as to erect barriers against surrounding ‘criminal places’. On the one hand, the process of 
enclavisation is in itself a form of violence, as it creates structures that reduce the life 
chances of those ‘outside’. Turner (2010) offers a parallel between the US experience of 
‘ghettoisation’ and the stringent citizenship laws imposed on external migrants as similar 
forms of exclusion. In both instances, those excluded from access (to decent housing or 
citizenship) face reduced opportunities to integrate into the economic and political life of 
the city. On the other hand, the literature on the violent megacities of the South points 
towards enclavisation as a process that emerges as a way of creating order in a city 
otherwise characterised by disorder (Caldeira, 2000; Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Gayer, 
2014).  
As violence escalates, repressive state policies are enacted in response to appeals by 
urban residents who see the poorer neighbourhoods as sites of incivility and extreme 
disorder. The poor are thus represented as perpetuators of violence and not only suffer 
from inter-communal personal violence but also from state-led violence. As Galtung 
(1969) asserts, the increasing intensity of personal violence is a manifestation of latent 
structural violence. The perpetuation of violence—structural and political—in such 
urban conditions is a situation that Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois refer to as ‘chains, 
spirals and mirrors’ or the ‘continuum of violence’ (2004: 1). In this way, I argue that by 
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creating conditions that engender structural violence, enclavisation perpetuates another 
form of violence that is manifested by the politics of control as well as repressive state 
policies.  
Enclaves also spatialise governmentality, i.e. they sort, order and control people though 
notions of inclusion and exclusion and the categorisation of inside and outside (Diken 
and Lausten, 2005; Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). This exercise becomes one of governance, 
and in many countries of the global South this governance often extends beyond the 
state (Swyngedouw, 2005). Whether or not this signifies a ‘retreat’ of state power remains 
debatable and is beyond the scope of my argument here, but it does signify a 
transformation of state power. Moreover, as alternate systems of governance, enclaves 
appropriate power and enjoy the possibility of manipulating political leaders and the 
state. Nevertheless, as sites of governmentality and power, the politics surrounding 
processes of enclavisation and enclaved urbanism closely link the phenomenon to 
violence. While emerging as safe havens in response to crime as violence, enclaves also 
perpetuate violence by politicising urban space and creating conditions under which 
contests over space amongst urban residents and between urban residents and the state 
fester. 
Therefore, reviewing processes of enclavisation in relation to forms of governance and 
authority in urbanism in the global South makes it obvious that enclaves are significant 
geopolitical sites which spatialise contested rights, power and authority in the city. While 
urban space is divided and territorialised, processes of providing protection and 
discipline subjugate populations. In this respect, enclaved spaces are constituted as sites 
of power and alternative authority. Paying attention to these shifts opens up the debate 
and allows enclaves to be viewed as spatial outcomes of a renegotiation of democratic 
engagement and the social contract (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006), as well as helping to 
highlight how enclaves are agential geopolitical spaces. Equally significantly, it helps 
underline how enclavisation and violence are relational and circular processes. 
Conclusion 
Having previously argued that current scholarship on enclavisation and enclaved 
urbanism is limiting for scholars working on enclavisation in cities of the global South 
because related literature does not sufficiently address the multi-scalar, relational and 
processual nature of power in cities of the global South, nor does it elaborate the 
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complex relations of power in most post-colonial cities and states, In this chapter, I have 
aimed to redress this conceptual gap. I have presented a framework within which to 
contextualise the multi-scalar and multi-sited relations of governance and power in 
enclaved cities in order to understand enclaves as agential geopolitical spaces. 
In this chapter, I have highlighted how enclaves embody myriad forms of governance 
and emerge as important urban geopolitical spaces. By showing how processes of 
enclavisation are tied to multiple and divergent relations of governance and urban 
political life, I have elaborated how processes of enclavisation are productive in 
reconfiguring relations of power and politics in the city. Moreover, using examples from 
Karachi and other cities of the global South, I have elaborated how the production of 
enclaves symbolises as well as perpetuates contests of control over different levels of 
governance. Finally, I have explained the relations of power and politics in the enclaved 
city, outlining how this ties to urban socio-political relations, state power and authority. 
Through this, I have argued that enclavisation and violence are closely linked, and that 
their linkage is a circular, self-perpetuating phenomenon 
This chapter is therefore crucial in developing a framework for understanding the 
relations between enclavisation, governance and politics in cities of the global South. It is 
also important in linking enclavisation to more contextual processes of urbanisation in 
such cities. In this way, it builds on my earlier defined agenda to ‘post-colonise’ the 
literature on enclavisation and enclaved urbanism. Overall, the arguments and 
explanations presented in this chapter elaborate how power and politics are structured in 
post-colonial enclaved cities, and they help explain how enclaved spaces interact with 
state spaces in contemporary postcolonial cities. This chapter therefore informs my 
analysis of enclavisation and violence in Karachi in part II of this project. In Chapter 6, 
for example, I introduce processes of enclavisation in relation to governance and urban 
political life in Karachi. In embedding this analysis within the specificity of governance, 
politics and citizenship within the city, I am able to highlight how different enclaves in 
Karachi emerge as unique socio-material and socio-political assemblages that crystallise 
varying forms of citizenship. Similarly, in Chapter 8 I elaborate how the restructured 
relations of power and politics in the enclaved city couple with the socio-political 
consequences of enclavisation, and thus perpetuate violence and conflict in the city. 
Before moving on to these empirical chapters, in the next chapter I will outline a suitable 
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methodology for studying enclaves and enclavisation through the reconceptualisation 
proposed thus far. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING ENCLAVES AS RELATIONAL 
PROCESSES 
In earlier chapters, I have offered suitable frameworks through which I can critically 
analyse enclaves and enclavisation in Karachi. Thus far, I have reconceptualised enclaves 
as dynamic spaces that are produced through everyday negotiations of urban space, 
security, governance and social relations in cities with infrastructural development, 
multiple actors in urban governance and conditions of insecurity. Moreover, by 
unpacking enclaves as assemblages I have highlighted that enclaves are socio-material, 
performative, agential and political processes that spatialise social difference, 
subjectivities and governmentality. Understanding enclaves as such helps highlight how 
enclaves restructure relations of urban power and politics in ways that may perpetuate 
urban violence. To summarise, the key propositions I have highlighted in Part I of this 
thesis are as follows: 
1. Enclaves are socio-material and political assemblages.  
2. Enclaves are performative spaces that create political subjectivities. 
3. Enclaves are agential processes that restructure relations of urban governance 
and socio-politics in ways that engender urban violence. 
In this chapter, I will present the methodology that has guided both the fieldwork I 
carried out in Karachi and my analysis of the data collected for my study of the above-
mentioned propositions. In the first section, I will briefly introduce the intellectual 
processes that have guided my research strategy. In the following sections, I will outline 
my research strategy and design in more detail. I will explain my choice of ethnography 
as a method, my reasons for following a case study approach, my case selection, the 
means through which I collected data and the methods of data analysis. I will conclude 
with a discussion on the practical and ethical responsibilities associated with my research 
methodology, and some limitations. 
Assembling a Suitable Methodology for Studying Enclaves Relationally 
In this section, I will outline my research design in light of relationality and assemblage, 
both of which are key concepts that underpin my research. Overall, I will explain how 
my theoretical framework (outlined in the previous chapters) has led me to study the key 
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propositions of this thesis. I will justify my focus on urban relations as a site of analysis, 
and the use of the concepts of relational space, agency, performativity, subjectivity and 
identity for this analysis.  
Research Design  
An assemblage is, first, an ad hoc grouping, a collectivity whose origins are historical and 
circumstantial, though its contingent status says nothing about its efficacy, which can be quite 
strong. An assemblage is, second, a living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with 
energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it. An assemblage is, third, a web with 
an uneven topography: some of the points at which the trajectories of actants cross each other are 
more heavily trafficked than others, and thus power is not equally distributed across the 
assemblage. An assemblage is, fourth, not governed by a central power: no one member has 
sufficient competence to fully determine the consequences of the activities of the assemblage. An 
assemblage, finally, is made up of many types of actants: humans and nonhumans; animals, 
vegetables, and minerals; nature, culture, and technology. (Bennett, 2005: 445) 
Jane Bennett (2005: 445) articulates the concept of assemblage as a contextual, 
topographical, ad-hoc grouping of humans and non-humans along which action and 
relations of power are dispersed unevenly. In Chapter 3, I mentioned ‘assemblage’ as a 
concept that is central to my description as well as characterisation of enclaves. I clarified 
my use of the concept in detail in Chapter 3, explaining how it best serves to capture an 
understanding of enclaves that is emergent, processual, constantly shifting shape and 
composed of socio-material and socio-political relations. As suggested by Bennett (2005: 
445), an assemblage is a complex whole which is conjoined through relationality between 
its parts, which include the human and non-human. It may be thought of as an emergent 
and transient structure—a sort of permanence—that comes into being through the 
various interactions of its parts (McFarlane, 2011). 
Based on the assumption that assemblages are made meaningful through the relationality 
between their parts, identifying and tracing the social and political relations of the various 
objects underpinning and constituting assemblages is critical for studying processes and 
outcomes related to assemblages (Mutlu, 2013). Salter and Mutlu (2013) further highlight 
that it is possible to map processes surrounding the emergence and transformation of 
assemblages by tracing relations between the objects and subjects (both human and non-
human) that comprise the whole.  
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Methodologically, this means that to identify the best method for gathering data to study 
enclaves as socio-material, political and agential processes, it is important for me to think 
of key relations tied to each of my research propositions and the core concepts that will 
be useful in studying these relations. I have illustrated this in detail in the methodology 
table on the next page. In making this table, I was able to recognise ethnography as a 
suitable method for gathering the necessary information, and I was able to identify the 
means through which relevant information can be collected. However, before I go on to 
elaborate these methodological choices in the next section, I would first like to examine 
in more detail the concepts of performativity, actant, agency, power, identity and 
subjectivity, which are central to any task of studying relations within assemblages with 
the intent of studying my research propositions (see table 5 below). In the following 
section, I have outlined these concepts in detail, grouping them together in such a way 
that they cover particular propositions. 
Studying Agential Assemblages 
The first set of concepts, which are central to studying the first and last proposition 
illustrated in table 5 are those of performativity, actant and agency. The concept of 
performativity is methodologically suitable for studying assemblages as outcomes of 
discursive-material relations. Performativity (explained in more detail in Chapter 3), as a 
concept that identifies objects through stylised acts of repetition (Butler 1990; 1993), is 
helpful in studying assemblages because it reveals how the iteration of particular material-
discursive relations produces stable structures. As I elaborated in Chapter 3, the concept 
of performativity will be helpful in highlighting how enclaves are constituted through 
repetitive acts of bordering and curtailing urban circulations.  
Similarly, the concepts of actant and agency are also extremely useful in capturing the 
relations within different parts of the assemblage. The concept of ‘actant’, which is 
prominent in Actor Network Theory, is relational. An actant refers to the human or non-
human mediator which modifies other actors (within the assemblage) through a series of 
actions (Latour, 2004: 75). It therefore refers to the source of action which has the ability 
to produce effects, and it is not discriminatory regarding whether this source lies in 
human or non-human actors, thus distributing agency within the assemblage (Bennett, 
2005). The concept of actant is therefore useful in tracing how socio-material 
assemblages come to exist and how the various parts act together to produce particular 
outcomes. In my empirical analysis, I emphasise how certain actors and objects relate  
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Table 5: Methodology for studying enclaves as relational and agential processes. (Design adapted from Salter and Mutlu, 2012) 
Key Argument Enclaves are socio-material assemblages constituted through contextual multi-scalar socio-political relations between various actors, material objects and 
spatial processes. A focus on relationality indicates a theorisation of enclaves as performative, agential spaces that create political subjectivities and 
perpetuate urban conflict and violence. 
Key Propositions Key Relations  Key Concepts Method Collection (data) 
Enclaves are socio-material 
and political assemblages  
Multi-scalar relations between enclave 
residents and other governance actors; 
relations between mobility and socio-
material and discursive processes of 
securitisation; emergence; process; 
continuity; and transformation  
Performativity (relationality between discourse 
and materiality) 
Actant (mediator between actors in a system) 
Agency (capacity of objects to shape relations) 
Ethnography 
 
 
Observation (field notes, material 
culture) 
Respondent practices and 
experiences (interviews, field notes) 
Discourse (text from interviews, media 
reports, popular culture) 
Enclaves are performative 
spaces that create political 
subjectivities  
 
Tensions, contests and negotiations 
between and amongst different 
enclave dwellers, workers and visitors; 
subjugation through material and 
discursive bordering practices 
Norms (culture of group); Identity (self/other, 
inside/outside, excluded/included) 
Performativity (bordering practices and 
identity construction) 
Power and subjectivity (discursively produced 
subjectivity) 
Ethnography 
 
Observation (field notes) 
Respondent practices and experiences 
(interviews) 
Discourse (text from interviews, 
reference to popular representations 
through casual interactions) 
Enclaves are agential 
processes that restructure 
relations of urban 
governance and socio-
politics in ways that 
engender violence 
 
State-society relations of enclave 
residents; relations between enclave 
governors and state institutions; 
relations between urban residents 
inside and outside enclaves  
Identity (in group/out group) 
Power and subjectivity (discipline, 
governmentality, discursively produced 
subjectivity) 
Agency (capacity of enclaves to impact politics) 
Ethnography  
 
Respondent experiences (interviews, 
field notes) 
Discourse (grey material, media reports, 
text from interviews) 
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together to produce certain outcomes. For example, in Chapter 6 I outline the various 
associations and relations that emerge from events such as insecurity, infrastructural 
disruption or precarious conditions of living to produce differently formed enclaved 
spaces. Similarly, in Chapter 7 I outline how socio-material and discursive processes of 
securitisation assemble in various ways to restrict circulation in different ways in each of 
my study sites. 
Meanwhile, the concept of agency within socio-material assemblages refers to the 
capacity of the object to effect change in the world. This concept too is relational in 
nature, and I use it in the micro and macro context. By this, I mean that I am interested 
in agency within micro-assemblages (i.e. enclaves), but also the agential capacity of 
enclaves to change power and politics in the macro-assemblage (i.e. the city). In the 
macro-context, the concept builds a layer upon the concepts of performativity and 
actant. For example, given that enclaves are materialisations of discursive-material 
iterations, and secondly that there are various ‘actants’ within the socio-material 
assemblages that make up enclaves, the concept of agency attends to the impact that 
individual actants have within enclaves on their immediate surroundings (objects 
affecting bodies in micro-environments), but also on the wider city (i.e. enclaves as 
agential socio-material assemblages within the macro-environment). Following Bennett’s 
(2005) work on locating agency within the North American electricity blackout, agency 
within micro-environments and macro-environments is best studied at particular eventful 
moments. Methodologically, this means identifying how different forms of agency are 
mobilised, where such agency originates, and what effect it has in relation to other actors, 
institutions, discourses and structures (Aradau et al., 2014; Mutlu, 2013). It is with the 
help of these concepts that I will be able to highlight how enclaves change urban socio-
political relations in potentially violent ways. 
 Studying Contests of Space and Political Subjectivities  
The second key argument that I make is that enclaves create political subjectivities and 
constitute contested identities. As I highlighted in table 5, this argument intersects the 
second and third research propositions, and can be studied through an analysis of social 
relations constituted at various ‘nodes’ of the assemblage, at particular moments. For 
example, the relations between different human and non-human objects and users of 
enclaved spaces (e.g. visitors, residents, workers, security infrastructure or architecture) at 
passage points might reveal tensions, contests and negotiations between and amongst 
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different users of space and highlight subjectivities that emerge through material and 
discursive bordering practices. In this regard, the key concepts that guide investigation 
are space, identity, subjectivity, and power.  
While I have detailed the concept of space in much detail throughout, I would like to 
define the concept of identity as I use it. I take the concept of identity as a relational 
construct that is discursively and performatively constituted (Butler, 1990; 1993). Taken 
in this critical sense, identity can be applied as a category of social and political analysis 
that reveals expressions of group affiliations either imposed by dominant forces or 
contested through subversive tactics (Butler, 1990). In the case of enclaved spaces, the 
concept is useful for revealing the contested nature of place-identity (i.e. what enclaved 
space means for its users), as well as for highlighting the significance of spatial practices 
in constituting identity and subjectivity (for example rules for screening service providers 
more carefully than residents constitute service workers as dangerous subjects). In this 
way, the concept brings out the political nature of enclaved space by highlighting 
contests, negotiations and tensions in space.  
Similarly, I would also like to define my use of the concepts of power and subjectivity, 
both of which are relational constructs. Foucault defines power in different stages in his 
books The History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish and his work on governmentality 
(Foucault and Faubion, 2002; Foucault 1991a; 1991b). He defines power as a relational, 
diffuse and ephemeral concept, and traces relations of power in the discursive field, 
suggesting that knowledge and power are intertwined, as regimes of truth establish 
subjectivity by controlling how people define and position themselves within the social 
world. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1991a) gives the example of the panopticon to 
describe how power is diffused through society through disciplinary technologies which 
mediate relations of power between the sovereign and the subject. He elaborates how the 
design of the panopticon, which allows constant surveillance, creates an environment by 
which prisoners self-regulate themselves in fear of being found in violation of the rules. 
This is also elaborated in his work on governmentality, where Foucault (1991b) suggests 
that governmentality is a mode of governance by which individuals internalise the effects 
of state power and believe that the well-being of the individual is linked to the well-being 
of the state. Foucault’s concept of power is therefore extremely relevant for 
understanding the political environment of enclaves. The processes of securitisation and 
related practices of bordering in effect create discourses and mediate relations of power 
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and hence subjectivities amongst and between urban residents and various urban 
governance actors. Overall, once again, an analysis of social relations through these 
concepts will help illustrate the agential nature of enclaves in restructuring urban relations 
of power and politics in ways that are productive of urban violence. Below, I will explain 
how ethnography is a suitable method for operationalising this research design. 
Ethnography as Method 
Thus far, I have outlined the socio-material relations central for investigating my research 
propositions, and I have explicated relevant concepts for analysing these. As I have 
suggested in table 5, given my research objectives of studying urban relations, 
ethnography is a suitable method for data collection. In this section, I will explain why 
this is so in more detail. 
The aims and activities of ethnography are described by Geertz as:  
Establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking genealogies, mapping fields, 
keeping a diary, and so on. But it is not these things [...] that define the enterprise. What 
defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in, to borrow the notion from 
Ryle, ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973: 6). 
Indeed, it is the very notion of ‘thick description’ that makes ethnography an extremely 
useful method. The key task in ethnography is to be holistic in gathering data, arrange it 
in ways that present recognisable patterns and then contextualise this within wider 
processes to fully understand the phenomenon (Geertz, 1973; Hanwerker, 2001). This 
promise of conducting exploratory research (Schensul and LeCompte, 2012; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000) along with a commitment to contextualising emerging patterns within 
phenomena has popularised ethnography in research which aims to study relations 
between various actors. 
Ethnography, or thick description, has traditionally been a popular method used in 
anthropology for studying various aspects of social life such as culture, identity, power 
and marginalisation. Given the exploratory nature of the method, there are flexibilities 
associated with the research design which allow researchers to follow lines of inquiry as 
events unfold or new information emerges. Because of its attention to both verbal and 
non-verbal details, and the possibility of conducting research through observation as well 
as participation, ethnographies have also been extremely useful in developing and 
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contributing to the subjects of social marginalisation and exclusion, which are sensitive 
and difficult to explore otherwise (Bourgois, 2002; Gregory, 2003; Kuper, 2003). The 
embeddedness of the researcher in the field (as a participant observer) makes contrasts 
between the private and public worlds more visible. The relationships developed between 
the researcher and participants allows access to the ‘insider view’ of the society or people 
being researched in contrast to other quantitative methods that only provide an outsider’s 
perspective.  
In the past few decades, however, ethnography has also been adopted by Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) scholars, operationalising elements from Actor Network 
Theory, who aim to study intersecting relations within and between various objects 
(human and non-human) within networks and assemblages (Star, 1999; Bennett, 2005; 
Latour, 1996). The appeal of ethnographic methods for studying relationally produced 
phenomenon is summarised by John Law (2004) below: 
Realities are not explained by practices and beliefs, but are instead produced in them. 
They are produced, and have a life, in relations. So what we need is ethnography, or what 
Mol calls praxiography. [...] A praxiography allows us to investigate the uncertain and 
complex lives of objects in a world where there is no closure. [...] It allows us to explore 
the continued enactment of objects. And as a part of this, it allows us to investigate the 
multiplicity of those objects, the ways in which they interact with each other (Law, 2004: 
59). 
The quotation above, while highlighting the advantages presented by ethnography as an 
explorative method, also signals the potential difficulty of ‘containing’ the inquiry and 
delimiting the exercise of gathering data while tracing processes. Here, I would like to 
point out once again how the researcher is significant within the project. As related by 
O’Reilly (2005), ethnography is an iterative-inductive approach. The method is inductive 
in the sense that the researcher does not start with the expectation of testing set 
hypotheses, but instead starts out with very few propositions in mind so as to keep a 
focus on the messiness of reality. At the same time the researcher also plays an important 
role in shaping the research through iterations, i.e. a constant to and fro between what he 
observes in the field alongside and guiding preconceptions/theories which help shape the 
direction of the project (O’Reilly, 2005). It is for this reason that reflexivity—i.e. critical 
reflections on the researcher’s positionality, limitations and other factors which influence 
the quality and output of research—is an important concept in ethnographic research. 
97 
 
 In the next section, I will explain how I operationalise ethnography as a method for 
studying enclaves as agential socio-material assemblages that create tensions in space, 
security and circulation, produce subjectivities and perpetuate urban violence. 
A Case Study Approach 
In this section, I present an argument for a case study approach to studying enclaves. 
Next, I will describe the sites which will make up my case studies, explaining how these 
will be useful for illustrating the arguments presented in the first part of this thesis. I will 
then summarise the methods used for data collection. 
A case study approach presents opportunities for collecting and analysing in-depth, 
contextual data.  
[...] most case studies feature descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of 
not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic 
observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim 
quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than 
explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to the 
understanding of the case. (Stake, 1978: 7) 
The above quote highlights the promising qualities of case study analysis for studying 
relational phenomena such as enclavisation and governance. Case studies are usually 
undertaken to exemplify a situation, though the method can be applied in various ways 
depending on the type and aims of the study. The method allows for an in-depth 
investigation of what the case is i.e. an individual, population, event or structure (Stake, 
1978). While the method can also be descriptive, it is largely used for explanatory 
research (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) highlights case study research as being used to explore 
causation in order to find underlying principles—the method usually asks ‘how’ and 
‘why’ outcomes occur in an uncontrolled environment. For the purpose of this research, 
case studies will flesh out the various typologies of enclaves and the emerging socio-
political relations which result from processes of enclavisation.  
Case study research places heavy emphasis on in-depth analysis: Ethnographic data from 
case studies presents thick description of interrelated variables, and the importance of 
understanding the case allows a flexible protocol for studying the object of analysis (Yin, 
1984). The approach is also extremely useful for studying a real-life phenomenon within 
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its contextual conditions, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
its context are not clear (Yin 1982; 2009). The method requires that the research strategy 
is strictly followed through (selecting the site/sites, collecting and managing data and 
analysing information) in a logical way (Yin, 2009). As a result, a clearer understanding of 
a phenomenon is presented through case study analysis, and opportunities for further 
examination may be opened up. In this way, case studies not only test, but may also 
generate theories (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
Case studies are increasingly popular in urban studies research, and are progressively 
featured in critical research that critiques the universal generalisability of established 
phenomenon across different contexts (Coutard, 2008). I find this approach useful for 
my research because it can allow me to simultaneously study and compare different 
enactments of enclaves and enclavisation in Karachi. The emphasis on contextual data 
would allow me to analyse the ethnographic data collected from each case in relation to 
wider processes in the city. Such an approach will allow a more varied and nuanced 
understanding of enclaves and urban life.  
However, case study research can also fall into the trap of essentialising certain 
phenomena. Applications of comparative case study research have been critiqued for 
generalising the experiences of a single city or a part of a city to predict wider urban 
trends, as well as for fetishising the origins of a phenomenon to the city where it was first 
studied (Robinson, 2006; Ward, 2010; Hogan et al., 2012). I argue that my conceptual 
groundings counter such potential misappropriations of my case studies. Moreover, I 
have purposefully selected widely divergent case study sites in order to illustrate the 
variety of physical forms and variations of functions and structures that enclaves create 
and support. Furthermore, my commitment to relational comparative strategies and my 
understanding of the contextual nature of socio-material assemblages ensure that I avoid 
inaccurate extrapolations on my part as well as discouraging misappropriation of my 
findings.  
Finally, on a broader scale, the very fact that my cases are situated in Karachi, a megacity 
of the global South, helps subvert the existing frameworks of enclaved urbanism which 
rest on paradigmatic cities of the global North. As I have argued in detail in the 
introductory chapter, my choice to situate my research in Karachi is a response to 
Robinson’s call for post-colonising urban theory (Robinson, 2006), and Roy’s (2009) 
encouragement to locate new geographies of theory. My focus on Karachi will help to 
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dislocate the dominant narrative of the North American gated community and its 
variations as a prototype for enclaves, while also drawing attention to alternative 
processes of governance, planning and securitisation in a burgeoning megacity of more 
than 20 million people which largely remains off the map in urban studies. Having given 
this brief overview of my choice of city, in the following section I will provide more 
detail of my case study sites within Karachi, and outline my reasons for choosing these. 
Case Selection 
I have outlined above the reasons for my choice to focus this study on Karachi, as well as 
justifying the generalisability that Karachi offers to scholars wishing to use this case study 
for comparison. Here, however, I will present more details of the particular sites I have 
chosen for in-depth analysis. Within Karachi, I have decided to choose case study sites 
from neighbourhoods in Saddar Town and Clifton Cantonment, which are the central 
districts of the city. I have selected case study sites from the central districts of Saddar 
and Clifton for three main reasons: firstly because of the strategic relevance of these 
districts; secondly because places within these districts are becoming increasingly 
fortified; and thirdly because of the blunt contrasts which exist between governance 
structures and socio-political life in these neighbourhoods. 
As areas that lie in the city core, Saddar and Clifton are more densely populated than any 
other district, and they are the oldest settled parts of Karachi. For this reason, these 
districts are symbolically and strategically significant for Karachi’s governors (Hasan, 
1999). Saddar is often metaphorically referred to as the ‘heart’ of Karachi. It houses the 
financial district, the city government offices and the historical bazaar area, while the 
city’s elite residential areas, shopping districts and leisure centres lie within the 
neighbouring area of Clifton. Moreover, as I described in the introductory chapter, these 
central districts are also becoming increasingly fortified because the changing nature and 
intensity of violence in Karachi has deeply affected security in these areas. Parts of 
Saddar lie within the security red zone (see figure 9 on following page). The prevailing 
insecurity is not only intensifying militarisation of strategic buildings at threat from 
terrorist violence, but the escalation of political violence and crime is also pushing 
residents living in ordinary neighbourhoods to turn towards enclavisation. The high 
number of enclaved neighbourhoods within Clifton and Saddar therefore makes it an 
ideal area to study the relations within and between enclaved spaces, and how these 
affect everyday life in the city centre. 
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Figure 9: Map of Saddar and Clifton, showing Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad
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Equally significantly, Saddar and Clifton display glaring socio-spatial inequalities. As the 
oldest parts of Karachi, they are scarred by the uneven history of infrastructural 
development and the fragmented nature of urban governance in the city—both of which 
are remnants of Karachi’s colonial past. As a result, the juxtapositions of the historic and 
the contemporary, of public and private spaces, of elite residential areas and katchi abadis, 
are more stark and proximate in the city’s central districts. Here, contiguous patches of 
land have been developed and are managed by the city government, cantonment boards 
and private (informal) land developers—a situation which usually causes confusion and 
contests over jurisdiction between the multiple governance actors, frequently resulting in 
crisis.  
Within this part of Karachi, I have selected three different enclaves that lie in close 
proximity to each other. These are Askari III (a gated community), Clifton Block 7 (an 
enclosed neighbourhood) and Sultanabad (an ethnic enclave). As Figure 9 on the 
previous page shows, these three sites are within a 5 mile radius of each other, and are 
also close to the security red zones. Askari III is a middle class, multi-ethnic gated 
community built in the late 1980s which houses ex-military and civilian residents. This 
gated community was developed and is managed by the Cantonment Board, one of the 
several governing bodies of Karachi. The Cantonment Board is an institution which 
dates back to British times and falls under the rubric of the Ministry of Defence, placing 
it beyond scrutiny or control by the civilian city government. Given its reputation for 
militaristic control and order, civilians hoping to escape the problems of insecurity and 
disorder in Karachi have recently started moving into the neighbourhood as tenants.  
Clifton Block 7, on the other hand, is an ordinary public neighbourhood which was 
developed by the Karachi Development Authority in the 1970s. It is an upper middle 
class neighbourhood, mostly populated by Ismaili Muslims (a minority sect of Islam in 
Pakistan). Following failures in municipal governance and increasing fear of crime and 
sectarian violence, residents—who are mostly businessmen and high ranking serving and 
retired government officials—have recently organised themselves into a residents’ 
association and have taken to enclosing and privately securitising the neighbourhood. 
My third case study site is Sultanabad, a low income neighbourhood which originated as 
an informal squatter settlement or katchi abadi in the 1940s. With the exception of a few 
blocks, most parts of the settlement have been regularised. Sultanabad is a densely 
populated and ethnically heterogeneous settlement which is fast expanding due to an 
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influx of Pashtun migrants pouring in from the war-torn Pakistan-Afghan border. 
Despite not being bounded at all, Sultanabad is perceived as an enclave by the other 
residents of Karachi. The imaginative geographies of danger and criminality related to the 
multi-ethnic and highly politicised katchi abadi discourage outsiders from entering. While 
Karachiites perceive all of Sultanabad to be one enclave, the settlement is in fact further 
fragmented into various ethnic enclaves. 
I have selected Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad for data collection keeping my 
research design in mind. As an approach to data collection, the case study offers a thick 
description of the complexities of the situation, focusing on a variety of viewpoints and 
sources (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009). In this context, my choice of sites are appropriate 
because they offer insights into the variations in types of enclaves, and complexity of 
enclaved urbanism in Karachi. More specifically, I have selected these three sites for five 
main reasons. I will elaborate these in detail below. 
Firstly, I chose these three particular enclaves because of their conformability with 
prevalent descriptions of enclaves. On the surface, each site corresponds to a popular 
type of residential enclave that is outlined in the literature (Caldeira, 2000; Blakely and 
Snyder, 1997; Glasze et al., 2006; Marcuse, 1997). For example, Askari III offers an 
example of a highly fortified gated community, Clifton Block 7 corresponds to what 
scholars describe as an enclosed neighbourhood and Sultanabad is a typical ethnic 
enclave. Secondly, I felt that these enclaves would make good case studies because of 
their proximity to each other. As well as sharing a common immediate environment, the 
proximity of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad leads to frequent interactions 
between the people who are resident in these enclaves. Residents of Askari III and 
Clifton Block 7 have friends or distant relations living in either enclave whom they visit 
often, while residents of Sultanabad work in both Askari III and Clifton Block 7 as 
domestic workers, drivers or security guards. This proximity and interaction between 
each enclave would be helpful for analysing the everyday interactions and relations 
between these enclaves. 
Thirdly, and more significantly, I selected these sites because they are not only 
representative of the diverse forms which enclaves can take, but they also have different 
histories, functions and structures. As described in the previous paragraph, each site has 
emerged as an enclave through different circumstances and has been developed and 
settled through varied processes. Moreover, their residents have different 
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ethnic/sectarian/political affiliations and socio-economic status. As study samples, these 
diverse sites are therefore representative of the heterogeneity of Karachi, and therefore 
allow me to study differentially spatialised socio-political relationships within an enclaved 
urbanism. Taken together, these three sites offer an analysis of enclave formation and 
enclavisation through a variety of structural, class and political positions, and will hence 
ensure that my study is well rounded. Moreover, another aspect of diversity that these 
three sites offer is that of governance structures. For example, Askari III is administered 
by an executive committee overseen by the Ministry of Defence; Clifton Block 7 is an 
ordinary neighbourhood where a recently incorporated residents association assists the 
city government in carrying out its municipal and security governance functions within 
the enclave; and in Sultanabad, community elders govern everyday life in the 
neighbourhood by liaising with political patrons (at the city, provincial and state 
government level). In this respect, each neighbourhood offers a different perspective of 
changing state-society relations, a key focus for my study.  
Fourthly, I have chosen these sites because each was created in response to different 
particular fears of insecurity. As an enclave that is well known for its affiliation with the 
military, Askari III has recently increased its security following increased risk of terrorism 
in the city. In response to the military operation against terrorists, Karachi has witnessed 
an escalation in terrorist attacks, most of which target state and military machinery. On 
the other hand, Clifton Block 7 has buttressed its security protocols following an increase 
in ordinary crime such as robberies, kidnappings, vehicle snatching and muggings in the 
neighbourhood and its surrounding areas. Finally, enclavisation in parts of Sultanabad 
has emerged in response to increasing ethno-political violence in the city, while in other 
parts of this large neighbourhood it has emerged in response to state-terror. 
Finally, I chose these three study sites because these were the most accessible of an array 
of similar choices available within Saddar and Clifton. However, I would like to highlight 
that selecting my case study sites according to accessibility has not resulted in any 
sampling biases, especially as each site chosen within the sampling framework is as 
ordinary as those not chosen for the purpose of this study. This is especially clear when 
recalling my broad conceptualisation of enclaves as processual assemblages, whereby 
each enclave is a unique constellation of architectures, actors, cultures, imaginative 
geographies, performative practices and governance structures, producing varying 
relations, actants and agents. Keeping this consideration in mind, even if the 
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particularities of the chosen study sites may differ from those not chosen, a study of 
social-political relations within these sites and between these sites and the city would 
highlight the distinct, dynamic and political nature of enclaved spaces in the same way as 
if I were studying any other enclave within the city.  
Having outlined my overall methodological framework, research design and case 
selection in this section, in the next section I will present my means of data collection 
and provide practical details of data collection, emerging limitations and ethical concerns.  
Practical Details and Means of Data Collection 
I conducted fieldwork in Karachi over the course of six months, spread over three visits. 
Given that I had lived and worked in Karachi previously, I was able to gather substantial 
data within my six months of fieldwork, as I did not have to spend time establishing 
contacts or familiarising myself with the local culture and language. On my first trip, I 
visited different enclaves within the city to conduct preliminary observations. On this 
visit, I tried to find enclaves that matched the criteria and descriptions of enclaves which 
I had read about in human geographical, sociological and anthropological literature on 
enclaves. As I highlighted in the introductory chapter, in this visit I was able to identify 
inconsistencies with what I had read about enclaves in urban studies literature. I found 
Karachi’s enclaves to be more physically open, built through different rationales and 
more porous than what I had read about gated and fortified enclaves. These 
inconsistencies between the literature and my fieldwork data led me to reflect on and re-
think my conceptual framework for studying enclaves. For this reason, my preliminary 
field visit was extremely influential in shaping the critical conceptualisation of enclaves 
which I presented in the earlier chapters. It was also helpful in my case selection, where I 
chose widely different case study sites in order to illustrate the diversity of types of 
enclaves. Following this, the next two phases of fieldwork were substantive. 
Over my second and third rounds of fieldwork, I collected around 48 in-depth 
interviews. I collected 13 from each of my case study sites and nine from outside. Within 
the case study sites, I interviewed residents, enclave managers, security guards and 
visitors (including maids and drivers). Outside my case study sites, I interviewed serving 
mid-level and senior city government officials, an owner of a private security company, 
mid-level and senior police officials, the ex-mayor of Karachi and professional urban 
planners and activists. Some of these interviews were gathered in the last phase of 
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fieldwork, while in the last phase I also returned to some of the people I had previously 
interviewed for more explanation or to confirm my initial analysis.  
Before I outline the interviews and other means of data collection in more detail and 
explain how these correspond with my theoretical framework and research design, I 
would like to explain some practical issues of access to neighbourhoods and interview 
subjects. In most cases, I gained access through friends (or friends of friends) and ex-
colleagues. For example, in Askari III, my first interview was with the sister of a friend of 
mine who allowed me to visit her. In Clifton Block 7, an ex-colleague informed me of 
the site, while I established contact with the residents’ associations myself, whereas I 
visited Sultanabad with a driver previously employed by my brother, who lived there. He 
introduced me to a former city councillor who lived there, with whom I established a 
relationship, thus gaining access.8 Although these introductions allowed me initial entry, 
there are important practical and ethical considerations and limitations tied to this which 
I will discuss in more detail in the next section. Here, I will only focus on details of data 
collection. 
Once I had access to these neighbourhoods, I selected respondents through a 
combination of snowballing and random sampling techniques. Snowballing is a process 
that refers to gaining access to interview respondents with the help of leads or 
introductions from previous interviewees (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Although this 
strategy has been criticised for not being adequately representative of the views of people 
beyond a limited social network, as well as for resulting in community biases (Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981), it is still considered a valid and effective sampling strategy for 
obtaining in-depth and quality interviews from otherwise impenetrable groups (Atkinson 
and Flint, 2001). For me, this strategy was helpful for obtaining interviews from residents 
in Clifton Block 7 and Askari III, as I had obtained very few interviews through cold 
calling. However, in each site, I managed to obtain at least two interviews from residents 
via cold calling. For interviews with workers, visitors and security guards I used random 
sampling methods, trying to reach respondents personally when ‘hanging out’ in each 
enclave. For interviewing enclave governors or members of residents’ associations, I 
made formal applications.  
                                                 
8 Access to government and police officers and urban planning professionals was made possible through 
formal interview requests. 
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Once I had gained access to the field sites and established independent relationships with 
respondents, I went about collecting data for analysis. In the rest of this section I will 
elaborate the means of data collection and highlight how these satisfied my inquiry into 
enclavisation and urban socio-political relations in Karachi. In the following section, 
however, I will present more detail on my limitations, biases, and ethical concerns raised 
by my sampling methods and methods of access. I will also elaborate my positionality as 
a researcher and how this affected data collection and interpretation. 
Participant observation 
First, during fieldwork I spent time in my selected sites to observe interactions between 
residents, workers, users, managers and governors of enclaved spaces; as well as patterns 
of movement into and inside enclaved spaces. In my repeated visits, I particularly 
observed issues of acceptance and access, particularly at points of entry and exit. This 
was to trace how patterns of circulation for residents and non-residents varied at each 
site across identity-based registers (ethnicity, class, colour, gender and affluence) and by 
mode of entry (pedestrians, motorists and cyclists). Such an exercise which focuses on 
crossings and movements along the boundaries/borders of enclaves will help in 
discovering the phenomenological aspects of enclaves and enclaved spaces, i.e. the 
relations between material things and moving and perceiving bodies. As Büscher and 
Urry highlight, ‘Through investigations of movement, blocked movement, potential 
movement, and studies of immobility, dwelling and place making, analysts are showing 
how ‘moves’ make social and material realities’ (Büscher and Urry, 2009: 99). Such 
observations, supplemented by interviews and casual interactions, will also allow a critical 
analysis of enclave borders as dynamic spaces that create subjectivities (Parker and 
Vaughn-Williams, 2009). 
I also gathered observations by sitting in residents’ association meetings, administrative 
offices and community events within my selected sites. As Munck and Sobo (1998) 
suggested, these were extremely helpful in allowing me to develop meaningful insights 
into community concerns and perceptions of enclosure and insecurity, as well as relations 
between community members, associations governing the enclaved spaces and other 
urban governance bodies.  
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Interviews 
Second, I conducted unstructured, in-depth interviews with residents, workers, users, 
managers and governors of enclaved spaces. Observations and reflections from my field 
notes allowed me to frame a few leading questions which would open up responses. 
Discussion with residents and users of enclaved spaces focused on the challenges of 
negotiating life in an insecure city and on the complexities of living/working within 
enclaved spaces. Community leaders/managers of such spaces, as well as government 
officials, were repeatedly interviewed to piece together information on processes of 
enclavisation; relations between the underpinning structures of governance, residents and 
the city government; and relations between urban security and enclaved spaces. 
Media reports and grey material 
Third, media reports and grey material played a very important part in shaping my 
research. Literature collected from online newspapers, NGO libraries and local policy 
documents helped me to understand contextual issues relating to municipal and security 
governance in Karachi. This has been very useful for me in understanding politics and 
processes of enclavisation in Karachi. Similarly, notices presented by key informants and 
circulars collected from home associations have been helpful in highlighting discursive 
practices of enclavisation as well as the documented notions of personal and collective 
identity and difference. 
Field notes 
Finally, I kept a field journal, in which I recorded my interviews and observations. As 
Silverman (2010) and Madison (2011) suggest, I found reflective field notes especially 
helpful in developing my research questions and critical insights. After recording my 
reflections, I would share these with my research participants on a regular basis during 
casual interactions. Sharing my thoughts allowed me to present and hence question my 
assumptions regarding the field, and also helped qualify and validate my observed 
findings. I also made it a point to regularly discuss my thoughts and pose questions to 
friends living in Karachi (outside of study sites). These sessions were often very helpful 
for me in thinking through what I had observed in the field or even just adding useful 
context of which I was not aware to some piece of information. While I have done my 
best to obtain the information required in the most satisfactory and ethical ways possible, 
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I have faced some challenges. Below, I will elaborate the main limitations and the 
practical and ethical concerns that arise from this research. 
Practical Limitations, Possible Biases and Ethical Concerns 
In the course of my fieldwork, I found that cultural issues and my positionality as a 
middle class Pakistani woman both mediated and stunted my interactions in the field (c.f. 
Mandel, 2003, Merriam et al., 2001). I found that I had to negotiate this carefully—and 
often very differently—for each case study site. While I found it easy enough to gain 
access to my research sites, I was consciously aware of my gendered socio-economic 
position, especially in Sultanabad where I was more of an ‘outsider’. While I had 
expected that it would be hardest to gain trust in Sultanabad, I was pleasantly surprised 
that respondents were extremely happy to see a middle class woman break the normal 
rules of social (dis)engagement and show interest in their lives and their neighbourhood. 
Yet, throughout my study sites, I often felt that I had to take a more submissive and 
passive persona in order to persuade my respondents to accept me (Arendell, 1997). On 
the one hand, this allowed me to mitigate the usual power relations which strengthen the 
position of the researcher against that of the researched, while on the other hand it 
meant that I could not always push forward proactively in approaching potential 
respondents or develop more casual relations with them. Although these were limiting 
factors in establishing deeper relationships with respondents in ways that ethnographic 
accounts suggest, I still felt that these cultural norms did not limit me in obtaining access 
to respondents or gaining their trust (Merriam et al., 2001). If anything, working within 
cultural norms earned me respect and continued access. Furthermore, being a woman I 
was always treated courteously, and people went out of their way to help me. Moreover, I 
was able to access male as well as female respondents, and this was useful for me in 
achieving a gender balance in my responses. 
The practical considerations arising from issues of access were not just linked to identity 
and related cultural issues. Problems of safety were also evident in negotiating fieldwork 
and access. Research in an insecure and dangerous environment necessitates creative 
responses which sometimes go against the grain of conventional ethnographic enquiry 
(Kovats‐Bernat, 2002). I chose my research sites keeping personal safety in mind, 
knowing that I would require gatekeepers to help me build relationships within the 
communities. I used my links with friends living in Karachi, in Askari III and Clifton 
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Block 7, to access residents and managers of these enclaves. Keeping in mind the 
prevalence of violent crime in squatter settlements, I had to balance the ethical 
problematic of asking my brother’s ex-driver to guide me around the settlement where he 
resided. This was a necessary step to ensure my safety in the field, though it was 
impossible to shake off the power relations (as his ex-employer’s sister) that mediated 
our relationship. Also, my access to Sultanabad was further cemented through support of 
the local union council leader who lives within Sultanabad. As a respected member of the 
community, his introduction provided me with some level of protection as well as 
support. This may have caused bias as respondents may not openly voice concerns or 
accept me as unbiased. I attempted to mitigate this by a few short interactions with 
workers in Clifton Block7 and Askari III who lived in Sultanabad. I felt that perhaps 
being away from the environment and its encumbrances might allow people to speak 
more openly and freely. 
Having outlined these practical limitations, I will now turn to a reflection on my personal 
biases and my strategies for mitigating these. Various authors critique ethnography as a 
method and suggest that the researcher may affect or effect outcomes by becoming a 
research variable, or that issues of representation and hence legitimation might dilute the 
reliability, validity and objectivity of ethnographic research (Marcus, 1998; Hammersley, 
1992; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). However, as O’Reilly (2005) suggests, it is impossible 
to separate the researcher from the research context, and instead it is important to accept 
and acknowledge positionality and to be reflexive about this throughout the research 
project. I have therefore stayed conscious of any personal biases that might exist prior to 
or during the investigation. In order to stay reflexive, I noted down personal 
emotions/feelings during and after fieldwork and critically assessed these at the end of 
the day. This reflexivity has helped me to stay focused throughout the fieldwork, 
especially as at times it became a particularly emotional exercise. It was impossible for me 
not to suffer at the inequalities and violence that I witnessed or heard of, or to remain 
disengaged and dispassionate when speaking with people who may support such 
structures or who may be victim to them. In my case, given the loop of observations, 
interactions and interviews, it is true that I may have affected research variables through 
involvement in the lives of participants and by inadvertently questioning and probing an 
otherwise ubiquitous phenomenon. However, this criticism is challenged by feminist 
scholars who argue that researchers can never fully separate or distance themselves from 
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participants, and that in fact any attempt to do so might create power inequalities 
between the researcher and the researched (McDowell, 1992). 
Related to this is the ethical issue surrounding my relationship with my respondents. In 
gaining privileged access, I was careful to keep the trust they vested in me intact. This 
was done by repeating my understanding of the situation as respondents describe it, and 
sharing my initial analysis along the various stages of fieldwork. This added to the 
integrity of my research, while helping to balance the power dynamics of the relationship, 
as my respondents might feel more like participants in my research. Another significant 
ethical issue is that of protecting the interests and rights of the participants in my 
research. The American Anthropological Association stresses that information taken 
from participants must be with their consent, and conditions of anonymity must be 
respected (American Anthropological Association, 2009). Although I was able to get 
verbal informed consent, a few respondents were hesitant to provide written informed 
consent. Initially, this posed setbacks for my research. A few respondents who were 
initially open to being interviewed subsequently declined, and particularly those who 
could not read were mistrustful of signing a document which I had explained verbally. 
This was not surprising given the environment of insecurity in Karachi and the nature of 
my project, which asked questions which explored personal interactions with securitised 
spaces and political structures. A lot of respondents agreed to be interviewed with the 
caveat that they would not sign any paperwork. I proceeded to record these interviews 
and include them in my research, after gaining verbal consent.  
Having outlined these details on data collection, I will elaborate in more detail below how 
this rich information on enclavisation gathered in each study site will be analysed. 
Methods of Data Analysis 
Personal observations, the practices and experiences of respondents and the discourses 
gathered during field work are all useful in providing information for studying the 
various relations produced by and productive of enclavisation. For example, by exploring 
relations between the various objects that comprise enclaves, and by tracing relations 
between the discourses which constitute enclaves and the practices which perform them, 
enclaves can be studied as processual socio-material assemblages. In analysing these 
relations, key concepts such as performativity, actants and agency have helped make 
sense of the data that I collected through ethnographic methods.  
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Similarly, I have studied inside/outside relations and inclusion/exclusion within and 
between my different case study sites. A comparative approach to studying such varied 
instantiations of access and inaccessibility, inclusion and exclusion and security and 
insecurity has helped configure an accurate interpretation of how restrictions on 
circulation affect identity, subjectivity and urban space. The data collected through 
interviews and personal observations was also analysed to reveal respondents’ 
experiences as well as their practices for negotiating contested space and emergent 
subjectivities.  
To contextualise some of the responses, I have applied discourse analysis, a method 
which seeks to uncover the political and historic (discursive) construction of symbolic 
systems and social orders (Howarth, 2000). It seeks to investigate the different ways in 
which social practices challenge as well as articulate the discourses that make up social 
reality (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000). Discourse analysis is rooted within the 
theoretical assumption that all objects are discursively constituted (i.e. their meaning 
depends on socially constructed rules). An analysis of particular data as a discursive form 
forms the basis of such an analysis. This data, known as text, is wide ranging and can be 
linguistic as well as non-linguistic. It includes actions, interviews, manifestos, policy 
reports and historical events, as well as institutions (Howarth, 2000).  
 Discourse analysis can highlight how social practices form the identity of objects and 
subjects through social imaginaries. It can lay bare hegemonic practices which attempt to 
produce collective imaginaries and social myths, as well as establishing how political 
identities are formed/dissolved (Laclau, 1994). For this reason, the method can be 
extremely useful for understanding how identity and difference is constructed in spatial 
terms (as it can help inform how ‘place’ is a marker for social inclusion/exclusion). My 
own methods of conducting discourse analysis were as follows. From news reports and 
my own field notes, I carefully noted instances where allusions to violence and insecurity 
were tied to location, or perpetuators of crime and violence were pointed out as a 
particular group of people or even people belonging to a certain place. I also noted 
whether the choice of living in localities had any links to security, crime or fear. This 
helped draw a link between the ‘representation’ of conflict and the subjectification and 
identity formation of people who live in these ‘insecure and conflict ridden’ areas. 
Attention to such details has meant that I am able to present a richer and more detailed 
analysis of the politics of space, identity and difference across the three case study sites. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have operationalised a methodology for theorising enclaves and 
enclavisation as relational processes. Foregrounding my onto-epistemological emphasis 
on relationality, I have presented an appropriate research design through which I will be 
able to gather data relevant for studying enclaves as spaces that are productive of urban 
violence. More specifically, I will use ethnographic methods to study the socio-political 
processes of enclavisation, relations of governance and urban political life, relations 
between space, security and circulation in enclaved spaces, and tensions, contests and 
negotiations between residents, visitors and workers within enclaves and between 
enclaves and the city. By studying these relations, I will be able to exemplify the socio-
material and socio-political nature of enclaved spaces and highlight the agential and 
political nature of enclaved spaces. Moreover, in elaborating my research methodology, I 
also explained that I will use a case study approach in gathering and analysing data. 
Relatedly, I introduced my three case study sites—Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and 
Sultanabad—while outlining my rationale for selecting these sites. I further explained my 
sampling techniques, methods of data collection, the limitations of these choices and 
other practical and ethical issues. Following this, I presented my methods of data 
analysis. 
This chapter concludes the first part of this thesis. In the following three chapters, of 
which part II consists, I will present my empirical analysis. Each of these chapters 
presents facets of identified relations (through key propositions) linked to processes of 
enclavisation and urban politics. In Chapter 6, I trace the processes of enclavisation 
within Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, and explain how each enclave emerged 
as a differentially spatialised response to contemporary and historical processes of 
splintering urbanism, the crisis of urban governance, widespread insecurity and political 
exceptionalism in Karachi.  
In Chapter 7, I present how enclaves both shape and continue to be shaped by patterns 
of circulation, processes of securitisation and performative security. In examining the 
material, discursive and performative processes of bordering and securitising in detail, I 
argue that enclaves are often discursively produced and that enclave ‘borders’ are not 
best defined by urban form. Instead, I argue that enclave borders are permeable and 
dynamic. In this chapter, I also elaborate tensions between enclaved space and 
circulation, which further highlight that enclaves produce political subjectivities and 
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identities. The chapter thus suggests that identity is tied to relations between 
enclavisation and circulation, and that enclaves have fluid borders which regularly shift 
and blur to accommodate or exclude people. 
In the final empirical chapter, I build on the evidence presented in the previous chapters 
and focus on the relations between enclavisation and urban violence. Here, I elaborate 
how processes of enclavisation restructure urban socio-political and state-society 
relations. While residents’ associations appropriate functions of sovereignty and 
exacerbate the vulnerabilities of marginalised populations, processes of securitisation 
produce racialised identities. Moreover, processes of enclavisation also re-arrange the 
relations of power and governmentality. Such outcomes disturb the existing balance of 
power amongst and between the various private and public governance actors in the city, 
often with violent consequences. Therefore, in this chapter I demonstrate how enclaves 
can be understood as significant political actors that perpetuate cycles of urban violence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VARIED RELATIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND URBAN POLITICAL LIFE 
IN KARACHI’S ENCLAVES 
In this first empirical chapter, I will introduce my three case study sites: Askari III, 
Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad. More specifically, I will provide an overview of the 
context within which each enclave was formed, the governance structure of each enclave, 
the urban socio-political relations in response to which each enclave emerged and the 
state-society relationship that each enclave coalesced. I will therefore highlight how 
Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad all spatialise differentiated forms of citizen 
engagement in response to governance failures in Karachi. In the end, I will argue firstly 
that Karachi’s enclaves spatialise social, material and political inequalities in the megacity; 
secondly that they are self-perpetuating spaces that relationally reproduce existing spatial 
inequalities; and finally that processes of enclavisation in Karachi both operate through 
and reinforce cultures of political patronage and alternative institutions of urban 
governance. In conclusion, I will summarise the key points presented in the in-depth case 
studies concerning relations of governance and urban political life and I will tie together 
the way in which all three enclaves are relational to each other. In this way, this chapter 
offers a first glimpse into the way in which enclavisation may change relations of power 
and politics in the city and hence escalate urban violence. This is a theme that I 
introduced in Chapter 4, and which I will pay more attention to in Chapter 8. 
However, in describing enclavisation in this chapter, I will not delve into details of 
security practices, the physical security architecture and the specific urban form of each 
enclave. I will focus on these issues in greater depth in the next chapter. Though these 
aspects are equally significant for understanding the political and agential nature of 
enclaved spaces, I find that entering into these details at this point would distract me 
from the key objective of this chapter, which is to follow the framework suggested in 
Chapter 4 so as to contextualise processes of enclavisation in Karachi through relational 
processes of urbanisation, and in so doing, to reveal the macro-politics of enclavisation.  
Askari III: An Enclave of Order in a Sea of Disorder 
Usman, a resident of Askari III, describes the gated community as a ‘sea of order in a city of 
disorder’. This middle class enclave is located near the densely populated and extremely 
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busy downtown bazaar district of Saddar (see figure 10).9 The area is a thriving multi-
ethnic and mixed income residential area. It is also the seat of government offices, five 
star hotels and important foreign consulates, as parts of Saddar lie within the security red 
zone. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, despite heavy securitisation and 
fortification around the area, Saddar is frequently paralysed by violence (Ullah, 2012; The 
News, 2012; Dawn News, 2011b). Residents of the area live with the constant threat of 
disruption to their everyday lives caused by ethno-political violence, mobs of angry 
rioters and suicide bombings. They also live in perpetual fear of crime, especially as 
Saddar is the second largest hotspot for cell-phone and vehicle snatchings in Karachi 
(Cplc.org.pk, 2014). As in other parts of Karachi, life in Saddar is also often made 
unbearable by the constant inconveniences caused by municipal mismanagement and 
crisis. The central district is notorious for substandard municipal upkeep, regular 
electricity outages and the non-existent public water supply.  
 
Figure 10: 'Saddar Town’. Source: Flikr, photograph by Damien Entwistle, 2008. 
                                                 
9 The ‘Saddar’ area is different from the Saddar Town administrative district. The Saddar area is the historic 
city centre, parts of which are governed by the cantonment board while parts fall under the city 
government’s jurisdiction. 
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Figure 11: Askari III main entrance gate. Source: Photograph by Ejazdar, 2011. 
 
 
Figure 12: Askari III Commercial Avenue. Source: Photograph by Ejazdar, 2011. 
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Figure 13: Canteen Stores Department (CSD) shop in Askari III. Source: Photograph by Ejazdar, 
2011. 
However, life in Askari III (pictured in figures 11, 12 and 13 above) is very different 
from that outside. Amna, a house wife who has recently moved to Askari III, elaborates 
this further, explaining: 
When there is trouble in the city, people get quarantined inside their houses. For us, it is not as 
depressing. Thank God I can bring my kids down to the park where they can play tennis, and 
our special events can continue in the community centre. Even the market (inside the complex) 
remains open, so it’s easy to get everyday groceries. We are not worried about stray bullets or 
rioters disturbing us as we go about our day! 
Similarly, Molly is happy to elaborate the advantages of life in Askari III: 
Here, there are few water problems. In fact, hardly ever! Garbage disposal is timely – it is done 
by Askari’s own contractor. The mosque is extremely well maintained, and the building gets 
painted on the outside every year. […] The electricity situation isn’t as bad as in other parts of 
the city either. There is load shedding for only 3 hrs a day.  
Such interactions with Askari III residents demonstrate how those inside live a much 
more secure, predictable and comfortable life compared to other Saddar residents living 
outside of the gated community. Residents of the gated community also speak 
enthusiastically about how living in Askari III takes them back to the Karachi of old, as 
densification and commercialisation haven’t ruined the sense of community, municipal 
water and electricity provision supplies continue uninterrupted and people feel so secure 
that they can happily state that they can ‘sometimes even leave our front doors unlocked 
119 
 
when we step out to the mini-mart!’. Minahil, a mother of two young children who had 
recently moved to Askari III from an apartment in Clifton explained: 
I like this mohallah [communitarian] style of living – where we socialise with our neighbours in 
the park or pop over to their flat to ask for a missing ingredient. It takes me back to my 
childhood days.  
In this regard, Askari III is an archetypical gated community. It offers its residents 
security, premium service delivery, a comfortable lifestyle, a sense of community and a 
well-ordered environment (cf. Glasze et al., 2006; Atkinson and Blandly, 2006). Quotes 
such as ‘Once I enter the gates, I feel relieved and safe’, or ‘No one can over-price here – 
the army is very strict about fair prices’ show how the gates act as a symbolic form of 
order and separation from the chaotic city—one that gives residents an immediate sense 
of safety and confidence. However, as is common in many such gated communities 
(Peyroux, 2006; Low, 2001), residents have to conform to the strict normative 
framework that structures the use of space and everyday life within the community. 
Many do this grudgingly, yet having their individual freedoms compromised is a bitter pill 
they are willing to swallow given the range of advantages that living in the community 
offers: ‘Yes, I do resent that I’m not allowed to sell or rent out my house without their 
(the Executive Committee’s) approval’, said Asad, a businessman, ‘But that’s just how it 
is’. Naz had a similar opinion: ‘I feel bad. My maid complains that they check her bags all 
the time, especially when she is on her way out, and she hates it. She’s been working for 
me for so long. But I guess we don’t have a choice’.  
 
Such expressions illustrate how well Askari III conforms to the notion of a heterotopia, 
which Foucault describes as a space that exists in otherness, ‘another real space, as 
perfect, as meticulous, as well-arranged, as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled’ 
(Foucault, 1997: 356). He further describes such spaces as illusions that conceal 
exclusions which people submit to in order to escape there. Yet, while residents live in 
Askari III to escape the city of disorder, for many the choice is based on limited options 
in a city where life is always a struggle. As I will outline in the rest of this section, Askari 
III’s production as an enclave is largely a function of the unequal civil-military relations 
in Pakistan and their effect on urban governance, politics and experiences of citizenship. 
Created as a residential space for retired military officers, Askari III is now extremely 
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popular amongst Karachiites whose priorities between security and democracy have 
become skewed: living in Askari III is a lifestyle choice which denotes a disaffection with 
citizenship rights and signifies dilemmas of attachment to the public realm (Sennett, 
2000; Low and Smith, 2006), especially in the context of an increasing reliance on the 
Pakistan Army as saviour. 
Civil-Military Relations, Disaffected Citizenship, and Enclavisation  
Let me tell you, you can go around all the (housing) societies that are developed. […] You won’t 
find this kind of thing anywhere on a private development—whether that is in Clifton or 
Gulshan-e-Iqbal. This amount of open space, green areas, parks for kids to play in or 
cleanliness doesn’t exist anywhere else. Wherever the army is, it has done well! 
These remarks were made by Colonel, a resident and a senior member of the Residents’ 
Executive Committee which governs the day to day functioning of Askari III. In his 
comment, Colonel credits the Karachi Cantonment Board, a civic body that falls under 
the ambit of the Ministry of Defence, lauding its municipal planning and management 
skills as superior to those of Karachi’s civilian city government and other land 
development agencies. Karachi is in fact an archetypical splintered megacity, where, as I 
explained in tables 1 and 2 in Chapter 4, the realm of urban governance is fragmented 
between various city level, provincial and federal authorities. The distribution of powers 
among these various scales of governance is often manipulated by the federal 
government as a way of maintaining ‘control’ over the city, often causing confusion and 
ambiguity and problems of efficient urban planning and municipal service delivery. The 
cantonment areas, however, do not suffer any of these confusions, and as a result remain 
well managed and governed. Figures 14 and 15 displayed below show the neatly ordered 
communal spaces within Askari III, while figure 16 illustrates the contrast between the 
environment inside and outside the cantonment area. 
In fact, Askari III is not only unique for being so well-planned and managed, but also for 
being one of the very few horizontally developed lifestyle communities in Karachi. 
Unlike in other cities of the global South, privately developed gated communities are not 
common forms of residential development in Karachi as yet (Caldeira, 2000; Landman, 
2006; Falzon, 2004). In most Pakistani cities, gated communities such as Askari III have 
developed as housing societies to provide affordable homes to professionals working 
within government institutions (Hasan et al., 2013). Askari III, for example, was settled in  
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Figure 14: Park inside Askari III. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
 
Figure 15: Uniformly planned apartment complexes in Askari III. Source: Photograph by author, 
2011. 
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Figure 16: ‘Goodbye Karachi Cantonment’. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
the 1960s by the Ministry of Defence to address the housing needs of ex-army officers. 
Even though it was exclusively built to house members of the armed forces, a significant 
number of residents today are civilians, as properties have changed hands over 
generations and many have come onto the rental market.  
In telling the history of Askari III, Colonel explained that Askari III used to be an open-
plan neighbourhood, but was walled and gated in the 1990s. Colonel stated that at the 
height of ethno-political violence between the MQM and state forces during the mid-
nineties, ‘the green open areas of this place became a dumping ground for dead bodies’. 
While the perimeter walls and gates effectively provided adequate protection from such 
acts throughout the 1990s, in the past few years security in the enclave has been visibly 
enhanced to counter increased threats of terrorist violence and crime. Armed security 
guards patrol the neighbourhood, strict mechanisms control entry and the gates have 
been physically reinforced. As I explained in the introduction, I will elaborate these 
processes of securitisation and enclavisation in more detail in the next chapter, while here 
I will only focus on the relations of urban governance and politics through which the 
enclave was formed. 
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Following my reconceptualisation of enclaves in Chapter 3, I found that Askari III is an 
enclave not just because of its fortified physical structure, but also because of the 
juridico-political structures underpinning it. Since the gated community is built within the 
cantonment area, its administration and control is divested from the authority of the 
civilian government and related institutions. Cantonment areas are a remnant of 
Karachi’s colonial past, and were initially British military enclaves which accommodated 
military depots, camps and/or garrisons to house officers and auxiliary personnel. After 
independence, control of these cantonment areas was passed to the Pakistan Army, but 
even then these areas lay outside the remit of the civilian constitution. Today, many 
cantonment boards have entered the profitable business of real estate development for 
commercial use, and as a result the various cantonment boards in Karachi—including the 
KCB which governs Askari III—are independent local bodies governed by the Ministry 
of Defence. 
As it is built within a cantonment area, Askari III benefits from subsidised and 
preferential supply of electricity and water in a city where these utilities are otherwise 
scarce and frequently disrupted. This privilege is a function of legal agreements with the 
Karachi Water and Sanitation Board (KWSB) and the Karachi Electric Supply Company 
(KESC), which have been shaped by successive military dictatorships to favour military 
enterprises. In a country where the military enjoys unparalleled power and authority, such 
agreements serve to increase the prestige and value of military and development 
enterprises at the cost of other government and private land development projects 
(Siddiqa 2007).10  
Although the Karachi Cantonment Board is the administrative authority which overlooks 
Askari III, budgeting and day to day running and administration is maintained through a 
voluntary Residents’ Executive Committee. The committee is structured along army 
                                                 
10 However these inequitable agreements have recently been challenged by the KESC and the KWSB 
(Dawn News, 2009a; Dawn News 2009b), who have taken legal action against the cantonment board in a 
bid to end these preferential agreements (Express Tribune, 2013; Express Tribune, 2014a). The legal 
argument is based on the fact that cantonment areas no longer hold military significance, but instead the 
military is slowly becoming a ‘land baron’ while flourishing on public subsidies (Dawn News, 2011c). The 
KESC and KWSB have sought legal action after facing severe financial difficulties caused by cost 
inefficiencies. Previously, the ordinary public has been made to bear the cost of agreements which are 
preferential towards cantonment boards, but this financial model is no longer practically or politically 
sustainable. 
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hierarchies, and its members are approved by Station Headquarters in Karachi. It is 
headed by a president and vice president who are usually retired colonels or higher 
ranking officers. They in turn preside over six other committee members (four retired 
army officers of major rank and two civilians). The committee members manage a small 
number of paid staff who are hired to prepare and manage the budget, oversee cleaners, 
security guards and handymen, manage rents and payments from shopkeepers and also 
follow up on service provision complaints. For living in the community, residents are 
charged a reasonable tax in the form of ‘maintenance fees’ for the range of services they 
receive. When it comes to having a say in setting the agenda or in the Executive 
Committee’s decision making process, residents are mostly sidelined. As Colonel put it:  
We do listen to them and hear their (residents’) suggestions, even though we might not be able to 
implement everything. It is impossible to make everyone happy. […] Not all of them want the 
same thing. We make decisions that offer a common benefit for the whole community. 
The administrative structure of Askari III is therefore militaristic and authoritative. As 
the majority of executive committee members are retired or serving officers of the armed 
forces, the current administrative structure is overly representative of military interests. 
However, even though the rule-setting and decision making environment is biased 
against the under-represented civilians, most civilians living in Askari III do not lament 
their loss of democratic freedom much. The majority of those interviewed had little 
confidence in the current democratically elected government to deliver basic rights such 
as security and good governance. Even though there is a general acceptance that 
successive military takeovers disrupt natural political processes, and that in the long term 
military governance destabilises the polity (Malik, 2001; Gregory and Revill, 2008), those 
living in Askari III find the weight of the everyday insecurities, struggles and disruptions 
which come with democracy more unbearable. Irfan’s comments below sum up the 
contempt residents have of democracy for having failed them, especially when 
considering the current state of affairs: 
The police are a source of insecurity rather than security, the government is extremely corrupt. 
Look at all the violence in Karachi. Look at the high food prices, electricity shortages, fuel price 
rises. Current events have completely destroyed my trust in these institutions. The only time the 
government runs properly is when it is under the Army’s baton! 
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Irfan’s comment about mismanagement in the face of recurrent instability was reflective 
of popular sentiments within Askari III, whose residents were clearly disaffected citizens, 
willing to retreat from public space by way of rejecting the public sphere (Smith and 
Low, 2006). Irfan’s nostalgia for military rule and his disaffection with democracy is also 
common in other similar cases, where residents of newly democratising states become 
dissatisfied with insecurity and everyday uncertainties, and wish for the stability and order 
that military rule offered (Benson, Thomas and Fischer, 2011). The regimented 
organisation of municipal services, security, the clockwork maintenance of common 
spaces and the well-controlled, socially homogenous environment are actually craved in a 
city where everyday life frequently spirals out of control. Hashim, a civilian renting in 
Askari III, articulated this in one of our conversations: ‘If only rules could be enforced 
everywhere like they are here (in Askari III), we’d have such a beautiful city and a 
prosperous country’. 
Such sentiments are illustrative of the imprint of military dictatorships in generating a 
discourse of deliverance and progress, and they resonate especially with Karachi’s middle 
class. The military has ruled the country for more than 30 of the 66 years since Pakistan’s 
independence. Despite the fact that the last military regime was driven out of power in 
2008 after a popular political uprising which demanded the restoration of democracy, 
today most middle class urban residents nostalgically evoke the order and stability of the 
dictatorship years. They continue to regard the military as the antithesis of all the current 
problems associated with democratic government in Pakistan. The army is popular with 
many Pakistanis, who believe it is able to deliver prosperity and security due to its 
historical success as an institution. In contrast, the democratic government is seen as 
ineffectual and corrupt. History has shown that political negotiations between coalition 
parties result in perpetual uncertainty over who holds power. Civil conflict often ensues, 
and the government repeatedly loses credibility and legitimacy, especially as local and 
international expert opinion-makers tend to classify such governments as inefficient and 
corrupt (Malik, 2001; Gregory and Revill, 2008). In such an environment, the idea of the 
army as a saviour, or as an institution that has mastered the art of governance, starts 
gaining strength. Manan, a retired major living in Askari III, echoed this sentiment: 
The point is: why does the whole nation look to the armed forces for solutions? I don’t know! 
Their work, their job, their planning is the best. This has been the same since 1947. The army 
comes to power because there is this wish that the army should rule, it does the best job at that. 
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Everybody knows that! It is not an ideal system of governance, but it is still the hope of the 
people that we will uplift the country—I don’t know—make it heaven. 
Manan’s attitude, and that of others like him, is largely in line with the ethos of Askari 
III. In creating a space structured around strict and enforceable rules and regulations, 
Askari III’s governing body creates a highly controlled and predictable environment 
within which residents can live and go about their daily lives. For some residents, 
however, this overt governmentality is less palatable. This is the case for most civilians 
living in Askari III, who are less used to rigid militaristic discipline in everyday life. Yet, 
Askari III remains desirable for them as a space that offers privileges that they are willing 
to make sacrifices for. Sana, one such resident, elaborated this:  
We a get new circular with new rules every day. We must inform those at the gates if we expect 
guests, we can’t water our garden, paint our house the colour we like or hang our clothes outside 
to dry. […] I just don’t like this kind of life, but what do you do? You know what life in 
Karachi is like. No water, no electricity, no security! 
Sana’s comments suggest that the varied rules and regulations imposed by the Askari III 
authorities on its residents are definitely seen as inconvenient, imposing and even 
restrictive of basic freedoms. Yet, Sana and other such dissatisfied residents understand 
that life outside the enclave can be harsher in the unpredictable and volatile city. Other 
interviewed residents echoed this, and were quick to forgive the militaristic 
administrators for the high degree of social control they exert, because they inspire a 
sense of confidence and a promise of deliverance. ‘It’s the only way to live in Karachi’, 
said Hashim, a resigned resident.  
Such interactions with Askari III residents, when contextualised within the history of 
land development, unequal civil-military relations, conditions of insecurity and the crisis 
of civilian governance, allowed me to understand the processes through which Askari III 
flourished as an enclave which is a popular place to live for a certain class of Karachiites, 
especially as everyday life in Karachi becomes more volatile and unpredictable. Askari III 
residents clearly reject the public sphere, which they find is laden with uncertainty, 
unpredictability and chaos. Instead, they prefer to live within a tightly controlled 
environment, even if this means that this may curtail personal freedoms, or that they may 
be forced to comply with rules they disagree with. In fact, Askari III residents resign 
themselves to unequal representation and rights to participative decision making and 
127 
 
place their trust in the army—especially after their disappointments with the democratic 
experience within national politics.  
Keeping in mind Holston and Appadurai’s (2003) argument that the city is a place where 
experiences of citizenship vary, I will now illustrate how enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 
takes place through a reassertion of democratic rights by the urban middle class. In the 
following section, as I have done for Askari III, I will trace enclavisation in Clifton Block 
7 through the lens of relations between governance and urban political life. The 
introduction below will demonstrate how Karachi’s enclaves take different forms and 
crystallise variant state-society relations. Moreover, keeping in line with my arguments in 
Chapter 3 that enclaves are relational processes, I will also highlight how Clifton Block 7 
coalesces as an enclave in response to the fragmented urban governance which is a 
function of cantonment areas. 
Clifton Block 7: An Enclave in Process  
Life always went on in Clifton—no matter who was fighting or who got killed. It is different 
now—we have to be careful. When Benazir was killed, mobs attacked cars on Zamazma, they 
burnt tyres on Teen Talwar, ripping open ATMs along the banks at Schön circle. Even now, 
12 May was shocking—gun fights on the streets! These things never happened here before! 
 
Figure 17: Neighbouring Spaces in Clifton: Block 7 and Tikri Colony. Source: Photograph by author, 
2012. 
Samira, a long-time resident of Clifton Block 7 expressed her shock at the fact that 
popular areas within Clifton had come under violent attack at times when political 
violence in the city flared. Up until recently, Clifton had remained one of the safest 
localities in Karachi. During the military’s ‘Operation Clean-Up’ against the MQM and in 
its violent political aftermath in the mid-90s, a number of residents from older elite 
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residential areas in the north and west of Karachi such as KDA Scheme 1, North 
Nazimabad and Federal B area flocked to Clifton and neighbouring Defence in the south 
of Karachi to escape militant ethno-politicisation.11 Luxury houses and apartments, global 
commercial outlets and entertainment centres flourished within Clifton and Defence, 
popularly considered to be less volatile areas, making the area one of Karachi’s trendiest 
localities. However, this popular imagery of Clifton and Defence as posh localities is 
simplistic, especially as neighbourhoods within this area remain unequally developed and 
socio-spatially polarised. As depicted in figure 52 in Chapter 8 (showing a map of South 
Karachi), and the picture of neighbouring spaces in Clifton above, Clifton and Defence 
are peppered with katchi abadis that make a clean division between the affluent and the 
urban poor.  
The close proximity of katchi abadis and affluent neighbourhoods within Clifton is a cause 
of much concern for affluent residents of Clifton Block 7, who feel increasingly 
concerned that rising political violence in their neighbourhood is due to ‘the scores of 
people who live around the corner, who are knee deep in crime and violent political 
activism. They spill over to our neighbourhoods to earn some easy money looting and 
thieving’. Such attitudes are spurred by the reality of increased crime within Clifton and 
Defence, especially as spatial crime analysis data published by the Citizen Police Liaison 
Committee (CPLC) demonstrates the spike in robberies and burglaries within these 
localities (see figure 18 on the next page). Interviews with data analysts at the CPLC also 
suggest that certain pockets within Clifton and Defence—such as Sea View and Boat 
Basin—are crime hotspots where muggings, car-jackings and kidnappings are frequent. 
In light of these trends, various neighbourhoods in Clifton and Defence, one of which is 
Clifton Block 7, have started practicing enclosure. Alluding to the private organisation of 
security and enclosure in his neighbourhood, Imran, a resident of Clifton Block 7, states, 
‘We have no illusions. We know how incapable the government is—it’s just easier to 
manage it ourselves’. Imran’s words reflect common attitudes to gaps in governmental 
                                                 
11 Defence (short for Defence Housing Authority) is an open plan residential area developed by the Clifton 
Cantonment Board largely as a commercial enterprise. Defence is different to Askari III because it is not 
walled or gated and it was not specifically developed to house those linked to the armed forces, even 
though army officers (serving or retired) are allowed to purchase land at discounted prices. There are also 
no restrictions on civilians purchasing or renting properties like in Askari III. Similarly, the by-laws 
governing Defence are different to those governing Askari III 
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service delivery, whereby Karachiites are accustomed to privately organised individual or 
collective efforts, similarly to cities such as Johannesburg and Maputo (Lindell, 2008; 
Benit-Gbaffou, Didier, and Morange, 2008). 
 
Figure 18: Map of volatile areas in Karachi for robberies and burglaries. Source: Cplc.org.pk, 2014. 
In fact, enclosure in Clifton Block 7 is unique in Karachi for many reasons. Firstly, the 
securitised enclosure is quite wide, extending beyond individual streets to cover almost 
the whole block. Secondly, it is led by a committed residents’ association, which actively 
engages with the municipal government and police and security forces in aiding 
governance. In the process, it receives disproportionate funds, favours and attention 
from the city government, which is happy to support a civic-oriented middle-class. 
Relatedly, and thirdly, the instantiation of the Block 7 Residents’ Association signifies a 
shift in urban middle class politics. In stark contrast to the residents of Askari III, who 
remain disaffected with democratic politics, Clifton Block 7 demonstrates a case where a 
previously aloof urban middle class has re-engaged with urban politics and exercised their 
citizenship rights, albeit in ways that attempt to create expulsions and exclusions of the 
urban poor. 
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 In the wider literature on enclavisation, the production of enclaved spaces is largely 
viewed as an elite retreat from public sphere and public life (Smith and Low, 2006; 
Caldeira, 2000). Yet, I argue that the opposite is true in the case of Clifton Block 7, where 
an analysis of processes of enclavisation demonstrates that the activity of creating 
enclosure and privatising public space is made possible through middle class reassertion 
of citizenship rights in response to insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2009). Holston 
explains insurgent citizenship as the exercise of a ‘right to the city’ by the dispossessed 
urban poor, who confront regimes of citizen inequality through organised social 
movements, appropriation of public spaces and evocation of a rights-based discourse. In 
this section, I will explain how, far from pushing the middle class into a politico-spatial 
retreat (Caldeira, 2000; Holston, 2009), enclavisation denotes an elite assertion of a right 
to the city through active civic engagement. It is this aspect of enclavisation that I will 
pay detailed attention to in this section. 
Associational Politics, Governance, and Enclavisation  
Unlike Askari III, Clifton Block 7 was developed by the city government, hence the 
neighbourhood is a public space. Nevertheless, public access to the neighbourhood is 
now limited by strategically placed road blocks and guarded barriers which attempt to 
monitor and filter movement into the neighbourhood. As I will elaborate in more detail 
in the next chapter, the barriers are open but guarded by private security guards during 
the day, while all except one are closed at night (from 10pm until dawn). Private security 
guards also patrol the neighbourhood 24 hours a day, seven days a week for added 
vigilance. In addition to this, 24 hour CCTV cameras supplement the guards’ gaze. 
Moreover, mobile police units are stationed just outside the main entrance of the 
neighbourhood so as to provide support to the private guards in case of emergency.  
The processes of enclosure and collective security are overseen by the Block 7 Residents’ 
Association. The privatisation of public space within Block 7 also comes with the 
informally-sanctioned privilege, bestowed by the city police, of apprehending criminals 
caught in the area. The city police have also offered their full support to the association’s 
members in related investigations, detentions and trials. Zaman, a senior police official in 
the nearby Boat Basin police station, explains his own opinion of the policy: 
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We definitely don’t have the resources, so we can’t condemn those that do who secure themselves. 
We are here to provide support, and meanwhile we can focus our attention on other troubled 
areas. 
Such practices of devolved security governance and collaborative forms of policing in 
Block 7 are one aspect of enclavisation in the neighbourhood. In fact, processes of 
enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 are tied to wider collaborative arrangements between the 
neighbourhood and the city government. The relationship between the city government 
and the residents of Block 7 developed following a city-wide municipal crisis in 2007, 
when heavy rainfall caused severe flooding in parts of Karachi (see figure 19 below). As 
water stagnated on Karachi’s streets for days and a health emergency became imminent, 
(Qizilbash, 2006; Dawn News, 2006b), the serious incapacity of the city government was 
revealed.  
As the cartoon image in figure 20 shows, the rainwater floods became an issue that 
caused public outrage and the city government faced ridicule. Syed Mustafa Kamal, the 
mayor of Karachi at the time the flooding occurred, continued to defend the city 
government in an interview. He spoke with resignation, arguing that fragmented urban 
planning and governance had led to haphazard infrastructural development in Karachi, 
while the illegal expansion of the city’s katchi abadis has made the problem worse. He 
pointed towards maps showing how most katchi abadis had developed along open storm 
water drains, and over the years had encroached further and blocked parts of the 
network. Yet, conversations with Mustafa Kamal and Clifton Block 7 residents and 
analysis of archival news reports suggests that Mustafa Kamal used the flooding crisis to 
garner support for his political party in areas previously out of the MQM’s constituency, 
and also to lead a campaign to solidify control over urban planning and development 
across the splintered city (Dawn News 2006a; Dawn News, 2007b). Kamal blamed the 
fragmented nature of urban planning and land development bodies for having led to 
infrastructural collapse, arguing that other land development bodies had encroached 
upon existing drainage systems in some places and overburdened them in others (Dawn 
News, 2007b; MPGO-CDGK, 2007).  
The city government also used the crisis as an opportunity to build its support base in 
areas outside its existing constituencies. One such area was Clifton, where the rival 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had historically held sway, especially as it had a wide 
support base within the high density katchi abadis within the locality. However, this  
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Figure 19: Cars fall in potholes following torrential rains in Karachi (2006). Source: Fravahr.org, 
2014. 
 
Figure 20: ‘City Mayor says the situation in Karachi city is under control’. Source: Siasat.pk, 2014. 
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situation soon turned around, especially once Clifton Block 7 residents approached 
political patrons and saw positive results. As Farrah, a resident who was closely involved 
in liaising between the association and the city government, stated: 
We are very supportive of the MQM—especially as we have seen how active they are in 
responding to our calls. We approached the Nazim of Saddar Town, Mrs. Khushbakht 
Shujaat. She was extremely sensitive to our plight, and promised to help us. There was no 
system in the local government. Still, we did it! 260 garbage dumpers were called to lift the 
garbage in one day. 
In the general elections held the following year, Mrs. Khushbakht Shujaat (an MQM 
candidate) went on to win a seat in the National Assembly for the NA-250 constituency, 
which includes Clifton and Defence. The constituency had previously supported Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP) and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) candidates. Mayor Kamal’s 
initiatives and his response to the flooding crisis had paid off. In an interview published 
soon after, Mrs. Shujaat publicly sympathised with the problems faced by her middle 
class constituents:  
So while all of Karachi might have water shortages, people in these areas (Clifton and Defence) 
will buy themselves Rs. 10,000 worth of water, but it isn't something they should have to do. 
On top of the taxes that they pay, which katchi abadi residents don't, they have added expenses 
due to the add-ons such as water or generators they have to invest in (Baig, 2008: 6). 
Mrs Shujaat’s speech reflected the local government’s clear acknowledgement of the 
middle class as tax-paying citizens. It further justified supporting policies that protected 
middle class interests. It also reflected an awareness of her new constituency, which 
comprised middle-class residents who had started to engage in civic politics through an 
entitlement based discourse. Mrs. Shujaat had won by a narrow majority, and her support 
base was the middle class living in Clifton, while her rival belonging to the Pakistan 
People’s Party had received more votes from the neighbouring katchi abadis (Kamran, 
2013).  
The floods therefore served as a watershed moment whereby Block 7 residents were able 
to navigate the messy web of urban governance in Karachi through civic and political 
engagement, realising that the city government was sympathetic to middle class interests.  
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Figure 21: Mrs. Khushbakht Shujaat at the inaugural ceremony of Aga Khan Park. Source: Clifton 
Block 7 Residents’ Association, 2012. 
 
Figure 22: Aga Khan Park inaugural plaque styled in the colours of the MQM party flag. Source: 
Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association, 2012 
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Buoyed by their success, the residents who were involved in resolving the flooding crisis 
started to formalise their initiatives and expand their areas of collaboration with the city 
government. They were now prepared to take more active control of municipal and 
security governance within their neighbourhood. This was the birth of the Block 7 
Residents’ Association, which now operates through its slogan ‘My block, my 
responsibility’. The founding members formally registered the association as a charity and 
decided to run it through an elected governing body. They also kept close ties with the 
MQM and Mrs Shujaat, who emerged as their political patron (see figures 21 and 22). 
Azim, a senior office holder in the association, related that the Block 7 residents became 
popular once the success of collective efforts in delivering a cleaner, greener and safer 
neighbourhood became visible, saying: 
First we had to go door to door to convince people to join us. [...] But now people come after us 
to become members’. In the span of a few years, membership grew from 28 members to 200.  
At this point, the association also started to expand its mandate to include private 
provision of security. As I will highlight in more detail below, the community association 
was able to do this by actively enforcing their citizenship rights through negotiations with 
the city government and other civil society bodies. The step towards formalising the 
association as a civil society body denoted a significant shift in elite attitudes towards 
public and civic life in Karachi. ‘We are honest citizens—but we’ve just never fought for 
our rights before!’ exclaimed Farrah, a recent member of the association. At the same 
time, the association worked as a catalyst for residents to re-orient their expectations of 
the city government. Rejecting a previous disposition towards individually responding to 
infrastructural breakdown, members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association now actively 
claim civic rights by engaging with the city government. ‘We would just sit outside their 
office all day, continuously call them, harass them’, said Imtiaz, a member of the 
Management Committee (MC) which steers the Block 7 Residents’ Association. 
‘Eventually, they had no choice but to listen’, he continued. 
Having cemented their relationship with the city government, members of the 
association organised themselves by setting up task-oriented Management Committees 
(MC). Each MC looked after a specific area of collective interest, and at the time of 
interviewing, these included committees for security, garbage collection, street lighting 
and development, electricity and water. The administrative head of each MC is 
responsible for dealing directly with the corresponding Executive Directors (EDs) of the 
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local government. Through this structure, MC members support EDs in managing and 
administering services in Block 7. Imtiaz elaborated how the association’s strict 
organisation, passion and demonstration of civic responsibility have been rewarded by 
the city government: 
The only reason that the government cannot provide proper services is because it lacks funds. 
Block 7 gets premier services (such as door to door garbage collection), because we take an 
interest in our neighbourhood. No one else (neighbourhood) does. 
 
Figure 23: Block 7 Residents’ Association members sitting with municipal staff. Source: Block 7 
Residents Association, 2012. 
Although the infrastructure and manpower required for carrying out municipal upkeep 
and neighbourhood development are provided by the city authorities, these remain under 
the plan and management of the Residents’ Association (c.f. figure 23). For example, the 
Association sets rules whereby residents are allowed to carry out ‘tree cutting’ only on 
Thursdays, because municipal dumpers are scheduled to collect all debris on Fridays. 
Similarly, the Association has also set up an efficient service monitoring, management 
and complaint system between the neighbourhood and the government departments. 
Security, however, is managed differently. The task of purchasing and installing security 
infrastructure such as barriers, guard rooms and CCTV cameras has been a private 
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initiative, although the CPLC played a guiding role in providing expert advice. Moreover, 
all guards patrolling the neighbourhood are hired privately, thereby making security the 
costliest service provided by the Association. However, the head of MC Security is given 
extraordinary support by the city police through extra deployment of police outside the 
neighbourhood as well as back-up support in apprehending criminals.  
Even though there is no legal precedent for the current system, the fragmented and 
splintered nature of urban governance in Karachi allows flexibilities for innovative 
systems of management such as these. As the literature in global South urbanism 
suggests, illegality and informality are tools that urban residents and governors use to 
plan, develop and govern cities characterised by uncertainties (Vera da Silva and Hirata, 
2007; Simone and Fauzan, 2012; McFarlane, 2012). Therefore, similarly to other cities of 
the global South, the realm of urban governance in Karachi is fragmented, dynamic and 
flexible (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Simone and Fauzan, 2012; Lindell, 2008), allowing space 
for innovative ways of managing everyday crisis in the crisis prone megacity. Although, 
as I will highlight at the end of this chapter, the politics of such initiatives is questionable, 
the method seems to be working well for Clifton Block 7 residents and city officials. City 
government officials and local residents argue that the current system of cooperation and 
devolved governance allows more efficient resource management and better service 
delivery at reduced costs to both the city government and residents. Farrah explains this 
by her observation that ‘now there is less rishwat [bribery] going around. The municipal 
staff have also become more efficient, as they are now liable to answer to people’. 
Similarly, Sitwat, a municipal official, elaborated:  
We know so many workers cheat the system by claiming they’ve been to work—they set up 
arrangements with foremen, but we can’t be present everywhere to monitor them can we? By 
sharing their records of attendance, the Block 7 admin officer is doing us a huge favour. 
Other interviews with municipality officials and the town administration demonstrated 
that the initiatives of Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association and the resultant 
enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 was made more successful because it is warmly 
welcomed by bureaucrats working in city government institutions. In the past decade of 
transition from military rule to democratic consolidation, urban governance has really 
suffered. As I highlighted in Chapter 4, the consistently changing structures of local 
government and the civic contests between different tiers of government have resulted in 
disorder (Gayer, 2012). Infrastructural development in the city has suffered, while 
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delivery of municipal services is also negatively affected. This has left town 
administrators, who are keen to demonstrate good governance to international donors 
through positive results, desperate. Also, in a city where the town administration rarely 
gets any praise, improved performance with the help of urban residents wins accolades 
and hence secures promotions for bureaucrats. The Saddar Town Administrator 
elaborated this as follows: 
With people taking ownership of their neighbourhood, Clifton Block 7 is emerging as a model 
neighbourhood which the city government can claim credit for. In an environment where it 
continuously faces critique for its failures, the successes of Block 7 as a clean, well-functioning 
and secure neighbourhood allow the city government to gain political support and credibility. It’s 
a star we can pin on our shoulders. 
Although such engagement could be considered a novel solution to problematic 
governance in complex megacities, the present ways in which enclavisation is structured 
within Block 7 are not entirely ideal. Presently, there are clear biases in urban governance 
priorities, as the local government rewards the Block 7 Residents’ Association for its 
active engagement in and help with municipal resource management by prioritising the 
needs of the area over other areas perhaps deserving more urgent attention. This is 
especially troubling when considering that prioritised relationships between the city 
government and the residents’ association have recently spilled over to the realm of 
security provision as well. In fact, the form within which enclavisation is practiced in 
Clifton Block 7 runs contrary to the law regarding privatisation of space and 
enclavisation. Although there has been legislation demanding the removal of all street 
barriers (Dawn News, 2008), urban security officials continue to look the other way 
when it comes to Clifton Block 7 and other such affluent localities (The Express 
Tribune, 2014b). When questioned over the legality of their barriers, MC members 
insisted that they have all the necessary permissions in place. Nasir, one of the MC 
members for security elaborated: 
We have permission from the CPLC, and we even sought approval from the Home Office. The 
Boat Basin Police are extremely invested in security in this area—you see the fully equipped and 
staffed police car at the main entrance? So how can all this be illegal? 
By cordoning off access to the public, enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 therefore not only 
blurs the boundaries between formality and informality, but also those between legality 
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and illegality. This is also the case in South African cities, for example, where 
enclavisation and enclosures are often illegal, unregulated and contested (Lemanski, 2004; 
Landman, 2004). Yet, as I will elaborate in the next chapter, the practice is problematic 
because it produces tensions in urban space and exacerbates existing marginalities. In the 
case of Clifton Block 7, enclavisation is evidently possible within a particular governance 
regime in Karachi. Roy (2009c) explains the planning regime in Indian cities along the 
same lines. She highlights that it is an informalised entity characterised by a state of de-
regulation, ambiguity, and exception. Such a mode of planning—where informality and 
formality are considered relational practices tied to planning, development and politics—
presents governments in contemporary cities of the global South with opportunities for 
urban development, while also creating possibilities to exercise governmentality and fulfil 
political objectives (Roy, 2005; Roy,20011a; McFarlane, 2012).  
Therefore, as public priorities shift in unequal and undemocratic ways, the political 
nature of enclaved spaces is revealed. The process demonstrates government biases in 
favour of the urban elite, while it also demonstrates the middle class’s reactionary 
appropriation of public space. This appropriation, however, paradoxically exists through 
the privatisation of public space, and at the same time reveals the fractured and 
subjective nature of citizenship rights in Karachi (Chakrabarti, 2007). Enclavisation in 
Clifton Block 7 therefore spatialises what Baviskar (2003) describes as bourgeois 
environmentalism. This is a form of spatial governmentality oriented towards elite 
interests prioritising aesthetics, leisure, safety and health. However, as I will demonstrate 
in the next chapter, this process also marginalises a large population of people who live 
and work in Clifton Block 7, either people who don’t buy into the enclave experience and 
remain non-members or those who aren’t seen to belong, such as servants. I will expand 
the topic of exclusion and violence further in the next two chapters.  
However efficient the current system may be, the related politics underpinning it 
nevertheless produce structural inequalities. The relations between government 
institutions and Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association is predicated on a form of 
preference, or a politics, whereby elite neighbourhoods are favoured and supported in 
ways which are denied to other neighbourhoods in the city. While this is different from 
the vote bank politics or a politics of patronage that the urban poor are party to (see the 
case of Sultanabad below), such a relationship is more stable and perhaps can be linked 
to the institutionalised politicisation of pockets of the urban middle-class and elites. Even 
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though such a politics of governance has been much studied in the Indian context as one 
that heightens marginalities and urban contestations (Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2004; 
Benjamin, 2000; Zerah, 2010), I find there to be some differences in the context of 
Karachi, where the emerging practices of enclavisation in middle-class and more affluent 
areas remain fragmented and limited within different neighbourhoods and do not 
coalesce as broader-based civil society movements. Nevertheless, as I will expand upon 
in Chapter 8, this system is also productive of structural, social, and political/institutional 
violence in Karachi. 
I will end this section by highlighting that enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 is evidently 
related to a turn towards associational politics in the face of governmental failures. In 
contrast to the disaffection with democratic politics which was productive of political 
space in the enclavisation seen in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 demonstrates a case where 
members of a previously distant urban middle class re-engage with urban politics and 
exercise their citizenship rights. In the process, the affluent produce an entitlement-based 
discourse in urban politics which re-orients political support away from the politicised 
masses of the urban poor to the ‘deserving’ privileged few in ways that exacerbate urban 
inequalities. In such an environment, where there is little governmental support, the 
urban poor are in turn pushed into their own marginal enclaves. Living within such 
spaces, the urban poor are able to strengthen community ties, construct associational 
networks, and build political alliances in order to navigate everyday life in the insecure 
city, and negotiate with the state for protection and community development. I will 
elaborate this argument in more detail in the following section, where I introduce 
enclavisation, governance, and politics in Sultanabad. 
Sultanabad and the Balti Mohallah: Enclaves of Marginality  
On hearing that I regularly ventured into Sultanabad for fieldwork, Shaheen, a senior 
police officer, remarked:  
It [Sultanabad] is a no-go area. It is a dangerous place—full of troublemakers! Those people 
are best left to themselves. Why would you go there?’ 
Other well-meaning people from Askari III and Clifton Block 7 echoed Shaheen’s 
warning and entreated me to steer clear of Sultanabad. Despite being well within the 
security red zone (see figure 24), this dense inner-city low income settlement is popularly 
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regarded a source of criminality in the city. This reputation is built from stories 
circulating in various news media which describe the katchi abadi as a hub of ethno-
political conflict, a home to Taliban sympathisers and a place from which violent riots 
which disrupt the city often emerge (Khan, 2013; Zaman and Ali, 2013).  
 
Figure 24: Sultanabad’s proximity to critical sites within the security red zone. 
Sultanabad gained especial notoriety in the aftermath of the deadly bombing of the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on 11 November 2010, an event which I 
described in the introductory chapter. In the aftermath, police suspected that a few of 
Sultanabad’s residents may have abetted the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the 
attack (Walsh, 2010b; Dawn News, 2010a). Consequently, the police initiated a large-
scale campaign of rounding up ‘suspects’ and forcibly taking them in for ‘questioning’. At 
the same time, Awami National Party (ANP) leaders resident in Sultanabad made 
forceful media statements claiming that the youths picked up were innocent ANP party 
workers and that the police exercise was a biased targeting of ethnic Pashtuns. ANP 
leaders also publicly threatened police against entering the area, and warned of dire 
consequences if those arrested were not freed quickly (Dawn News, 2011d). Evidence 
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suggests that these threats are worth heeding, especially since in the past, Sultanabad’s 
residents have lethally targeted security officers and have driven the police out by force. 12  
Therefore, even though Sultanabad (pictured in figures 25 and 26 on the following  page) 
is not walled and gated like Askari III, or enclosed like Clifton Block 7, the katchi abadi’s  
reputation as a no-go area outside the sphere of law produces imaginative geographies 
(Gregory, 2003) of the abadi as a distinctive and inaccessible enclave. However, in this 
section, I elaborate how Sultanabad is not simply a no-go area or an enclave of 
criminality. Instead I will outline how processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad are tied to 
residents’ experiences of living in marginal conditions within the megacity. I will highlight 
how in Sultanabad, enclavisation is a necessary tactic of living everyday life in insecure 
environment where the state has failed to provide protection or support. More broadly, 
related processes of enclavisation are built on relations of governance and urban political 
life that have been strengthened through experiences of land settlement, infrastructural 
development, and dispute resolution in the starkly polarised megacity.  
The process of land development and settlement in Sultanabad is similar to accounts of 
settlement in other katchi abadis in Karachi (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 
2011). Interviews with long-time residents revealed that Sultanabad originated in the early 
1950s, when migrant labourers working in the nearby port faced problems finding low-
income housing due to supply shortages and were allowed to build shacks on the marshy 
land owned by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) with KPTs express permission. Given its 
extremely central location and its proximity to Saddar, demand for housing in the 
settlement rose, especially as migrants continued to flock to Karachi in the decade 
following the creation of Pakistan. Early migrants subdivided their land to accommodate 
growing families and close relatives migrating from their villages, thereby creating ethnic 
clusters. Earlier settlers recalled their active lobbying activities with federal government 
bureaucrats and senior-level political party officials in order to develop electricity, water 
and gas connections within the settlement in ways that have been documented in other 
studies as well (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2011). These connections soon 
became the basis for claims of regularisation of land under the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act 
                                                 
12 Compiled from field research, while this information has been corroborated in various news reports. See 
for example Khan (2013) and Dawn News (2011b). 
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1987, which allowed squatters to formalise ownership of what was previously considered 
illegally occupied and developed land.  
 
Figure 25: Sultanabad was settled in the early 1950s on marshy land reclaimed from a mangrove forest. 
Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
 
Figure 26: A view of Sultanabad from the Shia mosque in Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 
2011. 
144 
 
In Sultanabad, this history of successful collective action has helped strengthen residents’ 
belief in activism and associational membership. Today, associational membership 
continues to ensure the development and maintenance of community infrastructures 
when the state fails to provide such services. Similar to what we saw in Clifton Block 7, 
in Sultanabad, associational membership is therefore strongly tied to political 
organisation around community interests in an environment of governmental 
inadequacies. However, in Sultanabad, such associational membership differs because it 
is more tightly organised around ethno-political clusters. As I will highlight in more detail 
in the next section through the example of the Balti Mohallah, these ethno-political 
clusters are smaller units of territorial governance within Sultanabad, and in this respect, 
can be viewed as enclaves within the larger settlement. 
However, even though Sultanabad is internally divided into further enclaves, the whole 
settlement stands united in blocking access and maintaining security against external 
threats. This collective protective stance leads ‘outsiders’ to consider all of Sultanabad as 
a singular enclave. For example, given the current environment of urban insecurity, 
Nishat (a resident) explains how young men within the settlement have become 
mistrustful of people from ‘outside’ visiting their neighbourhood, and take up protective 
roles to guard the community: 
You know how it is. One MQM party worker dies, and they try killing twenty Pashtuns. They 
don’t care if the man is politically oriented or not. […] We have to take our security into our 
own hands. If we don’t recognise someone, we check their National Identity Cards [for clues of 
ethnicity]. If they look like trouble, we ask them to leave immediately. It is for their own safety. 
In this section, I will therefore introduce Sultanabad as an alternative form of enclave 
which is established through relational processes of socio-spatial community formation. 
Moreover, I will highlight how enclaves within Sultanabad emerge through reactionary 
politics of making do in an environment where the state has lost its legitimacy and 
authority, and where residents have to make do with living in an insecure megacity. In 
doing so, I will illustrate how the differentiated experience of citizenship—whereby 
residents of Sultanabad are both abandoned by the state and themselves reject state 
forces—results in the creation of a different form of enclaved space. This contrasts with 
enclavisation in Askari III, which is a process tied to disaffected citizenship. It is also 
relational to enclavisation in Clifton Block 7, where middle-class residents are actively re-
asserting their citizenship rights while generating a discourse of rights based citizenship 
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which further marginalises residents of katchi abadis such as Sultanabad, who find 
themselves largely abandoned by the state. 
Marginality, Negotiating Urban Life, and Enclavisation 
As I have briefly explained above, to those on the outside, all of Sultanabad is considered 
a unitary cohesive enclave. In reality, Sultanabad is further fragmented into various socio-
politically homogenous ethnic enclaves. Therefore, the patterns of enclavisation in 
Sultanabad are more nuanced than one would expect. The katchi abadi is formally divided 
into 8 blocks spread over approximately 600 square kilometres, housing around 80,000 
people.13 These blocks are administrative subdivisions which do not correspond with the 
loosely organised ethnic clusters, mohallahs, which spatialise the socio-spatial limits of 
‘community’. In Sultanabad, there are numerous mohallahs, some of which are distinctive 
enclaves because of their unique character as homogenous ethnic clusters, which are 
well-organised around a common politics. The shared spaces within these mohallahs have 
a quasi-private character, and are tacitly acknowledged by residents of the wider 
settlement to be for the private use that mohallah’s residents. 
In rough translation, a mohallah is a tight-knit urban community that is spatialised around 
a common culture. The mohallah characterises a form of living where norms of 
governance, social relations and public and private space are different to those in other 
urban neighbourhoods. Usually an ethnic cluster, the public spaces of the mohallah are 
appropriated as collectively owned private spaces, and mohallah residents are often 
considered an extension of one’s own family (Gayer, 2014; Datta, 2008; Khan, 2007). In 
this respect, the mohallah also denotes a boundary based on perceived differences 
between inside and outside (Chakrabarty, 1991). Here, I would suggest that mohallah 
organisation in Sultanabad can be understood as a marker of enclavisation in the 
settlement. Following from this, in the remaining section I will elaborate how 
Sultanabad’s mohallahs have coalesced as enclaves through processes of migrant 
settlement, community governance and negotiation of everyday life in an insecure (and 
                                                 
13 This is a rough approximation made by the author using Google Maps. Around 60% of residents in 
Sultanabad are ethnically Pashtun, mostly living in G block. The remainder of the population is mostly 
Hazara (Hindko speaking), populating blocks A, B, C, E and K. There are very few Mohajir, Sindhis or 
Balochis living in the settlement.13 There is also a small population of Baltis, clustered in a single 
neighbourhood between Blocks D and H. 
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often violent) heterogeneous katchi abadi. I will support these claims by drawing on 
personal encounters with residents of the Balti Mohallah in Sultanabad.  
The Balti Mohallah houses migrants from Gilgit-Baltistan (popularly known as Balti for 
short). As the illustrations in the next chapter show (see figures 45 and 46), the mohallah is 
situated behind the Habib Public School (HPS) by special permission of the school’s 
owners. The first houses were built in 1982 after Balti employees of HPS (who were 
Ismaili-Shia) felt unsafe travelling to work because of heightened sectarian violence in the 
city.14 ‘We did feel safe living there’, said Sakina, an early settler of the Balti Mohallah, 
recalling her previous neighbourhood. ‘But knowing that my husband had to cross the 
city to get to work struck my heart with fear—they were killing Shias everywhere at that 
time!’ Such fears led Balti workers to ask for permission to build residential quarters in 
the marshy wasteland behind the school. The school’s owners—themselves Shia 
Muslims—sympathised with their poorer staff members’ plight and gave them 
permission. The mohallah, which initially consisted of four or five houses, has now grown 
to accommodate 75-85 families.  
The Balti Mohallah is one of the most tightly organised ethnic enclaves in Sultanabad. 
Matters of community life are overseen by a community association which is presided 
over by Imam—a respected community elder and a religious instructor who was called 
by residents to lead them as a community because of his knowledge of religious and legal 
affairs:  
They asked me to move here in 1999 and lead their Jamat (prayers). I was also asked take 
over religious instruction and resolve community matters. My job is to ensure the welfare of the 
population by providing security and structural development in the mohallah. I do this for them 
in exchange for their loyalty and obedience.  
This arrangement suits most residents who have full confidence in Imam and the three-
member team he leads. ‘The elders know what’s best for us’, says Qaiser, a small trader 
who lives in Sultanabad with his family. Qaiser then shared the fact that his work 
                                                 
14 Ismailis are a sect within Shia Islam. Shia Muslims are a minority in Pakistan, and since the 1980s there 
has been increased incitement of violence against Shia Muslims by hardline Sunni clerics. This has often led 
to cycles of sectarian violence in Pakistani cities. In recent years, with the increased presence of Taliban 
forces in Karachi, sectarian violence has once again escalated as all Taliban are militant Sunni Muslims 
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required him to travel for days on end. For him it was important to feel that his wife and 
family were looked after and safe in his absence. He explained that the small rules that 
residents were made to live by were actually for common benefit: 
We are not allowed to sell or rent our property without their approval; they want to make sure 
this remains a Balti or at least a Shia Mohallah. This is for our own protection—it will ensure 
that we remain a majority within this mohallah. Of course I support Imam, he is passionate 
about making things better for us! 
Unlike residents of Askari III or Clifton Block 7, the Baltis didn’t mind the strict rules 
imposed by the community elders, or feel resentful about restrictions on freedoms. This 
is because they felt a real need for these rules in the environment they live in. With the 
influx of new tribal Pashtuns engaged in violent sectarian conflict in the tribal regions of 
Pakistan, the Baltis, who belong to the minority Shia sect of Islam, feel more insecure 
living in a settlement that is fast radicalising. Through Imam’s leadership, the Baltis were 
able to securitise themselves through enclavisation in various ways. Firstly they were able 
to organise protection from emerging threats by physical enclosure; secondly they could 
forge political alliances that ensured the community remained protected; and thirdly they 
represented community interests through their elders in dispute settlement mechanisms 
within Sultanabad.  
The Balti Mohallah is therefore a unique form of enclave within Sultanabad, as it has 
only recently been enclosed. As illustrated in Figure 27 on the next page, residents have 
attempted to restrict access to the enclave by blocking various entrances with thorny 
shrubs and other scrap materials. They have left one point of access from Sultanabad, 
which is gated. The narrow steel gate is locked from 11pm to sunrise, during which time 
watchmen hired from within the community keep patrol. This enclosure is a defence 
mechanism against the neighbouring Pashtun areas, which Shafqat describes as a 
troublesome community which in his words houses ‘gun toting tribals with a Taliban 
mindset’. However, despite these measures, residents continue to face threats (see figure 
28). Majid, a young Balti student, elaborated one of these incidents in detail: 
The other day, two armed Pashtun men came into our mohallah, taunting us, mocking us for 
being Shia Muslims. They threatened that if we didn’t vote for the Awami National Party 
(ANP), we would suffer. Our elder sorted it out, I think. He’s well respected in Sultanabad 
[…] that is why he is our leader.  
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Figure 27: Pieces of wood and sticks block entry to the Balti Mohallah from a connecting lane in 
Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
 
Figure 28: Graffiti alluding to violence within the Balti Mohallah. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
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The incident Majid spoke of was confirmed by Imam. ‘These stupid children are full of 
hot air’ he retorted. ‘I recognised them, and complained to the elders of their community 
of their behaviour. They were made to apologise soon enough, and that was the end of 
the matter.’ When I asked Imam on what basis he was able to offer protection to his 
community members within the increasingly radical settlement, his answer was simple:  
We are 300 votes. Everybody in our community—men, women, and young adults—is a 
registered voter, as opposed to the Pashtun families here whose women aren’t voters. We may be 
a minority community, but our voting power adds weight to our numbers.  
Imam’s statement highlighted how democracy has been a force of empowerment for 
residents, and more importantly it is a means of ensuring security. Imam, for example, 
had struck a political alliance with Khattak, a respected community elder amongst the 
religiously moderate long-settled Pashtuns within Sultanabad.  
Imam explained his reasons for trusting Khattak: 
Khattak has ties with political groups who have done extensive development work in 
Sultanabad. He is progressive, open minded and is well connected to people in power (in the city 
government). We usually follow his advice on voting and fully support him. 
Interviews with other ethnic communities living outside the Balti Mohallah confirmed 
that the exercise of the right to vote had been an essential turning point within the katchi 
abadi. Khattak, a prominent community elder and an ex-councillor who has lived in 
Sultanabad (G Block) all his life, revealed the significance of voting for residents of the 
community: 
Voting has changed our lives. I still remember how Zulfiqar Bhutto15 came here in 1968, 
rallying support against Ayub Khan’s military dictatorship. Bhutto’s slogan of roti, kapra, 
makan (bread, clothes and shelter) aroused fire in our hearts. He liberated us and gave us a new 
lease on life with the power to vote. Now we own our houses—we are not poor and downtrodden 
as long as we have the power of our vote. 
                                                 
15 Founder of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), a left wing party that garners support from across the 
country 
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As is common in recently democratising states (Caldeira, 2000; Chatterjee, 2008), 
Karachi’s urban poor have been able to seize the opportunities offered by democracy 
and have been able to improve their conditions of life on the urban peripheries. 
However, despite this political activism, the social contract between the residents and the 
state remains weak, especially as the urban poor make up what Chatterjee (2004) refers to 
as political society and not civil society. The difference between these two forms of civic 
engagement is that the former is developed through tactical patrimonial arrangements 
with state actors, while the latter signifies a sustained political engagement. Sultanabad’s 
residents can therefore use vote bank politics to gain benefits of regularisation and 
infrastructural development, but they are unable to access benefits other than municipal 
infrastructural development. This is mainly because under the current administrative 
system in Karachi, social development funding is beyond the purview of local body 
electoral candidates. These candidates, therefore, do not have the power to provision 
funds for health care, schooling or youth development. In this respect, Khattak and 
other prominent local elders have successfully reached out to various NGOs, 
philanthropists and even US-Aid for assistance in developing the neighbourhood. 
For example, the settlement has a basic health centre funded by affiliates of the Aga 
Khan University Hospital.16 It is staffed by paid health workers who care for patients 
with basic ailments at nominal rates and educate residents about hygiene and family 
planning. At the same time, the health centre allows a platform for the university’s 
doctors and students to conduct sampling for academic research on various health- 
related issues. Similarly, Khattak has overseen the construction of primary and secondary 
schools in Sultanabad and Intelligence Colony where children from the settlement have 
access to heavily subsidised education (see figure 29 on the next page). 
Both schools are funded jointly by politicians and philanthropists. As well as failing to 
provide the community with welfare and social development, the state also fails the 
urban poor when it comes to providing protection and justice. Despite their increased 
troubles, residents feel the police can never provide protection. In common with many 
other marginal settlements, the Karachi police are often an integral part of criminality in 
                                                 
16 The closest hospital is the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre, which neighbours Askari III and is 
approximately 5 km away. 
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poor enclaves (Auyero et al., 2004). Kamal, a Pashtun who has lived in Sultanabad for 
over 40 years says: 
We are helpless—they (the new Pashtun migrants into Sultanabad) are drug addicts with a 
backward mentality. They steal, beat our children up for no reason, and have brought a rural 
culture to this place. We don’t support this Talibanisation. But we can’t trust the police either. 
They take cuts from the drug mafia and happily look the other way.  
 
Figure 29: ‘Government’ Boys Secondary School in Intelligence Colony (Sultanabad). Source: 
Photograph by author, 2011. 
Many residents also alluded to hindrances in accessing justice against such criminals 
within the settlement. For them, reporting a crime was an expensive process that came 
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without any guarantee of dispensation of justice. Nighat, a mother of two young boys, 
spoke of the community’s ordeal in trying to keep drug dealers away from their mohallah: 
We had to bribe policemen to register a First Information Report (FIR). Then we faced 
continuous harassment for more bribes throughout the process of investigation. Even accessing the 
courts is expensive. Where do we get the money to hire lawyers, especially when the judges are 
corrupt and lengthen the trial process? 
As a result of these grievances, residents of Sultanabad place higher trust in the ‘jirga 
system’, a traditional dispute settlement mechanism led by trusted and respected 
community elders who are in charge of adjudicating complaints. The community elders 
receive the facts of the case from both parties and are trusted to act in neutrality to both 
complainant and defendant. Justice is dispensed immediately, and is also enforced 
through communal pressure. Residents in Sultanabad express more confidence in this 
traditional system for dispute resolution compared to the legal system, especially since 
problems are adjudicated quickly and rulings are respected within the community. Irfan, a 
clerical officer at the Karachi Port Trust, explains why he prefers the Jirga system: 
The courts are inaccessible, inefficient and unjust—everyone knows that judges award decisions 
to the party with deeper pockets! It takes months, sometimes years to get a judgement. The Jirga 
decides cases within a few weeks! 
These interviews and observations within different enclaves of Sultanabad therefore 
suggest that processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad are made possible through strong 
community cohesion. Setting up community-level governance structures and ensuring 
socio-spatial and political homogenisation within each mohallah helps residents of the 
marginal settlement overcome the inadequacies of state protection against escalating 
violence, substandard provision of social and infrastructural development and the 
corrupt and inefficient systems of policing and justice. In such an environment, 
enclavisation also becomes a means to strengthen the bargaining position of ethnic 
communities within Sultanabad both within the heterogeneous and often violent enclave 
and outside in the polarised megacity. In the process, enclavisation strengthens and 
institutionalises alternative structures of urban governance and reinforces a vote bank 
politics which I have alluded to and explained earlier in this section. 
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Yet, the above-related experience of security provision and justice in Sultanabad 
demonstrates how the democratic right to vote in enclaves such as Sultanabad goes 
beyond the traditional vote-bank politics of clientelism and patronage as described in 
scholarship (Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2008; Huq, 2014). Instead, such a politics is an 
essential means of ensuring protection for minority communities within Sultanabad, 
while practices of pledging community votes to local political groups also enfranchise 
local community elders with respect and voice within the wider community. 
More importantly, processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad may be understood as 
encompassing governance of everyday life in a violent settlement where the state is 
visibly absent in the provision of services such as housing, land titles, urban 
infrastructure and personal and community security. Community affairs are managed by 
well-respected ‘elders’, who are prominent within the community as well as influential 
within the wider settlement. While these elders are not elected, their authority stems from 
their capability to meet community needs through connections with other elders within 
the settlement as well as with local police and lower-tier municipal officers. The key task 
for elders is to maintain strong relationships with other elders within the settlement and 
with prominent politicians or government officials outside. Such alliances are necessary 
for matters such as security, dispute resolution and coordinated infrastructural 
development work within the settlement. 
Overall, I found that practices of enclavisation in Sultanabad were largely inspired by 
learned experiences of living in conditions of marginality within an insecure city. Here, 
enclavisation seems to be a spatialisation of what Simone refers to as an anticipatory 
urban politics that creates conditions for knowledge and navigating the city to one’s 
advantage (2009: 62), or which Bayat describes of politics in a ‘city-inside-out’, where the 
disenfranchised collectively negotiate with institutions and emerge as key players in urban 
politics and governance (Bayat, 2012: 119). Similarly, as highlighted in the previous 
chapter, it is also tied to a form of associational politics which provides ways for citizens 
to access the state at the margins, or simply ensures community protection in a violent 
city (Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011; Fregonese, 2012; Akar, 2012).  
However, I would like to argue that the current processes of enclavisation within 
Sultanabad clearly skew the social contract, especially as community elders become key 
mediators between people and the state. The processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad’s 
mohallahs—seen through the case of the Balti Mohallah—demonstrates that individual 
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rights to vote are stripped away from residents in a bid to ensure collective bargaining 
power. As citizenship rights are divested away from individuals, elders emerge as 
powerful political brokers between citizens and other urban political agents. As I have 
elaborated in chapters 2 and 4, this potentially distorts individual democratic rights and 
freedoms, while at the same time creating structural conditions that may exacerbate 
marginalities within the settlement or create political/institutional violence in the city.  
For example, in the marginal Balti enclave within Sultanabad, voting is recognised as a 
powerful instrument for ensuring protection against violence from within the settlement. 
As Imam explained through his comment about being able to influence his community’s 
vote, he was able to protect his community by using his ability to command more than 
300 votes, which are enough to swing the vote bank within the settlement. This makes 
the Balti community strategically significant for other politicised communities within 
Sultanabad who are interested in winning political patronage for claiming infrastructural 
improvements from an otherwise inefficient state (Benjamin, 2008). However, this 
situation gives rise to a paradoxical condition whereby the individual right to vote is 
stripped away by elders who advise mohallah residents on which local political candidate 
to support. At the same time, the community elder’s decision about which candidate to 
garner votes for is an outcome of extensive negotiations amongst the various mohallah 
elders.  
The process of pledging votes, as well as that of seeking broader political alliances within 
the community, strengthens the power of community elders, and by extension ensures 
protection and support for the community. Moreover, such processes of enclavisation 
shift structures of urban governance in ways that displace the social contract (Alsayyad 
and Roy, 2006). In Sultanabad, for example, community elders are evidently key 
mediators between citizens and the state, and often command more legitimacy than state 
actors and institutions. Nevertheless, as I have briefly elaborated in Chapter 4, and will 
outline in greater detail in Chapter 8, even though such changes in structures of urban 
governance emerge because of unequal socio-political relations and structural violence, 
they result in the displacement of state authority and may create conditions that are 
generative of concatenations of violence in Karachi. In the next two chapters, I will 
expand these arguments in greater detail. Before moving on, I will argue that overall, 
enclavisation in Sultanabad is a product of strategies that the marginalised and 
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abandoned urban poor use to navigate insecurity and vulnerability in a conflicted 
megacity. It is therefore a form of anticipatory urban politics (Simone, 2009).  
Conclusion  
The three enclaves introduced in this chapter demonstrate how enclaves in Karachi are 
relational spaces that are produced through varying interactions between urban 
governance and political life. The case studies presented here help highlight three key 
points. The first is that enclavisation is a differential process which is produced, enacted 
and materialised in diverse ways within the same city. This is reflective of Holston and 
Appadurai’s (2003) argument that, as lived spaces of uncertainties, cities become sites 
where differentiated citizenships are constituted. The authors suggest that in 
contemporary cities, substantive citizenship (tied to civil, political, socio-economic and 
cultural rights) may not correspond with the formal citizenship status that is associated 
with being a member of the nation state (Holston and Appadurai, 2003).  
In ethnically heterogeneous, politically fractured and socio-spatially divided megacities 
such as Karachi, such disjunctures are often spatialised. This is clearly evident in the case 
studies presented in this chapter, whereby each case demonstrates how processes of 
enclavisation crystallise subjective experiences of urban political life. Enclavisation in 
Askari III seemingly spatialises disaffection with democracy and the rejection of 
citizenship rights, while in Clifton Block 7 it is suggestive of the re-appropriation of civic 
responsibility and the public sphere. Meanwhile, the case of Sultanabad suggests that 
enclavisation is tied to a constant struggle of assertion of citizenship rights through 
practices of insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2009).  
Secondly, I have also demonstrated that experiences of urban political life are relational 
to the particularities of urban governance in Karachi (as set out in Chapter 4). Not only 
does the fragmented nature of urban governance create recurrent infrastructural 
disruptions in Karachi, but it also leads to a variety of governmental responses and 
governance arrangements. The case studies of Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad illustrate 
how enclavisation often becomes possible within a regime of urban governance which is 
structured around informality and insurgence being the ‘idiom of urbanisation’ (Roy, 
2009c). Roy (2009c) describes this to be true for processes of urban planning in Indian 
cities, which are informalised and hence lend to a state of deregulation, ambiguity, and 
exception.  
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Finally, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that enclavisation in Karachi is a 
self-perpetuating phenomenon. For example, the case of Askari III demonstrates that 
residents’ relationship with public life echoes the civic-military relations which are 
embedded in Pakistan’s statehood. Askari III residents reject the disorderly spaces of the 
city and its public, having full confidence in the ability of the authoritarian regime to 
provide regimented order. Yet, this order is often at the cost of other spaces and citizens 
of Karachi (Hasan et al., 2013; Dawn News, 2007a). By disconnecting from the city 
government in planning and developing cantonment areas, by walling off spaces such as 
Askari III, and by demanding priority provision of scarce resources such as water and 
electricity, the Military Lands and Cantonments Department reproduces the disorder, 
insecurity and crisis which fuels demand for accommodation in cantonment areas in the 
first place.  
Meanwhile, increasing urban crime and violence and an intensifying crisis of governance 
also orients residents living in areas such as Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad towards 
enclavisation. While residents in both spaces enter associational memberships to navigate 
urban uncertainties and engage with the city government (Tostensen, Tvedten, and Vaa, 
2001), the modes of such engagement and the response it generates from the city 
government are entirely different. In the case of Clifton Block 7, the formation of the 
Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association and its engagement with the city government and 
police has helped fuel the processes of enclavisation. Here, enclavisation stemmed from 
an otherwise uninterested neighbourhood organising to actively re-engage with the public 
sphere and help the city government to fulfil its duties to citizens. The primary feature of 
Clifton Block 7 as an enclave is not necessarily that it is a securitised space, but that it is 
also a unique political space organised through its orientation towards middle class 
interests and bourgeois environmentalism (Zerah, 2010; Chatterjee, 2008; Baviskar, 
2003). 
The engagement of the city government and police with Clifton Block 7 suggests the 
biases in governing the city. While enclavisation is encouraged in Clifton Block 7, it is 
often justified as a reaction to the troubles of the city which are linked to the poor’s 
undeserved appropriation of urban land and public services through insurgent forms of 
citizenship (Holston, 2009). Electricity and water shortages are unfairly attributed to the 
burden ‘non-taxpaying’ katchi abadi residents place on urban infrastructures (Shujaat, 
quoted in Baig, 2008). In the aftermath of the flooding crisis, for example, the city 
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government blamed katchi abadis constructed along storm water drains for causing 
blockages and hence overflow. Contrary to this discourse, Arif Hasan, a prominent 
architect and planner in Karachi confided in an interview that ‘it’s not because of katchi 
abadis, it’s the huge encroachments by the military and railways’. Nevertheless, the poor 
are easy victims. The earlier-mentioned quotes from Shujaat (MNA) and Shaheen (the 
police official) demonstrate how katchi abadi dwellers are considered to be urban 
residents who are not deserving of citizenship rights. As I will elaborate further in 
Chapter 8, they are abandoned and criminalised. In light of this treatment, as the case of 
Sultanabad shows, the urban poor are pushed into their own more marginal enclaves for 
protection and mutual support.  
Overall, by contextualising these relational processes of enclavisation within the socially 
and politically polarised megacity, I have outlined how enclaves spatialise multi-scalar 
relations of power and politics in the city and restructure urban socio-political relations. 
The evidence presented in this chapter has helped illustrate how enclaves are intertwined 
with urban politics. The analysis presented in this chapter is also critical in setting up my 
arguments for the final empirical chapter, where I will elaborate how enclaves are agential 
in perpetuating urban violence. However, as I outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter, in the interest of detailing the relations of governance and political life in 
enclaved spaces, I set aside the task of interrogating the spatial form of enclaved spaces. I 
will take this up in the next chapter, where I will outline negotiations of security and 
circulation in enclaved spaces, so as to complete my analysis of enclaves as dynamic and 
processual spaces.  
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CHAPTER 7 
NEGOTIATING CIRCULATION, SECURITY AND IDENTITY IN 
KARACHI’S ENCLAVES 
On February 29th 2012, five members of the Bawani family were found stabbed to death 
in their house in Askari III. Following the murder, news reports quoted the Senior 
Superintendent of Police (SSP) of Saddar Town, who suspected that the murderer was 
someone who knew the family well—possibly another family member. His suspicion was 
rooted in the knowledge that the murder took place in one of the safest residential 
neighbourhoods in Karachi. The picture below accompanied the article, which read, 
‘tight security inside the Askari-III and the 10-foot-high walls of the house left little 
chances of an outsider breaking into the house’ (Pakistan Today, 2012). 
 
Figure 30: Picture of the Bawani house the day the murder was discovered. Source: Pakistan Today, 
2012. 
Askari III indeed has very strict security protocols. It has one main gate, which is open 
for entry from 5am but closes to traffic at midnight. The main gate (shown in figure 31 
below), is for all kinds of traffic, though this is monitored closely by guards. The check 
post at the main gate forces vehicles to slow down for security checks, while CCTV 
cameras supplement human surveillance. There are also two supplementary gates (Jinnah 
Gate and Stadium Gate) which are equally guarded and open only intermittently to allow 
particular traffic to flow during set times of the day. The guards are Karachi Cantonment 
Board’s own and their surveillance is sometimes supplemented by privately-hired security 
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guards. At all times, a mobile police unit is stationed outside the gates, ready for a chase 
if needed.  
 
Figure 31: Picture of Askari III’s perimeter walls and main gate. Source: photograph by author, 2011 
The event was therefore shocking because it was a spectacularly violent breach of 
security. The Bawani family lived in one of the few semi-detached houses close to the 
main gate, and the house’s outer walls adjoined the enclave’s boundary wall. The murder 
suggested lapses in the security infrastructure of Askari III and the permeability of its 
perimeter walls.  
At the same time, the event is also a suitable departure for introducing this chapter. Here, 
I will address my earlier critiques of existing scholarship on urban enclaves. In Chapter 2, 
I argued that in order to understand how enclaved urbanism is productive of urban 
violence, we need to shift attention away from established paradigms of describing and 
characterising enclaved spaces which fetishise enclaves as heavily securitised and tightly 
bordered ‘capsular’ spaces that are disembedded from the city. Instead, I argued that it is 
important to unblackbox enclaves, and consider the multiple processes through which 
they produce enclosure and regulate circulation. In Chapter 3, I presented a critical 
reconceptualisation of enclaved spaces through relational theories of performativity and 
assemblage (Butler, 1990; McFarlane, 2009; McFarlane, 2011c), thereby demonstrating 
that enclaves are always in process. The proposed reconceptualisation looks beyond 
physical fortification as a determinant feature of enclaves, and instead recognises that 
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enclaves are socio-political spaces that are often materialised discursively and 
performatively.  
Taking my cue from this, in this chapter, I will attempt to ‘locate the enclave and 
determine its form’. I will present detailed vignettes of relations of space, security and 
circulation within and between enclaved spaces for each of my study sites. In each of 
these vignettes, I will outline the various practices, performances and technologies of 
securitisation and enclosure, and thus highlight the fact that enclave borders are often 
produced performatively. Moreover, I will also present evidence of the fluid and osmotic 
nature of enclave borders, which shift and blur to accommodate or exclude people based 
on negotiations of power and politics. In the process, I will highlight how practices of 
filtering and restricting circulation are tied to relations of power, and are productive of 
identities and social differences. Therefore, overall, I will showcase how processes of 
enclavisation are generative of complex inside/outside relationships and produce political 
subjectivities. In conclusion, I will elaborate how evidence presented in this chapter 
substantiates my earlier critical conceptualisation of enclaves as processual and political 
spaces. 
Negotiating Identity at the Gates: Failures of Total Security in Askari III 
 
Figure 32: Physical Layout of Askari III. Source: Photograph by author and Google Earth, 2011.  
As described earlier, strict security procedures are in place to provide surveillance and to 
filter circulation in Askari III. Perimeter walls enclose the neighbourhood, and passage is 
possible through three gates. The main gate is open 24 hours a day, while the other two 
are opened intermittently during the day and closed throughout the night. The main gate 
services residents and visitors, while municipal workers and deliverymen enter through a 
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secondary gate. A third gate is assigned exclusively for the passage of domestic staff and 
pedestrians entering the enclave. I have presented the physical layout of the gated enclave 
in figure 32 above.  
All three gates are guarded at all times by Cantonment guards. Security at the main gate is 
further enhanced by police stationed outside the enclaves. Although the gates and walls 
structure movement, it is the guards who carry out the important task of surveillance and 
allowing entry. To make their task easier, the Executive Committee issues security passes 
to residents to display on their vehicles. Guards are instructed to grant entry on sight of 
the security passes. On the other hand, guards are tasked with stopping all visitors for 
security checks. Visitors are only allowed to pass once they satisfy conditions which 
deem them harmless. On reaching the gates, visitors are asked the purpose of their visit 
as guards look into the car to mitigate suspicions of risky intentions. At times, guards 
may hold onto visitors’ National Identity Cards (NICs) for proof of identity and as 
security for the duration of the visit. If there is a high security alert in the city, or if 
violent events flare up, guards are instructed by the Executive Committee to become 
more vigilant and make their checks more rigorous.  
On the other hand, guards are instructed to subject those crossing the service gates to 
closer scrutiny than visitors at the main gate. Domestic workers are not allowed to enter 
unless they carry and display an Identification (ID) card, which is issued by the Executive 
Committee after the applicant satisfies criminal background checks. As an added layer of 
security, guards are also assigned to ‘frisk’ household staff when they enter and leave to 
ensure they are not carrying anything dangerous inside nor taking anything with them on 
their way out which has not been authorised by their employers. 
Given knowledge of these strict security protocols, the murder of the Bawani family 
puzzled everyone. It led police officials and ordinary residents to speculate that the killer 
was someone familiar—most likely a member of the family—who could have slipped 
through security much more easily. This assumption was tied to tacit knowledge of the 
negotiable and subjective nature of security enforcement in enclaves such as Askari III. 
Similarly to the experience of security zones in Beirut (Fawaz, Harb and Gharbieh, 2012; 
Munroe, 2011), interviews and observations revealed that the processes, performances 
and practices of security varied greatly based on who encountered them. 
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The evidence I will present in this section details how the imposition and enforcement of 
security protocols in Askari III is not an impartial exercise. The process is laden with 
prejudice against poor service workers and domestic staff, who are both generalised as 
risky bodies and further criminalised through practices of securitisation within Askari III. 
The discursive production of criminal identity through security checks also undermines 
the security process, as residents, their guests and other visitors become offended if they 
are checked. As I will show in this section, they often resist security procedures, either by 
dodging questions or by expressing anger at security guards doing their duty. The process 
is therefore often open to subversion and is negotiated through the interplay of power 
and politics between the guards and those crossing the gates, fluctuating according to 
affective responses to identity and behaviour, as well as perceived positions of power. All 
in all, such practices frustrate the possibility of total security, and make it impossible to 
enforce set protocols. 
Security, Discipline and Identity 
We may meet people for the first time, but we know who they are. I’ve been a security guard for 
so many years. […] It is a matter of experience. 
The above quote from Masood, a guard, explains how profiling based on experiential 
knowledge of how to translate different registers of identity—age, class, gender and 
modes of entry—into insecurity events was crucial in his application of Askari III’s 
security protocols. In this broad scheme of classification, male domestic workers are 
generally categorised as suspicious bodies: ‘We always stop young men who are 
unaccompanied by anyone—especially if they are drivers or domestic workers’. Such 
attitudes are also reflected more broadly within Askari III. ‘(Whenever) incidents of petty 
crime have occurred, it’s always the maids—one has to be very careful!’ said Nighat, a 
house wife. Similarly, during a conversation, Major, a member of the Executive 
Committee, angrily stated: ‘These bloody servants are not loyal like before. They are our 
first point of suspicion and we are usually right’. Such attitudes criminalising domestic 
workers are largely a function of past events, where domestic staff-members have been 
involved in crime in Askari III. Yet, despite being regarded as criminal elements, maids 
and other domestic staff remain integral to the smooth functioning of everyday life in 
Askari III. More importantly, their continued presence within Askari III makes it difficult 
to cleanly separate the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. I will elaborate this point further in the 
vignette about Clifton Block 7. This runs contrary to some popular imaginations of gated 
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communities which typify them as homogenous ‘enclaves of privilege’ (Diken and 
Lausten, 2005). 
 
Figure 33: Maid undergoing security check in Askari III. Source: photograph by author, 2011. 
To ameliorate the risks of future occurrences, guards are especially instructed to stop 
maids, servants, pedestrians, and motorcyclists, while those in vehicles are often simply 
waved past (see figure 33 above). Sitting in the passenger seat next to the driver of the 
car, I usually got past security easily. In cases where guards did stop me to ask who I was 
or where I was going, a simple answer of ‘I’m here to meet a friend’ was often sufficient. 
Contrary to what I had heard from Colonel about the security procedure described 
above, I was never asked for ID. On the other hand, my driver Nawaz revealed his 
various tribulations at points of entry ‘It’s always easier when someone’s in the car with 
me. Otherwise it’s all sorts of questions and identification checks’.  
The repetitive and continuous practice of stopping people and asking them for ID 
becomes an act of performative security (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), and the associated 
iterative performative practices of securitisation (Butler, 1993) produce the identities 
both of those who are to be secured and those who constitute the threat that makes 
security necessary (Aradau, 2010). The form of ID itself—whether stickers for residents, 
ID cards issued by executive committee for domestic staff or National Identification 
Cards (NICs) issued by the government—becomes an artefact through which 
governmentality is appropriated by guards and exercised over those interacting with them 
(Tawil-Souri, 2012). At the same, given that it is mostly the urban poor who are taken 
aside for security checks or questioned about the purpose of their visit, such security acts 
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fix suspicious identities as a certain ‘type’. Following from Foucault’s (1998; 2002) 
concept of identity as a construct of regulatory ideals and Butler’s (1993) notion of 
identity as a construct of repetitive acts which both uphold existing regulatory norms and 
at the same time name what they produce, the act of stopping someone for a security 
check can be seen as criminalising the apprehended.  
For these reasons, even though middle-class residents and visitors are subjected to less 
stringent checks, responses from interviews suggest that they lash out at guards carrying 
out their duty because they read restrictions on movement as affronts and thus find such 
hindrances harder to bear. At the same time, their behaviour is also an expression of their 
middle class identity, which is seen to be elaborated in other contexts as that of ‘rights 
bearing citizens’ (Holston, 2009). Furthermore, it is also an expression of being tired of 
the performative security checks. Within Askari III, despite understanding the need for 
heightened security, residents complain of the constant monotony of repetitive checking 
and surveillance. Usman, a resident, expressed his annoyance, wondering, ‘why are they 
stopping us, why are they harassing us? We live here for God’s sake!’ However, Major, a 
member of the residents’ executive committee, also expressed his frustration at the 
uncooperative behaviour of residents: 
When the guards stop them they complain to us. But when we ask why they haven’t 
displayed the ‘resident’ sticker on their cars, they avoid the question. Instead, they say 
things like, ‘We have been living here for so long, how can we not be allowed inside—
don’t you recognise us?’ Well, I might recognise them, but the person who stands on 
guard duty keeps changing, it’s not certain that he would recognise them as well! We keep 
telling them that they must clearly display the stickers we issue them on their cars—it 
shows guards that you live here! But still, they refuse. They try arguing their way through 
the guards, and they resist our efforts at securing Askari III!  
Often, in anticipation of a belligerent response, guards even refrain from asking. On one 
visit to Askari III, when I questioned Nauman, one of the guards, why he let me pass so 
easily, he responded: ‘I didn’t want to upset you’. Similarly, although the security 
procedures are enacted for their benefit, many residents still resist the initiatives. Nishtar, 
a freshly recruited guard, articulated the paradox of trying to do his job and stop people 
from entering Askari III:  
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They don’t put up stickers on their cars, and then they protest if I stop them. I’m a poor man—
I’m in the position that damns me if I ask and damns me if I don’t.  
Power, Negotiation, and Resistance 
Thinking through these interactions, I found that the act of restricting and stopping 
people in enclaves such as Askari III is mediated through complex relations of power. 
Foucault describes power as an operative and productive force that is exercised between 
all points in a relation (Foucault and Faubion, 2002). Further, he explains that it is often 
manifested through disciplinary regulations and is also open to resistance and subversion 
(Foucault and Faubion, 2002). Interviews with guards in Askari III reveal that the will to 
stop and check people is not just born of representative notions of the identity of those 
attempting to gain entry, but also that the act is tied to negotiated relations of power. For 
example, reading into Nishtar’s earlier comment, I understand that negotiations around 
entry into the enclave are reflective of socio-political relations of power. When 
confronting middle class residents or visitors, a guard’s authority is often undermined by 
his weaker socio-economic position. This observation weakens the authenticity of 
Masood’s earlier comment, where he spoke of filtering people simply on the basis of 
profiling. My observations lead me to believe that perhaps the activity of profiling is not 
simplistically a derivative of probabilistic assumptions drawn from a register of 
experience, but is possibly a strategy that is also tied to relations of power and 
experiences of resistance.  
As a member of the Askari III administration, Colonel was clearly aware of these 
relations. He found the appropriation and subversion of disciplinary and security 
practices by relationships of power frustrating. This resistance was clearly a common 
theme that he encountered in his role of administrating and monitoring security 
protocols: 
They don’t even check anymore! Their (the armed guards’) job is to watch over the entry and 
exit of cars. Even then 100 percent security is not provided. They are very careless. Every day I 
scold them and threaten to fire them! It is also their (the residents’) fault. No one cooperates! 
[...] they don’t display the stickers! They have them, but won’t display them. 
Much of Karachi’s middle-class feels a sense of entitlement that contrasts with the 
acceptance of such treatment by the marginalised poor. Based on their cultural learning 
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as urban residents, middle class Karachiites flare up and often disrespect private guards 
and police if apprehended, while they also direct anger at guards for misjudging who to 
stop. Guards in Askari III, however, speak of the difficulties such resistance causes them. 
According to Fateh, an Askari III guard, their most common response is ‘Do I look like 
I’m trouble?’ He continues: 
But to be honest, how can we really tell what trouble looks like? There was an incident of car 
stereo system theft here. Such good kids, some of whom lived with their parents here—they were 
responsible for it! Since then, I stop haughty residents who are not displaying stickers. If they get 
angry, we tell them that we are just doing our job, following orders. 
Yet, it is also simplistic to assume that domestic helpers are passive subjects in front of 
security guards. When I asked Nawaz, a driver employed by my friend who took me to 
Askari III for my visits, how he was able to pass through the gates, especially considering 
that he didn’t have any ID on his person, he nonchalantly replied: 
They know not to bother me too much, because I take Amjad Sahib’s name [his boss], and tell 
them he’s the brother of Molly Baji [the resident I was visiting]. When he stopped me today, I 
told him I’m on duty with Amjad Sahib’s guest and that Sahib will get really angry if I tell 
him he delayed me. 
Nawaz’s interaction with the guards, and especially the way he used his boss’s name as 
reference, reveals how drivers and other domestic help often project their relationship 
with someone of higher social authority as a way of signifying their own power position. 
Such accounts therefore suggest that efforts to securitise circulation, such as the act of 
stopping residents or visitors at the gates, produce a moment where power relations are 
negotiated. Therefore, the politics of who is stopped and who is allowed to pass is both 
an outcome of the affective dimensions of securitisation and a result of situated 
positionalities and subjectivities (Monroe, 2011; Fawaz, Harb and Gharbieh, 2012). 
However, research from Beirut suggests that urban residents often become accustomed 
to such situations, and in turn develop a range of tactics and strategies to navigate their 
own movements (Fawaz et al., 2012). Nevertheless, as I will elaborate further in the next 
section, in the job of guarding Askari III’s gates, processes of bordering reveal the 
contests and relations of power that come with performing security. Such processes also 
reveal the emerging tensions, struggles and negotiation of power between different actors 
encountering the enclave.  
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Circulation, Security and Identity 
The act of moving through the gates of Askari III therefore reveals the power 
relationships between various actors interacting within enclaved spaces. At the same 
time, attitudes to security also reveal how its disciplinary impositions—i.e. attempts to 
enclose, structure, or order patterns of movements—aren’t entirely welcomed by 
residents. For most residents, security is only desirable insofar as it is not overly 
restrictive of their freedoms. Adam, a 19 year old university student, explains how he 
prefers this variable exercise of security: 
I think it’s okay […] it’s enough to keep this place safe and keep trouble out without being too 
troublesome. It’s very rare that friends have a problem coming in. the guards don’t always ask 
for their authorisation to enter (like an entry sticker). They may sometimes ask for their 
National ID Card, and take a cursory look at it, but they usually let them in without much 
hassle. 
Adam’s approval of the strength of security protocols picks up on the notion of 
circulation as used by Foucault, who explained it as a form of freedom within a security 
regime (Foucault, 2007). According to Foucault: ‘it is in terms of this option of 
circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the 
facets, aspects, or dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses (dispositifs) of security’ 
(2007: 49). The processes of security in Askari III therefore restrict the entry of 
undesirables, thereby allowing residents to move around freely within Askari III.  
 
Figure 34: Domestic servants walking in Askari III. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
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At the same time, Askari III’s regime of restricting circulation also creates racialised 
identities of the poor as potential threats to security. While residents are dependent on 
domestic staff in their everyday lives (see figure 34 above), quotes like, ‘Having a live-in 
maid is like inviting a thief to live in your house,’ or ‘You have to be careful of these 
Pathan drivers, you never know, they might be Taliban’ suggest how the otherwise 
essential household staff is also a source of much anxiety. Such relations of dependency, 
mistrust and insecurity are also common between domestic staff and employers in other 
cities with similar socio-economic and class structures (Dickey, 2000; Qayum and Ray, 
2003). In such situations, Waldrop (2004) highlights that gates are especially important in 
symbolising distance and creating a sense of order and control over domestic staff 
(Waldrop, 2004). 
While I thought that perhaps maids and drivers would find such attitudes in Askari III 
offensive, I was surprised to find that this was not always so. ‘It’s better than crossing the 
police checkpoints out there’ said Nawaz, making reference to the tedious random police 
checks at checkpoints peppered across Karachi’s streets. Similarly, Maskeen rationalised 
the procedures as for the greater good: ‘I like working here—it’s such a secure space! No 
one harasses me. Yes, we have to carry cards and permission notes, but it’s only because 
the actions of some people have condemned us!’ 
While the responses of Nawaz and Maskeen convey their lack of indignation at being 
treated differently, their attitudes are merely indicative of their relational experiences of 
life and movement in Karachi. Maskeen perhaps contrasted her experience in Askari III 
with her life as a woman who would otherwise suffer harassment in public spaces 
including her own neighbourhood (Ali, 2012). Similarly, listening to her accounts of 
home, it is obvious that for Maskeen, a resident of Sultanabad, coming into work was a 
refuge from an otherwise violent neighbourhood. Meanwhile, Nawaz was used to regular 
profiling at police checkpoints, which are notorious in Pakistan for drivers or less 
influential young men being hassled for bribes (Hisam, 2006). In the event, Nawaz had 
learned to master the skill of negotiating passage by making references to his 
relationships to people with more power, and the potential wrath the inquisitor might 
face for delaying him or interrupting his work.  
Thinking through these relations between security and circulation, it becomes evident 
that the processes of securing circulation generate difference and disjunctures in urban 
socio-political relations. Similarly, it is obvious that gates, perimeter walls and techniques 
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of monitoring behaviours create a sense of security for residents, who feel well protected 
from the dangers of the chaotic city outside and from potentially deviant domestic staff. 
However, as I will show below, such physical architectures and security measures are not 
always effective. In this section, I have presented evidence which suggests that enclave 
borders are fluid and negotiable. In the next section, I will elaborate on how the 
perimeter walls of Askari III are often osmotic. 
Osmotic Walls, Shifting Borders 
The mystery of the murder of the Bawani family was solved soon enough (see figure 35).  
In fact, the culprit turned out to be known to the family. The murderer was Ishaq, a 
driver who had been dismissed after serving the family for six months. The killer had 
scaled the enclave’s walls and entered the house with the intention of robbing the family. 
In his statement to the police, Ishaq claimed that he had been carrying the knife for 
protection in case things went wrong. Instead, he ended up viciously stabbing the family 
to death as they woke up one after the other after hearing him inside. The foiled robbery 
had turned into a brutal murder.  
Ishaq confessed that he had killed his victims in a rage, even though he had only 
intended to rob them: 
I worked there for six months and then took leave for ten days. When I came back, Arif Sahib 
said I was an alcoholic and that I gambled. I needed money to pay off a loan. And it made me 
really angry (Hasan, 2014a). 
The tragic murder demonstrated that, despite the controlled entry of outsiders, round-
the-clock security and the extra efforts to monitor domestic staff, the enclave was 
susceptible to desperate acts of violence. It also demonstrated that small acts of everyday 
abuse tipped the driver to a point to which he became a brutal murderer. While the act 
shocked residents, because the perpetrator was someone whom the victims encountered 
in their everyday interactions, the dependency on household staff could not be shaken 
off. The driver, along with a fleet of other staff such as maids, servants and guards, is 
integral to the daily functioning of most households in Askari III.  
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Figure 35: News broadcast of police press conference following Ishaq’s capture. Source: Huriyat News, 
2012. 
In the aftermath of the murder, I couldn’t help but recall an earlier interview with 
Colonel, who had singled out the potentiality of security breaches tied to security passes 
issued to household staff:  
The security card we issue to non-live-in servants is a one year card. In this time, if the 
servant/maid leaves the job they are supposed to inform us so we cancel the card. What happens 
if the servant/maid leaves their job and the resident doesn’t inform us? They can either pass that 
card on, or keep using it to enter the premises without anyone being any wiser. I’m sure that 
most servants/maids who got a card from one employer are now working for entirely another. 
As yet, we have no rule about where we stop or check the validity of these cards.  
This vignette from Askari III exposes the range of circulations that continuously connect 
the inside and outside of enclaved spaces, and hence the impossibility of imposing total 
separation and security. Meanwhile, the continuous interactions between guards, visitors 
and household staff also affect the practice of security. Not only does the task become 
monotonous for guards, but it also generates learned behaviours on the part of those 
encountering it in ways which might undermine processes of security. Similarly, the fact 
that access is often a negotiated outcome of power struggles enacted at enclave crossings 
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challenges the task of complete control and effective filtering. This would be something 
Ishaq (the murderer) must have been aware of, given his experience of working in Askari 
III. While the human task of filtering circulation is varied, as it rests on arbitrary and 
extremely subjective registers of profiling, Ishaq’s mode of entry—scaling the enclave’s 
walls—also shows how the very infrastructure that inspires most confidence in securing 
Askari III is not entirely effective at providing complete separation between inside and 
outside. 
At the same time, this vignette also illustrates the porous and fluid nature of enclave 
borders and the impossibility of cleanly separating risky and malign bodies. The evidence 
presented in this vignette has suggested that walls are osmotic, their degrees of openness 
and closure varying depending on who confronts them. As a process of enabling flows, 
as much as one which restricts movement, the decision about whom to stop and whom 
to allow through is highly subjective and based on strategically employed registers of 
identity. As Balibar (2002) suggests, sovereign borders are subjective and exist differently 
for individuals belonging to different social groups. Since identity itself is a process that is 
always under construction and negotiation, capable of being subverted, strengthened or 
constructed through discursive and performative practices (Hall 2000; Butler, 1993), 
security personnel at Askari III find it difficult to distinguish ‘dangerous’ from ‘safe’. 
Moreover, as I highlighted earlier, the processes of filtering circulation are also steeped in 
power relations and are open to resistance and subversion. Therefore, the complexities of 
security, identities and circulation within Askari III mean that it is impossible to achieve 
the ideal of total security in such enclaves. Moreover, these complexities of space, 
circulation and securitisation further illustrate the dynamic and processual nature of 
enclaved spaces. 
At most, the practices, procedures and processes of security in Askari III help to give 
residents a sense of security and distance from the violent ‘outside’. The enclave’s 
borders are therefore more symbolic architectures of security than they are points of 
surveillance and filtering circulation. I will take this theme further in the next vignette, 
where I discuss the case of Clifton Block 7 in detail. 
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Performative Security and Paradoxes of Inclusion and Exclusion: Emplacing the 
Enclave in Clifton Block 7 
 
Figure 36: Guarded barrier at one of Clifton Block 7’s entry points. Source: Photograph by author, 
2011. 
On my first visit to Block 7, I encountered Mehboob, who was guarding a 
neighbourhood security barrier. Sitting on a chair in his uniform which denoted his status 
as a private security guard, Mehboob read the Quran while squinting through his thick 
glasses. His sleeves were rolled up and he was wearing slippers in place of shoes. He 
glanced up as we neared the open barrier, while the driver slowed the car down and 
drove past well under the speed limit. When I questioned my driver about his slowing 
down the car despite the fact that Mehboob hadn’t really responded, Mushtaq said, ‘Baji 
(sister), it was a checkpoint’. My interest was piqued. I had heard of Block 7’s reputation 
as an enclave with round the clock security and closed off streets through a friend, but 
the effortless movement through the barriers spoke otherwise. Yet it became obvious 
that despite being open, barriers such as the one pictured above performed the site of a 
border, forcing my driver to slow the car down. I therefore arranged an interview with 
Azim, a senior member of the Block 7 association, to talk me through the 
neighbourhood’s security plan. At the same time, I interviewed residents, visitors and 
guards to get a better sense of how the enclave was performatively produced in Clifton 
Block 7. 
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Defensible Space, Community, Security 
My first meeting with Azim, president of the Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association, 
took place in the Aga Khan Park. The part was situated in the centre of the 
neighbourhood, and members of the Residents’ Association frequently met there to 
discuss issues relating to enclave management. As the image below shows, I found it to 
be a surprisingly busy park, with children playing and adults mingling. This is not a 
common feature in affluent neighbourhoods in Karachi, where affluent and middle class 
residents usually avoid public spaces. Azim waved his arms around him, proudly stating: 
You see this—we have worked hard to securitise ourselves. This thriving community is proof 
that our efforts have succeeded. 
 
Figure 37: Block 7 residents in Aga Khan Park. Source: Block 7 Residents Association, 2011. 
Recalling the harmless-looking guard, I asked Azim to elaborate how the neighbourhood 
had been securitised and through what processes. He responded by explaining that the 
key had been in closing unnecessary traffic out of the neighbourhood: ‘Between Boat 
Basin and Sultanabad, we were like sitting ducks waiting to get robbed. Anyone could 
come in from wherever they liked and disappear’. In explaining the constant threat of 
crime prior to enclosure, Azim made reference to the physical geography of Clifton 
Block 7 as a space of connectivity and intersection. Given the neighbourhood’s location, 
its open streets were conduits for people avoiding heavy traffic around the busy 
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commercial areas of Boat Basin and Schön Circle while crossing over from Mai Kolachi 
or the various katchi abadis. 
Street barriers, the physical infrastructure of enclosure, were placed along entry and exit 
points to manage circulation in and around Clifton Block 7. Although some of these 
barriers (see for example figure 38 below) remained open and unguarded during the day 
from 5am to 10pm, they were nevertheless effective material artefacts that signified 
security during the daytime. ‘They show outsiders that this is a residential community, 
not just any street that they can drive through’, said Jawad, another senior member of the 
Block 7 Residents’ Association.  
 
Figure 38: Open, unguarded barrier along Khyaban-e-Roomi in Clifton Block. Source: Photograph by 
author, 2011. 
In this way, attempts to create physical enclosure by members of the Block 7 Residents’ 
Association, the architects of the enclave, worked to produce a ‘defensible space’ 
(Newman, 1972). Newman’s concept of defensible space relates to the construction of a 
secure environment where physical characteristics such as neighbourhood design and 
layout allow residents to appropriate spaces and take ownership of their security 
(Newman, 1972). In Block 7 too, such practices encouraged a territorial appropriation of 
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space which improved neighbourhood security and fostered a sense of community. As 
Kamran, a recent member of the Block 7 Residents’ Association happily stated:  
We don’t need to look over our shoulders all the time now. Muggings are reduced, the barriers 
and round the clock guards really give us confidence, and our kids can cycle freely around the 
neighbourhood. We’re also becoming more of a community now! 
While Newman’s concept of defensible space is rooted in an environmentally 
deterministic notion of social relations structured through physical geography, I would 
instead argue that it is more revealing to regard Clifton Block 7 as a discursively 
produced enclave, where symbolic and discursive acts such as street signs giving warning 
of surveillance or street barriers substantiate security (Agnew, 1993). Such aspects of 
enclavisation have also produced a sense of community within the neighbourhood, 
where the structure and layout of houses—which were detached, set off from streets and 
bounded by perimeter walls and gates—had created an environment of substantial 
privacy. However, Kamran’s sentiments above were echoed by Rubina, who happily 
spoke of a newfound camaraderie within the neighbourhood:  
It’s nice that we have finally come out of our shells. I see my neighbours in the Aga Khan Park, 
we stop and chat. I’ve lived here twenty years, but it’s only now we’re getting to know who our 
neighbours are. 
However, despite this sense of shared community, the enclave is also productive of 
fractures, and processes of enclavisation are generative of inside-outside relationships. I 
will elaborate this in more detail next. 
Performing Security, Embodying Difference 
Members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association have devised a comprehensive security 
plan inspired by the militaristic forms of security which exist in fortified enclaves such as 
Askari III. As figure 39 on the following page shows, zones A and B of Clifton Block 7 
are enclosed by strategically placed street barriers on the main entry and exit points. 
These ‘borders’ are policed by private security guards who are instructed to keep an eye 
out for suspicious activity and asked to apprehend anyone who looks out of place. At the 
same time, guards on motorcycles patrol the neighbourhood, providing round the clock 
security. Strategically placed CCTV cameras supplement surveillance. The association’s 
members have also devised contingency protocols: in the case of emergency, members  
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Figure 39: Layout and barriers in Clifton Block 7. Source: Block 7 Residents Association. 
CLIFTON BLOCK 7 LAYOUT 
AND SECURITY BARRIERS 
During the day time, all barriers 
(marked in black and green) remain 
open.  
At night, all 10 barriers are closed, 
while the 3 denoted by green lines 
allow guarded access.  
177 
 
call Adil, the MC member in charge of security. Adil in turn calls for police backup while 
alerting the guards—some of whom rush to the scene with him while others are 
instructed to immediately close the entrance/exit barriers. Meanwhile, police stationed in 
mobile units outside the neighbourhood’s main entrance ready themselves to chase the 
criminals across town if need be. 
As explained in the previous chapter, Block 7’s security plan aspires to follow the 
institutionalised scheme of private governance offered by the Citizen Police Liaison 
Committee CPLC), i.e. the CPLC Neighbourhood Care program (CPLC, 2014). 
Installing structures of private security governance through the CPLC Neighbourhood 
Care program is extremely costly, as the initiative covers the costs of consultancy, private 
guards, public services (police mobiles) and infrastructural provision (street barriers and 
CCTV cameras). In contrast, enclavisation in Block 7 has been incremental, and as a 
result, it has not been possible to translate it into militaristic securitisation. Over time, the 
Residents’ Association has been able to secure tax revenue, private investment and 
corporate sponsorship to fund the installation of barriers and CCTV cameras and the 
ongoing labour costs of private security guards.  
Yet, the plan requires constant management by the association’s members and continued 
support from the public police. Despite this, the best efforts of the association’s 
members do not translate into the provision of strict regimented security protocols like 
those that exist in Askari III. This is firstly because, as a public neighbourhood, members 
of the Block 7 association are constrained in their attempts to fully enclose the 
neighbourhood in the same way as cantonment areas such as Askari III. Efforts to close 
all barriers or overtly restrict circulation have met with severe criticism by the residents of 
neighbouring localities who have successfully engaged with the public authorities to reach 
a compromise. The barriers have not been removed as long as they remain open during 
the daytime, and a few remain guarded at night to allow vehicles to pass. The resulting 
security protocols are therefore largely symbolic in nature. 
Secondly, it is not just enclosures and security practices that are symbolic in nature, but 
as a security practice, also the guards are largely symbolic in and of themselves. As the 
picture on the next page suggests, security guards in Clifton Block 7 are mostly unarmed, 
and largely benign-looking. They may deter visitors with criminal intentions, but as 
Paasche and Sidaway (2010) demonstrate in the case of Maputo, private security guards 
usually avoid responding to acts of crime with violence. Salman, the owner of a private 
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security company, reveals how private security guards (pictured in figure 40 below) are 
often merely performative symbols of security: 
These guards are not really there to take action, but just there to provide confidence. Even in the 
event of violent incidents, our laws don’t allow private guards to shoot someone. To avoid any 
legal trouble, we let our guards know that they are under no obligation from our side to engage 
with criminals or use their weapons. They can do so voluntarily on their own accord if they wish. 
We also let our customers know that this is their limitation. Our only job is to recruit people 
with a clean record, train them and discipline them to offer surveillance services. 
 
Figure 40: Private security guards on duty in Clifton Block 7. Source: Block 7 Residents Association, 
2011. 
As a result, the association’s members are aware that even though they may have private 
guards, this does not translate into crime prevention or the apprehension of criminals. As 
a result, they must prepare contingency protocols to support the community’s members 
in catching criminals or supporting the police in bringing them to justice. Consequently, 
security protocols necessarily involve both community support and the police. In 
response, the Block 7 Residents’ Association has developed a strong relationship with the 
police in the same way as it has with the municipality. ‘It’s like a public-private 
partnership’, claims Jawad, whom I introduced earlier. ‘We make some contribution and 
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they (the Sindh Police) provide us with their manpower,’ he continues. The police 
stationed immediately outside the enclave are also demonstrative of the Karachi Police’s 
bias towards supporting the urban elite. In a city where insecurity is widespread and there 
is already a notoriously low police to citizen ratio, a quarter of the police force is 
deployed to provide security to influential residents and foreign missions (Dawn News, 
2012). When questioned over why the police are overly helpful in assisting the residents 
of enclaves such as Clifton Block 7, Zeeshan, a senior police officer at the nearby 
Darakhshan police station, says simplistically, ‘We all know who gets burgled most’.  
Thirdly, the job of ensuring closure is constrained, because daily interactions are much 
more varied than in Askari III. This is a function of mushrooming commercial activity 
within the neighbourhood, as well as activities spurred by ancillary household staff. ‘This 
is a residential area, these firms should either be pushed out or closed down,’ says Adil. 
‘They invite all sorts of traffic, he continues. Similarly, Farrah contends that ‘The biggest 
security problem is of course because of visitors for our domestic staff. In my house, 
there are ten domestic staff members—they all have visitors coming and going.’  
This necessarily frustrates the task of security, as there is no way of either distinguishing 
residents from non-residents or of stopping them. Interactions with guards reveal a lack 
of clear direction and their confusion over whom to secure and against what. When 
asked to explain the responsibilities of his job, Mehboob, the guard I encountered earlier, 
explained, ‘my job is to open the barrier when the cars come, and close it when they 
leave.’ When I asked Mehboob to further elaborate how he knew who to let in, he merely 
shrugged, showing that he had little idea of the objects of security within the enclave. 
Similarly, Ishaq, another guard, voiced his confusion, ‘They tell us we should only let 
members through. But I don’t know who they (the members) are.’ Personal observations 
and detailed interactions with guards in Block 7 thus revealed that the task of providing 
security merely produces theatrical symbols of distancing between inside and outside. 
Yet, as is expected (Marcuse, 1997), such symbols effectively relieve residents and make 
them feel safe. Laila, a long-time resident, said, ‘I would always look fearfully over my 
shoulder when I made my way into my driveway. Now at least we are safe from 
muggings!’ 
As theatrical as they seem, the architectures of enclosure—uniformed guards, security 
barriers, signs welcoming residents to Clifton Block 7 and CCTV cameras—work. Given 
the notion of discourse as spaces within which subject formation takes place, or the 
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realm within which identity is materialised (Butler, 1993), Clifton Block 7 can be viewed 
as an enclave developed through citational practices of securitisation and restrictions on 
circulation. This means that visual signs such as CCTV cameras and notices, architectures 
which restrict circulation such as street barriers, the repeated acts of opening and closing 
barriers by privately employed guards and occasional street patrols all discursively create 
Clifton Block 7 as an enclave. 
Inside-Outside Relationships  
As is elaborated in critical research on borders (Johnson et al., 2011; Donnan and 
Wilson, 2010; Salter, 2012), borders are not just physical and territorial sites, but are also 
materialised through various practices, processes and discourses of identity and 
differentiation, inclusion and exclusion. Taking my cue from this, I would like to argue 
that in Clifton Block 7, street barriers are not the only structures delimiting separation 
and distance or creating inside-outside relationships. Rather, there are other registers of 
inclusion. In the case of Clifton Block 7, this is formal membership in the Residents’ 
Association, which is tied to an agreement to pay a service fee covering the costs of 
enclavisation. As I described in the previous chapter, the leadership of the association 
has generated a rule whereby only members are eligible to access support in security or 
municipal service delivery.  
Members are also informed of rules and regulations that are tied to the daily running of 
the enclave. Various methods of surveillance—such as guards, CCTV cameras and social 
media notices—all combine to ensure that the rules of conduct imposed by the residents’ 
association are followed by all residents, and especially association members. Through 
such practices, the ‘border’ is de-materialised as technologies of control are put in place 
(Bottomley and Moore, 2007) to ensure that all residents conform to the sets of 
behaviour that membership prescribes. Such practices further help to re-produce inside-
outside relationships within Clifton Block 7.  
In such circumstances, the emerging communal space becomes a site of struggle over 
relations of dominance and identity, inclusion and exclusion, privilege and deprivation 
(Nagar and Leitner, 1998). While a large majority of residents within the enclosed area I 
am referring to as an enclave have bought into the experience, some residents are 
opposed to the association’s work and remain non-members. They do not pay the 
monthly contribution to the association because they do not support the enclosures or 
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the costly security initiatives within the block. ‘Why should I pay?’ asked Hasan. ‘I have 
my own chowkidar [informal guard], and I don’t need their services. Also, I find these 
barriers inconvenient’, he continued. On the other hand, for Natasha non-membership 
was a non-issue. ‘I don’t really know of the association and its activities’ she said. ‘I know 
the Ismaili community has gotten together to work for their own welfare—they do look 
after each other [...] but I do think they are selfish. My friend who had a break in recently 
asked to see CCTV coverage and they refused!’ Natasha felt that the association was 
exclusionary in nature because it seemingly served the interests of the majority of 
members who belonged to the Ismaili community, a minority Muslim sect which is 
popularly considered a tight knit community. Natasha therefore viewed membership 
through the lens of sectarian affiliation and ignored the formalised structure of paid 
membership. 
However, non-membership is taken seriously by contributing members, who argue that 
the association is for all residents irrespective of faith and that non-members are 
purposeful free riders. During one of my visits to the Aga Khan Park, Jamal, an elderly 
member angry at those who don’t ‘pay up’ getting a free ride at his cost, angrily lashed 
out at Farrah, a senior member of the Association, saying, ‘You should smash their cars, 
threaten them!’. Azim, another senior member of the association, also expressed his 
frustration over the involuntary inclusion of non-members in a cleaner, safer 
environment. ‘I strongly feel that if they (non-members) complain or seek help from the 
association for any municipal issue, the association should refuse it so that they are made 
to feel helpless,’ he said, adding, ‘I have told my security guards to reject security 
assistance outright if requested by non-member’. 
Similarly, contacts and relationships with the municipal government, developed by the 
Clifton Block 7 association, are often exploited to push non-members to agree to 
membership. Azim highlighted that public service agencies (water and sewage, electricity, 
gas) are encouraged to refuse service unless the recommendation of the association is 
provided. Such tactics to create distance between residents and governance agencies 
ensures that the Block 7 Residents’ Association becomes a powerful mediator between 
the two. The quest for more efficient service delivery on the part of municipal agencies 
and the need to divert public policing resources to other security imperatives combine to 
encourage a shift in the burden of responsibility for the provision of public goods 
towards private actors. As I have highlighted in the case of Sultanabad in the previous 
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chapter, in Clifton Block 7 the processes of enclavisation shift the social contract in ways 
that devolve state power to privately organised bodies such as the Block 7 Association. 
The resulting re-structured relations of power strip citizenship rights from those who are 
not ‘included’ within the political community of the Residents’ Association. 
 
Figure 41: Domestic staff members of a house in Clifton Block 7. Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents 
Association, 2011. 
While tensions between members and non-members in the block make evident how 
enclaved spaces create paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion, another set of inside-outside 
relationships in Clifton Block 7 reveals paradoxes of security and insecurity. These 
inside-outside relationships are revealed by rules and regulations concerning the use of 
public space. Service providers and domestic workers are not allowed into parks at 
certain times of the day and are discouraged from ‘loitering’ in the streets. These 
limitations are set in order to produce a sanitised space where children can cycle in the 
streets, neighbours can mingle in the park and there is no fear of crime and insecurity. 
Yet, service providers, who often live and work within the premises (see image on 
previous page), resent these rules. For example Akmal, a domestic help in one of the 
houses in Block 7, finds the rules ironic. ‘That guard who says I shouldn’t sit in the park, 
who is he? He is the same as me except that he’s wearing a uniform, getting paid to push 
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people who look like him away!’ Other than restrictions on movement in leisure hours, 
domestic service workers also resent being criminalised. As Farzana says: 
Just because a few servants commit crimes, we all have to bear the brunt. They (employers) trust 
us to watch their children, look after their house, but they would easily hand us over to the police 
if someone robbed them. 
Farzana’s comments deriding her employers’ paradoxical sense of simultaneous trust and 
insecurity are reflective of the treatment meted out to ancillary service staff throughout 
the enclave. The inclusion of security guards within the security architecture of enclaves 
generates insecurities for residents and managers. ‘I don’t like the idea of these guards 
watching me all the time. I feel more insecure knowing that they are aware of my 
movements and my daily pattern,’ says Samina, a resident. However, the system of 
surveillance turns in on itself in multiple ways. While showing me the CCTV control 
room, Azim proudly stated that ‘we tell our guards these cameras are watching them 
too—lax behaviour or involvement in criminal activities on their part would be seen 
immediately’. The very guards who perform security for the enclave are therefore kept on 
edge, made to feel fearful that lapses in their front will be punished, or worse still, 
potentially regarded as complicity in criminal acts. 
Other quotes—such as, ‘99 percent of the time, guards are in cahoots with robbers’; ‘it’s 
almost always an inside job, they (domestic workers) may talk about our security details 
at the local tea shop in their katchi abadi? What then […] they live amongst criminals!’—
further suggest the paradoxical relationship between workers and enclave residents. 
Similarly to what Benit-Gbaffou (2008a) says of community policing practices in 
suburban Johannesburg, the enclave managers wish to have total social control over the 
workers in the neighbourhood. Given the deep mistrust of domestic workers and private 
guards, Adil, the head of the Management Committee (MC) for security, stated that he 
had instructed all association members to verify the validity of their servants’ National 
Identity Cards before employing them. This can be done using an SMS service that 
checks NIC numbers against personal information recorded in the government’s 
database. The next step is to register the NIC with the local police. This allows the police 
to check whether the applicant has a criminal record, and in any case provides the police 
with the essential information needed to locate the employee in case he or she becomes a 
suspect in any criminal activity in the neighbourhood. 
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The example of Clifton Block 7 shows how enclaved spaces produce paradoxical 
subjectivities along binaries of inside and outside, included and excluded and security and 
insecurity. Security guards, along with other service workers, are simultaneously placed 
inside and outside: they are bound by the rules governing life within the enclave, but they 
do not enjoy the benefits of membership. They may be part of the enclave’s security 
infrastructure, but they never truly belong within the enclave. Moreover, contrary to 
popular representations (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Low, 2003), enclaves are not entirely 
homogenous spaces that cement community. In Clifton Block 7, it becomes obvious that 
the enclavisation process both cements and fractures the neighbourhood and creates 
relations of power and disempowerment between the different users of space—whether 
between members or non-members or between residents and workers (Nagar and 
Leitner, 1998; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002). At the same time, it also 
shows how enclave borders—used here to denote registers of inclusion—are not 
spatially contiguous. As registers of membership and inclusion change, the borders of the 
enclave become apparent as they become more diffuse. In the next section, I will take a 
further step in shifting attention away from defining enclaves through physically 
bordered sites by sharing examples from Sultanabad, the katchi abadi which is home to 
many of the workers and guards employed at Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and other 
fortified enclaves within the security red zone.  
Restricted Circulation, Insecurity and Violent Identities: Tracing Subjectivities in 
Sultanabad’s Enclaves 
Walking through the haphazardly arranged narrow alleyways of Sultanabad, crowded 
with multi-storey houses on each side (see figure 42 above), I became resigned to the fact 
that there was no way that I could remember my way back. I had left my car behind as 
the road got narrower, and I soon realised that I was fully dependent on my guide. With 
no markers to guide me, and with constant twists in the lanes, I lost my bearings and 
recalled Azim’s (of Clifton Block 7) description of the katchi abadi as a strategically 
located labyrinth which criminals enter to lose their pursuers before spreading out across 
the city.  
Azim explained that this was possible because the few wide roads leading into Sultanabad 
from the main road (one of which is pictured below) don’t fully penetrate or cross 
through the settlement, thus restricting entrants unfamiliar with the settlement’s 
geography. On the other hand, residents expertly navigate the narrow lanes or jump over  
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Figure 42: A narrow lane in Sultanabad Block H leading towards the Balti Mohallah. Source: 
Photograph by author, 2011. 
 
Figure 43: One of the main entrances into Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
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the walls surrounding houses in order to exit the area at any point they like, before 
jumping onto the public transport that spreads out to all parts of Karachi. As described 
in the last chapter, such geography combines with the discursive production of 
Sultanabad as a lawless no-go area for police to create an imagined geography of the 
settlement as an enclave best avoided. 
At the same time, as I elaborated in the previous chapter, after several visits to 
Sultanabad I started to understand how it is configured as a highly complex 
neighbourhood which is further fragmented into enclaves structured around different 
norms and regulations. As explained earlier, the patterns of settlement coupled with the 
experiences of urban political life have created distinctly recognisable cultural enclaves or 
mohallahs within Sultanabad, where new and old migrants coalesce to negotiate their place 
within the multicultural megacity and perform community-making (Keith, 2005). As is 
usual in such mohallahs, the boundaries between Sultanabad’s ethnic enclaves are mostly 
symbolic constructs (Datta, 2012; Chatterjee, 2009). 
It is this aspect of Sultanabad’s enclaves which I will pay attention to in this vignette. 
While the approach here is different to that I have used to describe the earlier enclaves, I 
make this distinction in this section so as to better highlight the diversity of enclaves 
within Sultanabad and the multiple ways in which they are materialised. This will help 
substantiate my earlier outlined argument that enclaves are dynamic spaces which exist 
along a continuum of extreme fortification and openness, yet which are made apparent 
through patterns of circulation. 
Moving on, Sultanabad’s mohallahs are rarely materialised through physical infrastructures, 
but rather are subjective and temporal. For example, Khattak, a prominent local resident, 
explains that Sultanabad is generally open to outsiders but that police and security forces 
may find it harder to penetrate. At the same time, outsiders may find it hard to access the 
same spaces at night or at times when urban violence intensifies. Some of these enclaves 
are well-known militant hubs, while others are home to more marginal ethnic groups. 
Keeping this in mind, in this vignette I will detail how enclaves in Sultanabad are defined 
by uses of space, notions of socio-spatial community or simply a strong sense of 
difference. Rather than being visible through their borders, these enclaves are often made 
visible by tensions in space and patterns of circulation. At the same time, the existence of 
multiple enclaves within Sultanabad creates confusion based on perspective. To some, 
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the whole settlement is an enclave, while to those inside, the rules, regulations, norms 
and physical architectures subvert subjectivities, creating confusions about the limits and 
purpose of enclaves: who is walled in and who is walled out? 
Cultural Difference, Space, and Circulation  
This discussion about the width of roads and entry and exit points in the settlement is 
important, as I soon learned that such indicators shape ideas of community space and 
trespass. For many outsiders, it is usually impossible to get beyond the wide commercial 
lanes that stop halfway through the settlement (see figure 44), while for Sultanabad’s 
residents, knowledge of street layouts—dead ends or wider lanes—is important in 
negotiating safe movement within the settlement. When I asked visitors to Sultanabad 
about whether they had problems moving around the settlement, or whether they could 
define the borders of the enclaves within Sultanabad, Salman, a non-resident community 
health worker at the Aga Khan Health Centre in Sultanabad, explained: 
The border of the enclave—if such a thing exists—is defined by violence. There is no warning 
that you have crossed it. But someone will call you out and threaten you. You may be simply 
intimidated, or forcefully asked to leave. 
 
Figure 44: Map showing the main entry routes into Sultanabad and the Balti Mohallah 
In Sultanabad, I therefore found that enclaves were not particularly distinguishable by 
any security architecture. With the exception of the Balti Mohallah, which was enclosed 
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by self-constructed steel gates, most other enclaves were unrestricted and allowed 
passage, yet often remained inaccessible. Norms structuring movement between 
mohallahs were often constructed through culturally defined notions of public versus. 
private space. In the dense katchi abadi, where large families live within one bedroom 
apartments in tall buildings, street spaces usually become extensions of homes, and hence 
become quasi-private ‘communal’ spaces. For this reason, densely populated streets along 
narrow alleyways are territorialised as the mohallah’s own, and often become protected as 
such.  
This was made apparent through narrated experiences of trespass. For example Shamim, 
a health worker at the Aga Khan Health Centre, spoke of her initial naivety when she 
started working in Sultanabad. As an outsider she wasn’t familiar with the nuances of 
territoriality within the settlement. She narrated an incident where an ambulance couldn’t 
access a woman in labour who needed to get to a hospital for emergency care. She was 
carted out through Sultanabad on a wheelbarrow. Following this, the health centre raised 
money to initiate a road widening project, so that a thoroughfare could be constructed 
through the settlement. However, Shamin explained that despite best efforts, the project 
was not successful: 
The road was only widened up to a certain point. When we tried to extend it towards the other 
end of the settlement (as planned), some people came waving guns and warned us not to expand 
the road any further. 
The incident in which an attempt to open up roads incited violence took place in the 
Mehsud Mohallah. Residents of this mohallah perceived the road widening as a violation 
of their territorial claim and an attempt to ‘open up’ the enclave to more traffic. Given 
the reputation of the Mehsud Mohallah as a fiercely private space, and not being able to 
find any gatekeeper within, I was not able to access the enclave myself. However, 
narratives from other Sultanabad residents highlighted how the Mehsud Mohallah was 
often aggressively defended. Imam, the elder of the Balti Mohallah, expressed his 
frustration at the Mehsuds, who he says ‘use cultural use of space as an excuse. If the 
street is closed, then they can use it as private, but if the street is a thoroughfare, how can 
they call it private and refuse access?’ 
The Mehsud Mohallah therefore used violence and the threat of violence as a way of 
subverting cultural norms in appropriating and privatising space not traditionally 
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conceived as public. Their actions were widely opposed by most Sultanabad residents, 
who resent the violent intent with which the Mehsuds selfishly appropriate space. 
Khattak explained that his resentment was primarily because the Mehsuds gave such 
enclosure practices a bad name, as their territorialisation of cultural space was defined by 
a violent intent to keep out the police and security forces and other outside interference 
so that they could continue nefarious activities: 
Everyone knows that area as a den for marijuana, alcohol and gambling. The police also know. 
The corrupt get protection money from these wrongdoers, while the honest are scared for their life. 
[…] These people (of the Mehsud Mohallah) stop access so they can continue (illegal) business. 
Another enclave within Sultanabad is the Wazir Mohallah. The Wazirs are a distinct 
Pashtun community hailing from the tribal region along the Pakistan-Afghan border. The 
first Wazirs to settle in Sultanabad arrived in the 1980s, and they have successfully 
integrated into the community. However, recent migrants who have come to Karachi in 
order to escape the conflict around the War on Terror are much more conservative and 
insular, and they differentiate themselves from other (longer settled) Pashtuns in 
Sultanabad. They have mostly clustered into one area of Sultanabad, and violently defend 
their space. Furthermore, like the Mehsuds, the Wazirs are reputed to use coercion as a 
way of restricting access into the spaces of their mohallah. Gul, a long-time resident of 
Sultanabad and an older settled Wazir Pashtun, narrated his disgust at the new settlers’ 
enclave, and their backward way of life: 
They even don’t allow internet or TV cables to run through there. They cut them themselves, 
and warn operators to not come there. They don’t allow their families to watch TV. Not all of 
them are living here with their families though, and some are alone sharing a small flat with 
other men. They are ruining the mahaul [socio-cultural environment] and peace in the area. 
They are illiterate and have brought rural culture here. Since they have come, petty crime has 
also increased. They are also rude to children and other people—we know to generally avoid that 
area now—they are trouble! 
Although  I was not able to interview anyone from the Wazir Mohallah myself for safety 
reasons, interviews with residents such as Gul who lived close to the Wazir Mohallah 
suggested that the mohallah was constructed as an enclave in an effort to preserve cultural 
values. Rejecting the opportunities for integration and diversity offered by ‘cityness’ and 
urban life (Sennett, 2008; Keith 2005), the Wazir Mohallah could be regarded as a 
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spatialised effort to resist the loss of cultural values in a multicultural environment. 
Therefore, in the Wazir and Mehsud Mohallahs, circulation was restricted by intimidation 
and force in an effort to preserve culture as well as ensure community security.  
Circulation, Social Control and Enclavisation 
Such violent spatial practices of maintaining enclaved spaces highlight how practices of 
enclavisation and restricting circulation create vulnerabilities and differences within the 
multi-ethnic enclave. Older migrants from the same ethnic group who had assimilated to 
cosmopolitan city life found themselves in a difficult position negotiating their own 
identity in comparison. They resented such behaviour by new migrants as it ‘tarnished’ 
the reputation of Pashtuns in the city. As I will show in the next chapter, the Pashtun 
identity in Karachi is now racialised as violent, uncouth and uncultured. Yet, given the 
current system of conflict resolution in Sultanabad, whereby elders arbitrate disputes on 
behalf of the community, Chaman explained how older Pashtun migrants from 
Waziristan such as himself are caught in an awkward situation when recently migrated 
Wazirs initiate violence: 
Elders come and ask us to have a talk with them, or to explain to them how things work here, 
but it’s difficult. It’s just going to create enmity, and we want to avoid that. When these people 
go back to the village, they’ll make life hard for us and our families there. It is cultural: it’s 
hard to refuse to help newcomers coming in from the village, and it’s difficult in this case 
especially because these people are uncivilised.  
The presence of the new migrants has therefore altered the social profile and ethnic 
balance within Sultanabad. This also corresponds with the altered dynamics of urban 
security and politics in Karachi. Militant ethno-politics and religious conservatism have 
reared their head within the katchi abadi, which was previously a stable and peaceful 
settlement. Khattak elaborated that as a result of this, the political profile of the 
neighbourhood is changed: ‘We’ve all been PPP supporters here, but now you can see 
ANP and JUI [a sectarian political party traditionally opposed to Shia Muslims] flags 
here. Things are not the same anymore’. Essentially, such attitudes have intensified fear, 
especially for Balti residents in Sultanabad, who are long-time supporters of the PPP and 
as Shia Muslims feel threatened by the JUI’s political supporters. In the previous chapter, 
I elaborated how the Baltis have responded to this environment of insecurity by 
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fortifying their enclave through physical architectures such as walls and gates, as well as 
through practices of socio-political homogeneity as a means of ensuring protection.  
Such practices were informed by their community elder’s previous experiences of feeling 
safe living in a majority Shia settlement in Karachi at a time when sectarian violence 
against Shia Muslims was high. Imam elaborated this by narrating his previous 
experiences of living in another Shia enclave elsewhere in Karachi before he moved to 
the Balti Mohallah: 
People would stop me and ask about my own sectarian affiliation, but then left me alone. That’s 
because where I lived, the majority was Shia Muslim, so no problems existed inside. But if there 
is a minority living there, that’s where people had a problem 
In light of these experiences of living navigating urban insecurity, living in fear of 
increasingly radicalised neighbours, the elders of the Balti Mohallah have imposed 
control over their community. As Riaz related, elders restrict residents from renting or 
selling accommodation within the Balti Mohallah to anyone outside their own ethnic 
community: 
Obviously, this (selling/renting) will increase the chances of a clash. For example, what we see 
on TV, conflicts arise because of differences. […] If there is an urgent need, we might 
accommodate any Shia [in case there is no Balti interested in buying/renting]. 
At the same time, youngsters are strictly discouraged from socialising with others 
‘outside’. Majid, a student at Karachi University elaborated this while explaining 
restrictions to socialise with other youths living beyond the Bali Mohallah ‘Our elders 
know best, they tell us to steer clear of them (kids from Sultanabad), the kids there are no 
good. They are uneducated and violent. I don’t usually hang out with them’, he said. 
As a learned man with experience and exposure in the city, Imam commanded the 
following of his community. The rules and regulations he imposed on his community 
shaped the enclave as much as did the physical structures surrounding it. Enclavisation 
was therefore a function of social control as much as of security provision through walls 
and gates. It was a process that conflated cultural cohesion with security. Most 
importantly, the process helped preserve a sense of mutual interest though the option of 
collective bargaining, which was helpful in the settlement where power relations were 
often guided through patrimonial and clientelistic politics (Gazdar and Mallah, 2011). 
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Imam proudly stated his command over his community’s 400 precious votes as an asset 
‘If the entire community casts their vote, we can make candidates win elections. That’s 
why they ensure that we are happy, and that nobody bothers us’. 
Yet, the community leaders of the Balti Mohallah placed a disproportionate amount of 
emphasis on secure circulation. Although the Mohallah’s gates and walls manifested the 
prickly nature of the enclaved space (Flusty, 1996), interviews with Imam and other 
residents of the Balti Mohallah revealed an obsession with creating ways of ensuring 
complete spatial bypass of other areas in Sultanabad (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 228). 
Residents spoke of being victims of violence or of being fearful of being in harm’s way 
when moving through Sultanabad to access the main road. For this reason, they had 
petitioned the Habib Public School to allow them passage so that they could avoid other 
mohallahs in Sultanabad altogether. Below, I will elaborate this fear in more detail in the 
context of the production of difference and emerging subjectivities of inside and outside. 
Violence, Identity, and Subjectivities of Inside/Outside 
Issues of access and inaccessibility in Sultanabad reveal paradoxical subjectivities: do 
enclaves materialise as secure havens that keep out insecurities, or are they ghettos that 
wall in residents, trapping them? This was particularly evident when considering the case 
of the Balti Mohallah, which I described in the last chapter as a walled and gated enclave 
within Sultanabad. Yet, despite this added security feature, residents of the Balti 
Mohallah continued to aspire for complete ‘disembedding’ (Rodgers, 2004) from the rest 
of Sultanabad. They aimed to create an exclusive passage between the Balti Mohallah and 
the main road, one that would bypass Sultanabad. Riaz, a resident of the Balti Mohallah, 
shared the routine insecurity Baltis face in moving through Sultanabad. He explained the 
problem in detail: 
We are 80 to 90 families who are trapped because we are not safe travelling through 
Sultanabad, especially through the adjoining Wazir Mohallah. Since the people from 
Waziristan have come, they have changed the way things are done. They find violence to be the 
best way to resolve disputes or get a message across. Poor people in our area cut their houses 
alongside the Storm drain to make way for a narrow passage so we can have secure access to and 
from our Mohallah. We used to find it easy to come and go from Sultanabad, but now there is a 
problem. 
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Riaz’s sentiments about feeling trapped were relational to the increased threats of 
violence from neighbouring Wazirs when travelling through other lanes across 
Sultanabad. Majid, a university student living in the Balti Mohallah, mentioned how his 
friend had been assaulted by young Wazir boys for no particular reason, except perhaps 
that he was a Balti and hence a Shia Muslim:  
They accosted the boy walking to the shops just because he happened to walk past—beat him 
up. Then (at another time), they threatened someone with a revolver and said they won’t let our 
women cross their area. They are extremists, and don’t like Shias. 
However, speaking to non-Balti residents of Sultanabad, it seemed that such violence was 
not specifically targeted at Baltis. Khan, a Pashtun resident who lived in H block, just 
outside the Balti Mohallah, spoke of his own trials related to living in the settlement:  
We all get roughed up. Parts of this neighbourhood are rough and best avoided, but such violence 
is not directed at any particular community. The Baltis are creating baseless rumours about us 
Pashtuns, we are equal victims. And we’ve never threatened them [the Baltis]. My house is 
along the same lane as the Baltistani mohallah. The electricity transmitter for this area is next 
to their water tank, and in case there is an outage late at night, we don’t have access to check it 
because they lock their gates at night! It doesn’t bother them, because their electricity is drawn 
from the school. They have access to the open school grounds in case there is an electricity outage, 
while we have to stay cooped up in our narrow lane. They have all these benefits, but they create 
problems for us. And then they still complain! 
Khan’s comments reveal how enclaves produce subjectivities of inside and outside. From 
Khan’s reaction, it seemed as if those living in H block Sultanabad had been ‘walled in’, 
instead of ‘walled out’. The Baltis enjoy a monopoly over the entrance to Sultanabad 
through the Habib Public School (see figures 45, 46, and 47 below). As explained in the 
previous chapter, the arrangements between the school administration and the Balti 
elders allowed the Baltis to enjoy school facilities such as the parking space and 
playgrounds outside school hours. Khan felt that such exclusive permissions unfairly 
privileged the Baltis, who were inconsiderate to their neighbours at times of 
infrastructural failure. Since gating, those living outside the Balti Mohallah had no choice 
but to wait for morning to get access to the electricity transmitter situated within the Balti 
Mohallah (see figure 48) and check it for faults. 
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Figure 45: Picture of unhindered access to Balti Mohallah from within the Habib Public School.Source: 
Photograph by author, 2011. 
 
 
Figure 46: Entrance of the Habib Public School, which Balti residents can use to access their Mohallah. 
Source: Photograph by Khadim-un-Nabi Rao, 2012. 
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Figure 47: Physical segregation between Habib Public School and the rest of Sultanabad. Source: 
Photograph by author, 2011. 
 
 
Figure 48: Pole mounted transformers in Balti Mohallah. Source: Photograph by author, 2011. 
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Such attitudes and practices work to intensify difference and grievances between the 
Baltis and other community members in Sultanabad. Sultanabad is generally a more 
peaceful katchi abadi than other more troubled ones in Karachi. In Sultanabad, residents 
claim life is somewhat better ‘because we have been living as neighbours for so long—we 
are no longer really Pashtun or Mohajir or Sindhi but Karachiites now.’ 
Another resident claimed that ‘there are a few trouble spots—just as there would be 
anywhere in the city—but most mohallahs within the settlement are not violent ethnic 
clusters’.17 However, my interviews with residents from various mohallahs revealed that 
the Balti Mohallah was unique in nature, and also more extreme in its practices of 
isolation and socio-spatial differentiation. I also felt the socio-spatial practices of 
enclavisation within the Balti Mohallah had led to an intensified fear of the others 
‘outside’, and had constructed a racialised view of their neighbours in ways that are 
similar to how poor domestic workers are victimised in gated communities and enclosed 
neighbourhoods such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7. The Baltis, like much of 
Karachi’s middle class, have turned to fearing all of Sultanabad as a space of criminality 
and danger. 
Yet, it became evident that the relationship between identity and violence was entirely 
subjective. The Baltis were adamant that their community faced a threat from those 
‘outside’, and that this threat was based on religious differences. However, as interviews 
progressed, it was obvious that all of Sultanabad’s residents lived in an environment of 
extreme vulnerability and insecurity. Moreover, descriptions of violent events and the 
identity of violent actors changed depending on which ethnic group was being 
interviewed. For example Khan, a Pashtun living in close proximity to the Wazir 
Mohallah, was quite used to aerial gunfire and seeing people wield guns. He agreed that 
most people living in his neighbourhood and most Pashtuns within Sultanabad own guns 
and are not scared to use them. Yet, he argued that owning weapons is a norm in the 
tribal areas and hence the act of displaying weapons or firing them does not necessarily 
denote violent intentions: 
                                                 
17 Although other mohallahs may have their own norms of spatial use, interviews with residents of other 
parts of Sultanabad suggested that none are violent or dangerous to cross through with the exception of 
the Mehsud and Wazir Mohallahs. 
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We are used to firearms from our visits to our village. My uncles get cartridges and fire them on 
celebratory occasions, such as weddings. We’re from the tribal areas, and that’s what’s done 
there. Sometimes, we do that here as well, but we have to be careful. I’d never pick up a gun 
because it can be mistaken as a sign of aggression. My father is very strict and has taught us 
that those who live with guns die with guns. 
Politically active residents, on the other hand, spoke of routine aerial gunfire as a 
demonstration of power. For example, Khattak, a Pashtun who supported the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP), mentioned that aerial gunfire was common for members of the 
ANP (Pashtun Nationalist Party) who ‘see this as a way of bravado and intimidation.’ 
Interviews with others in Sultanabad revealed that violence and shootings in Sultanabad 
were indiscriminate and that such acts of violence were perpetuated by actors external to 
the settlement. This was especially the opinion of Hazara and Punjabi residents in 
Sultanabad. The Hazara and Punjabi ethnic groups are largely neutral in Karachi’s 
sectarian and ethnicised politics. In an interaction with two Punjabi women living in an 
ethnically mixed mohallah along the main road leading into Sultanabad, one of them 
related: 
It has been three or four months, it has never been like this before. They are Pashtuns and I 
think Mohajirs who are fighting together? Yes, Pashtuns and Mohajirs are fighting. They just 
stand here and start firing—I don’t know if they are residents or outsiders. The boy next door 
got injured by a stray bullet. Poor guy, thank God he survived. My daughter was walking home 
from a friend’s house when they started firing. They just do it for no reason. These are people 
affiliated with some party—I don’t know which, they come out wearing face masks and start 
shooting for no rhyme or reason. Maybe, just firing because they just have to (are ordered to) kill 
people. The situation has become so bad that we hardly leave our house because of fear. 
Based on the different narratives surrounding violence in Sultanabad, it was obvious how 
perspectives on violence changed depending on the identity of the person. Baltis, for 
example, argued that their identity as Shia Muslims made them vulnerable to sectarian 
violence perpetuated by recent Sunni Muslim migrants who had joined the ANP. On the 
other hand, as a Pashtun himself, Khan claimed to be unaffected by the gunfire because 
he had grown up in a culture where the use of firearms was normalised. Sarah, however, 
spoke of it as an event with a vague purpose that she couldn’t understand: it was perhaps 
political, but she wasn’t quite sure. She did not attribute it as directed against any 
community in particular, but it nevertheless instilled deep fear in her. 
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Within this context, the claims made by Balti community elders that their community is 
singled out and targeted may be true, but it was also obvious that others within 
Sultanabad were equal victims of everyday violence. Yet, the Balti Mohallah was one of 
the few mohallahs that restricted circulation (others being the Wazir and Mehsud 
Mohallahs). Considering that understandings of objectives and targets of violence in 
Sultanabad are subjectively constructed (depending on identity positions), it follows that 
the processes of enclavisation and restriction of circulation in these mohallahs is 
contingent on generating a strong sense of differentiated community. Yet, as Werbner 
(2005) highlights in his study on community and the translocation of culture, community 
is not a static formulation, but is heterogeneous (e.g. political, cultural, social and ethno-
linguistic), and its boundaries change situationally. This is helpful in considering not only 
how mohallahs may coalesce as enclaves that look after community interests, but then also 
for understanding that the ‘borders’ of such enclaves are flexible and may shift to include 
and exclude certain people based on changing community interests. 
In conclusion, although organised differently from Askari III and Clifton Block 7, a few 
mohallahs within Sultanabad were identifiable as enclaves thorough protective practices 
which limited access to outsiders, as well as the instantiation of collectivised identities. 
My own movement through the different mohallahs of Sultanabad led me to believe that, 
similarly to Askari III, access was negotiable based on registers of identity (whether 
ethnicity, religion, gender or class), the declared intention for a visit and building trust 
with gatekeepers. At the same time, I also became aware that socio-spatial practices of 
community formation are closely tied to bordering practices in spaces where no physical 
architectures exist to define enclave boundaries. As a non-resident woman who had no 
history of engagement with residents beyond academic interest, I was able to obtain 
access especially since my own presence within the neighbourhood was not as politically 
identifiable as that of many others.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented detailed vignettes of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and 
Sultanabad in an effort to explain my earlier-outlined reconceptualisation of enclaves as 
dynamic socio-material and socio-political assemblages formed through discursive and 
material processes of securitisation. By paying attention to practices of bordering and 
securitisation and patterns of circulation, I have attempted to highlight how processes of 
enclavisation are productive of identities and subjectivities. Overall, highlighting the 
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range of ‘forms’ that enclaves may take—from physically gated to enclosed to open—I 
have argued that the ‘borders’ of all these enclaves are dynamic, fluid and often simply 
discursively produced. Moreover, I have also emphasised how processes of restricting 
circulation are a key feature of enclaved spaces.  
Therefore, by presenting the various processes, practices and performances that combine 
to filter circulation in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, this chapter has taken 
another step towards highlighting enclaves as processual socio-material assemblages. 
Firstly, in each of my field sites I have focused on how the socio-material or 
performative architectures of enclosure are enacted, and how they work to constitute the 
enclave and filter circulation. Such a focus has helped in highlighting enclaves as spaces 
that are continuously assembled and re-assembled between varying degrees of openness 
and closure. Secondly, focusing on interactions between residents, enclave management 
and processes of enclosure and security in each of the enclaves has highlighted the 
constant contests, tensions and negotiations that exist between security and circulation in 
enclaved spaces. I have understood these tensions through critical theories of difference 
which highlight how identity is irreducible to a single construct and how power relations 
contribute to the construction of identity (Butler, 1993; Massey, 1995). Such a focus has 
allowed me to lay bare the way in which physical security architectures cannot be entirely 
credited for creating distance and separation. Instead, the processes of enacting enclosure 
are closely linked to symbolic and discursive practices that perform security and structure 
movement.  
For example, in the vignette on Askari III, I demonstrated the way in which disciplining 
circulation and enforcing enclosure is a constant negotiation between residents, guards, 
ID cards, gates and walls. It is also embedded in processes of bordering and securitising, 
which discursively and performatively produce identities of self and other (Butler, 1993). 
At the same time, examples from Clifton Block 7 demonstrated how physical 
architectures of security are usually symbolic in nature, yet they produce security 
performatively (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). At the same time, viewing community identity 
through registers of inclusion and exclusion has demonstrated how processes of 
enclavisation not only cement community but also fracture it. Following from this, ‘the 
enclave’ can no longer be conceived as a spatially bounded category defined by physical 
architectures alone.  
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Similarly, experiences of circulation in Sultanabad’s mohallahs demonstrate how 
negotiations of space and movement co-produce identity and difference in a 
heterogeneous and violent settlement. Moreover, I have highlighted how these categories 
often become confused in relation to broader urban identities. The arrival of new 
migrant groups, the increasing densification of the settlement and the proximity of 
mohallahs to each other, as well as the constant need to cross certain areas in order to 
move through others, all combine to create tensions in space. As most of the settlement’s 
enclaves exist as culturally distinct mohallahs, this spatial pattern becomes a platform from 
which elders collectively organise ‘community’, and in the process registers of political, 
ethnic or religious affiliation become strong markers.  
Although such tactics are deemed essential to negotiating daily life in the precarious 
settlement, invoking such a politics politicises everyday life and movement within 
Sultanabad. In the next chapter, I will detail how, in a city where violent ethno-politics is 
recurrent and peace routinely hangs in the balance, such politicisation can threaten to 
destabilise the delicate balance of peace. I will elaborate this by focusing on the ways in 
which enclavisation performatively produce identities of self and other, as well as 
identities of place. Recalling the causalities of violence presented in Chapter 2, I will 
argue that such processes of identity creation re-produce structural violence, while they 
also attract political and terrorist violence. Moreover, I will elaborate how violence often 
becomes a means of ensuring justice in an enclaved urbanism, and how resulting forms 
of extra-judicial violence further marginalise urban residents—especially the urban poor, 
pushing them to seek protection from militant actors who challenge state authority.  
To conclude, drawing on the evidence presented in his chapter, I will briefly summarise 
two key points about residential enclaves which meet my research objectives of 
reconceptualising enclaves as agential and political spaces that are continuously in 
process. Firstly, comparing the security practices within walled and gated Askari III, 
enclosed Clifton Block 7 and fractured Sultanabad, I found that urban form is not the 
defining feature of enclaves and that their walls and gates are not adequate markers for 
borders. Instead, it is the patterns of circulation, bordering practices and registers of 
inclusion and exclusion which make enclave borders more visible. Studying patterns of 
circulation also reveals that enclaves are not singular uniform spaces, but that each is 
subjective to whoever encounters it. As access and rights are subjectively granted to 
people based on various registers of identity and status, it becomes evident that enclaved 
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spaces are processual in nature. Building on to the argument presented in the previous 
chapter, it can be concluded that each enclave is a topological construct (Massey, 2005) in 
which a particular form of social life is organised through eclectic spatialisations that 
manage circulation. This frees us from a vision of enclaves viewed solely through 
panoptic disciplinary spaces that exist through sovereign exception, and instead allows a 
more mobile and fluid conception as elaborated in chapters 2 and 3. 
Secondly, I will argue that enclaves configure urban-socio-political relations in ways that 
perpetuate urban violence. Having already defined how enclavisation affects citizenship 
and alters state-society relationships in the previous chapter, this chapter’s focus on 
practices and processes of governing circulation and security within and between 
enclaved spaces highlights how enclaved spaces denote a system of governance that 
displaces responsibility from the state and places it on those systems, mechanisms or 
persons now governing enclaves. The evidence presented in this chapter therefore 
supplements my previously outlined arguments (in chapters 3, 4 and 6) that enclaved 
spaces spatialise governmentality (Foucault, 1991b; Robbins, 2002).  
Moreover, the evidence presented in this chapter also makes it possible to start 
considering how processes of enclavisation radicalise urban identities and produce 
subjectivities (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998). By elaborating how enclavisation, identity and 
subjectivities are intertwined, the arguments in this chapter allow us to view enclavisation 
as a potent force that reconfigures socio-political identities in the city. As I will 
demonstrate further in the next chapter, the inside-outside relationships resulting from 
enclavisation determine racialised identities and differentiations between self and other. 
Not only does the resulting fear propagate processes of enclavisation in polarised and 
heterogeneous parts of the city, but the processes of enclavisation also make particular 
enclaves identifiable as territorialised spaces or ‘turfs’. In such cases, enclavisation 
perpetuates marginality and extra-judicial violence, while enclaves themselves may 
become the targets of ethno-political or criminal violence. Building on evidence 
presented in this chapter and Chapter 6 before it, I will elaborate this argument in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ENCLAVISATION AND THE CONTINUUM OF VIOLENCE IN KARACHI 
Building upon the evidence presented in the previous two chapters, in this final chapter, I 
will consolidate my argument that enclaved spaces and processes of enclavisation in 
Karachi are productive of concatenations of urban violence in the city. Thus far, I have 
argued that processes of enclavisation are highly political in nature, and that the division 
of the city into guarded enclaves plays a critical role in amplifying structural inequalities, 
magnifying existing socio-political divisions, and restructuring relations of power and 
politics. In this chapter I will further elaborate these arguments to illustrate how 
processes of enclavisation are generative of urban violence in Karachi.  
Giving examples from Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, I will first highlight 
how enclaves territorialise identities of people as well as place, as well as showing how 
such territorialisation is generative of socio-political violence, state-violence and even 
terrorism. Secondly, I will elaborate how processes of enclavisation in Karachi materialise 
differentiated forms of citizenship, create stark structural inequalities and consequently 
violently marginalise the urban poor. Thirdly, and relatedly, I will elaborate how 
processes of enclavisation spatialise forms of governmentality and graduated 
sovereignties. The resulting enclaves emerge as spaces of sovereignty, political exception 
and extreme violence. Finally, I will elaborate the ways in which all these relations of 
power, politics and identity tie together in an enclaved urbanism. Viewing Karachi’s 
enclaves as relational and self-perpetuating spaces, I will emphasise that processes of 
enclavisation in Karachi are generative of continuums of violence.  
The Agency of Enclaves: Enclavisation and Identity Formation 
In this section, I will use evidence from my three case study sites to demonstrate that 
enclaves are generative of various forms of urban violence. I will first argue that 
processes of enclavisation produce socio-political homogeneity, and as a result, residents 
of such enclaves become the targets of terrorism and socio-political violence. Next, I will 
illustrate how the processes of securitisation are productive of criminalised and racialised 
identities. Such processes of identity formation magnify social difference between urban 
groups in ways that exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the urban poor, who become victim 
to structural violence, vigilante justice and state terror. 
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Socio-Political Homogeneity, Identity of Place, and Urban Violence 
At the start of the introductory chapter, I quoted a posthumous claim by a terrorist who 
carried out a suicide attack against the CID building in Karachi in November 2015. His 
claim that ‘the enemy has technology that can only be defeated by a suicide attack’ was 
significant. It explained that the brutal action of blowing up his body was intended to be 
a forceful attack on the otherwise impenetrable fortified structures of the building. More 
generally, his act of terror was an attempt to destroy the heavily fortified office of the 
Karachi Police’s anti-terrorist cell, from where officers carried out investigations which 
had helped capture high-level Taliban operatives in Karachi. The terrorist bombing of 
the CID building was one of many that Karachi has been victim to since Pakistan’s 
alliance with the US and NATO security forces in the ‘War on Terror’. Between 2007 
and 2012, 1360 people were killed and more than 2209 injured in terrorist attacks (suicide 
bombings and sectarian killings) (San-pips.com, 2014). These attacks have targeted 
members of the public who may be representative of a particular sectarian or political 
identity as well as symbols of state power or foreign intervention. In the process, many 
attacks have hit fortified enclaves such as foreign consulates (including those of the USA, 
Japan and Saudi Arabia), five star hotels, sectarian enclaves and VIP houses within 
enclosed neighbourhoods.  
Even though the inhabitants of such enclaves may not have any direct relevance to 
militants’ grievances, the attacks demonstrate that as militarised and securitised spaces, 
such enclaves have become the symbolic frontiers of a war fought elsewhere. Sassen 
(2010) eloquently suggests that, given the nature of contemporary asymmetric warfare, 
cities have become key sites of resistance as well as the targets of war. However, I would 
extend her argument and propose that in Karachi violence against enclaves is tied to 
political circumstances, whereby terrorists unable to counter state power on remote 
battlefields bring war to the city, targeting high-value sites which are representative of 
particular political identities. Related enclaves become targets in this war as they denote 
spatial identities of state power, global influence or integration, or even sectarian/ethnic 
distinctiveness. As a result, such acts of violence paradoxically reproduce insecurity in 
enclaves which have been securitised in anticipation of such acts of violence in the first 
place. In an interview, Jamal, a resident and member of the Clifton Block 7 association, 
made reference to this being the case for a neighbouring enclave: 
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Government officers live in In Bath Island. No one else will come or is allowed to live over there. 
Last year, security barriers and mobile police were installed outside the Corps Commander’s 
house and the Army house in Bath Island in order to protect them. It was right across the street 
from my house. Initially I felt more secure because of this, thinking the security there will 
improve my own security. But now we feel more insecure because of this! They [criminals] are 
more likely to target such places’ 
I found such sentiments to be especially true in Askari III, where residents felt concerned 
about their neighbourhood being identified as a space housing military personnel. As 
Asma, a resident of Askari III, stated: 
The way that army enclaves are currently under attack by the Taliban makes me feel nervous 
about our security in terms of living here. What do these militants know? They’ll see ‘Askari’ 
[a word denoting ‘local soldier’ in the British Colonial Army] written outside on the walls and 
gates. They may target us for getting the army’s attention—how do they know that not everyone 
here is affiliated with the army?  
Such fears of being identified as an army colony were especially strong following recent 
events in Pakistan, when terrorist attacks started to concentrate on soft targets within 
armed forces institutions. In a chilling statement made in the aftermath of the Peshawar 
School Massacre in December 2014, Khalifa Omar Mansoor, the Taliban commander 
who masterminded the attack stated: 
I want to tell the Pakistan government, and the directors, teachers and students of the army’s 
affiliated institutions, that you are the ones strengthening this un-Islamic democratic system […] 
and if you continue to target our women and children, then your children will not be safe 
anymore (Hasan, 2014c). 
The fear that Askari III residents felt in light of the threat of terrorism showed the 
paradox of security and insecurity that was produced through processes of enclavisation. 
Using feminist theories of geography (Massey, 1994; 2005), in previous chapters I have 
elaborated how enclaves are relational processes that are socially constituted through 
multiple socio-political and socio-material interrelations. Moreover, understanding 
identity as a discursive construct that is stabilised over time through repetitive iterations 
(Butler, 1990), we can understand how enclaves materialise spatial identities through 
structures, norms and processes that differentiate between inside and outside and 
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regulate movement and action within the enclave on a daily basis. Such ideas, whereby 
bordering processes and physical boundaries create identities of self and other and 
territorialise political identities of space, are also widely popular in scholarship on political 
geography (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Paasi, 1998; Mbembe, 2000).  
In the context of this literature, it becomes evident that the production of enclaved 
space, which rests on processes which border and instantiate inside/outside relations, can 
be considered to be generative of the identities of each enclave. By extension, I would 
argue that enclavisation in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad does not simply 
work to provide security to residents of the enclave, but also makes them more 
susceptible to forms of violence which are tied to collective identity. Recalling the 
evidence presented in the previous two chapters, in the case of Askari III the enclave is 
not only created by perimeter walls and gates, but also through militaristic rules 
governing access and spatial practices within the enclave. Moreover, the enclave is also 
made distinctive as an ex-military residential community by function of applicable legal 
covenants that are limited to Cantonment areas. These formal and informal laws, coupled 
with bordering practices at the gates, combine to generate an identity of the enclave as a 
homogenous space that has strong ties with the Pakistan Army. As a result, the residents 
of Askari III—whether they are civilian or have ties to the military—are equally 
susceptible to terrorist violence. 
Similarly, in Clifton Block 7, processes of enclavisation are led by the Block 7 Residents’ 
Association, which is representative of the interests of its upper middle-class members. 
Even though some residents remain non-members and refuse to contribute to the 
association’s activities, the physical enclosure of the neighbourhood has discursively 
created an identity of the enclave as a space of homogeneity, prestige and exclusivity. In 
Karachi, privately guarded enclosed streets are usually common in areas where prominent 
(and sometimes controversial) politicians, public servants, religious leaders, business 
tycoons or media moguls reside. Therefore, the securitisation of Clifton Block 7 may 
have reduced the incidence of burglaries, muggings and street crime within the enclave, 
but it has nevertheless increased the vulnerability of residents by way of drawing undue 
attention to their socio-economic status. Radha, a female resident who was not a member 
of the Block 7 Residents’ Association, spoke of this paradox: 
It is not as if we can just incarcerate ourselves in our homes! Twice, I have heard friends 
speaking of being followed, or of being burgled on the road when coming home from visiting the 
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bank. Our servants have ears—they know what we possess, where we are going. These barriers 
don’t stop them from collaborating with others to rob us outside. If anything, we look like we 
have something to protect—that makes us a better target.  
In the case of Clifton Block 7, however, the enclosure of otherwise public streets not 
only projects this identity of exclusivity, but also symbolises the socio-political 
homogeneity of its residents. However, as I have explained earlier, in reality, the 
neighbourhood was divided and not all residents were members of the Residents’ 
Association or supported its activities. This was because they either did not agree with 
the rules and regulations imposed by the association, did not approve of the strong 
political ties with the MQM, or considered that the association disproportionately looked 
after the dominant interests of Ismaili residents. Despite these internal fractures, the act 
of physical enclosure nevertheless generated a socially constructed notion of the enclave 
as a community with a shared political identity (Newman and Paasi, 1998). Those living 
outside the enclave made comments such as, ‘Oh yes, isn’t that where the Ismaili 
community live? It’s a very well organised neighbourhood, but Ismailis are like that—
they look after their own interests really well.’ Such notions made the enclave more 
susceptible to sectarian violence from outside. As Naghma, an Ismaili resident, 
mentioned:  
We have recently increased security in the Aga Khan Park because of threats from sectarian 
groups who may attack us on the way to the Jamat Khana [Ismaili Mosque]. 
Similarly, in Sultanabad’s Balti Mohallah, the link between enclavisation and the 
territorialisation of identity was similar to that experienced in Clifton Block 7. In the Balti 
Mohallah, inside-outside relations were demarcated through socio-political registers of 
ethnic, political and sectarian identities (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Paasi, 1998). As 
described in Chapter 6, the community elders prohibited the sale or rental of property 
within the Mohallah to Sunni Muslims, or to people outside the Balti community, 
therefore ensuring ethnic homogeneity within the enclave. Moreover, since commanding 
a vote bank was essential to ensure security within the rough settlement, the elders who 
represented the Balti Mohallah strictly imposed electoral unity within the community. 
This made the enclave more identifiable as a place with particular political leanings. As 
explained in chapters 6 and 7, residents and elders of the Balti Mohallah deemed socio-
political homogeneity to be essential for enhancing their power position within the 
neighbourhood, and thus for negotiating the minority group’s safety within the complex 
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and divided neighbourhood. However, such practices attracted hostility from rival ethno-
political groups. Simran, a resident of the Balti Mohallah, explained this situation: ‘even 
though we try to separate from them [politically active Pashtun nationalists within 
Sultanabad] as far as possible, their youth threaten our boys saying, “We know you vote 
PPP, if you don’t vote for ANP there will be consequences”.’ 
 
Figure 49: Sultanabad, outlined in orange and denoted as no. 6, is listed as a no-go area for particular 
ethnicities in times of ethnic violence. Source: Khan, 2013 
Yet, critical scholars of space and place argue that it is problematic to assign spatial 
identities along territorial lines (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Newman and Paasi, 1998). 
This may be true for most enclaves, which I have argued are not as socio-politically 
homogenous as they seem. As I have mentioned in the previous two chapters, this is also 
the case with Sultanabad, which is divided into various socio-spatial mohallahs. Not only 
are there different ethnic groups resident in the various mohallahs of Sultanabad, but 
Pashtun identity within the settlement is also splintered between different social views 
and political affiliations. Nevertheless, as explained previously, thus far some mohallahs 
within Sultanabad have formed political alliances with others in order to ensure 
protection and safety, especially from external threats. Media coverage of resistance to 
state forces conducting military operations within the settlement, or representations of 
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the enclave as a Pashtun-dominated no-go area (see Khan, 2013, and figure 49), combine 
to discursively produce all of Sultanabad as a homogenous enclave. As a discursively 
constructed Pashtun majority enclave, Sultanabad attracts not only state-terror (as I will 
explain later), but also ethno-political violence at times when political tensions are high in 
the city. This is especially since as figure 50 below illustrates, some of Sultanabad’s 
enclaves are territorially marked by political workers through graffiti.  
 
Figure 50: Political graffiti indicative of ethno-political association on walls in Sultanabad. Source: 
Photograph by author, 2011. 
Such graffiti cements notions of socio-political homogeneity in enclaves and discursively 
creates such enclaves as political strongholds. Asad, a Punjabi resident, spoke of his fear 
at times like this saying: 
They (MQM) workers are given a target—kill ten Pashtuns today. Where do they find ten 
Pashtuns? Here, sitting in the tea shop, or perhaps at the corner store. They come with their 
masks and open fire, killing anyone who comes in the way. They put no value on human life. 
Now kids from here are doing the same to them in their neighbourhoods—they have hot blood 
in their veins, and we can’t control them anymore. But unfortunately, innocent people die in this 
madness. 
These interactions suggest that, even though enclavisation was enacted as a protective 
strategy to ensure safety and security, the production of enclaved spaces has generated 
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identities of place and further solidified social difference. Regardless of whether there 
were social fractures within each enclave, evidence suggests that enclaves have become 
identifiable as socio-politically homogenous spaces. As a result, enclaves can be 
understood as spaces that produce paradoxes of security and insecurity. While they are 
instantiated as protected and securitised spaces, the socio-political processes through 
which they are produced territorialise space. As Paasi (1998) argues, every time a 
boundary is drawn, identities of self and other are produced.  
Therefore, the evidence presented in this section helps reveal the agency of enclaved 
spaces in perpetuating urban conflict in Karachi. Although Gupta and Ferguson (1992) 
argue that notions of culture and community can no longer be fixed to a territory 
because of the de-territorialised nature of urban interactions in mega-cities, the 
production of enclaved spaces brings territory squarely back into discussions of identity, 
difference and conflict. Thinking through the evidence presented here, and recalling the 
discussion in the previous chapter, it is evident that the production of enclaved space 
spatialises politics and reconfigures notions of rights, access, community and belonging. 
These affective binds become stronger and more fixed in relation to the discursive and 
performative aspects of the enclave, and the resulting tensions pertaining to space and 
circulation produce conflict between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’. As a result, Karachi’s enclaves 
territorialise identity politics and become identifiable sites of difference. In these 
circumstances, the very act of securitisation runs counter to its intent, and enclaves 
become easy targets for violent political actors such as terrorists or militant ethno-
political groups.  
In addition to this, I will also argue that enclaves are agential in perpetuating urban 
violence through the production of identities of people. In the next section, I will 
elaborate this by highlighting how processes of securitisation tied to enclavisation 
criminalise and racialise urban actors in often violent ways. 
Securitisation, the Production of Criminal Identities and Violence 
Here, I will argue that the socio-political practices of securitisation, which are tied to 
processes of enclavisation, criminalise particular urban groups by way of making them 
referent objects of security. This argument follows social constructivist ideas of 
securitisation, which consider that actors transform subjects into matters of security. 
Such acts are extreme versions of politicisation and allow extraordinary means to be used 
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against referent objects, which are politicised in the name of security (Buzan, Waever, 
and Wilde, 1998). In observing the everyday protocols and procedures enacted to control 
the movement and behaviour of domestic workers, guards and drivers in Clifton Block 7 
and Askari III, I found that service workers were overly securitised. The repetitive 
processes of securitisation were also generative of the performative identities of such 
workers as potential criminals (Butler, 1990). Furthermore, the figure of residents of 
katchi abadis, especially young Pashtun males, was further criminalised through discursive 
practices.  
For example, in the aftermath of an attack on a mosque within a military residential 
enclave in Rawalpindi, Major—an Askari III resident and member of the Residents’ 
Executive Committee—narrated the difficulties of ensuring security given the continuous 
and ongoing traffic produced by way of employment within the enclave: 
They (terrorists) can come to the mosque and drop off a bag. No one knows what’s going on. 
How far can security be foolproof? A terrorist can come and get employment here. Who’s to 
know? Everyone has a responsibility to be careful. Even the GHQ cannot provide 100 percent 
security to their people.  
In light of such suspicions, the Askari III Residents’ Executive Committee has 
instantiated strict security protocols for hiring and monitoring service workers. These are 
described in detail by Naz below: 
There’s now a separate entrance for pedestrians, and the guards there check for their specially 
issued ID card on the way in. On the way out, they look through their possessions as well. This 
is just to catch petty theft that these maids might be carrying out. It is very common for them to 
sometimes steal things like money, clothes, makeup, food items, jewellery etc. If I want to give 
something to my maid to take home, I’m instructed to write this down on a slip of paper which 
she will show the guard on the way out. The slip shows her name and the details of what’s in the 
bag.  
Naz’s comments reflect how the spectre of terrorism has worked to securitise ordinary 
circulations of domestic staff within the enclave. Other residents echoed Naz’s and 
Major’s sentiments, and suggested that monitoring maids and domestic servants was 
essential in the present climate of insecurity. Many did not trust their domestic staff, and 
instead considered them potential security threats. While the threat of terrorist violence 
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was more remote, the processes of securitisation of Askari III were found extremely 
helpful in keeping residents secure from ordinary crime. Sana, a professional woman and 
mother of two young children elaborated her dilemma: 
Though I haven’t been robbed, one has to be careful of servants and workers. What do people 
do? Increasing expenses and inflation have played a big role in changing their loyalties. The new 
measures to ensure security keep us secure from threats. Similarly, I think we have personal 
responsibility as well. My own maid has been working for me for quite a while now, so we have 
an understanding. I normally wouldn’t hire anyone without proper references, and would make 
sure to register them with the police like we are asked to here at Askari III. Also, I am wary of 
hiring new help. Even knowing some things about my current maid, that she does sometimes 
pinch groceries or loose change, I would never want to change her because I’ve known her for so 
long, and she knows the ins and outs of my house. If I hire someone new, they too would learn 
my routine and understand the way my family works or my house operates. Many people 
knowing this kind of information makes people more insecure. 
Sana’s comments were suggestive of the prevalent attitude towards domestic workers in 
middle class households in Karachi. Yet, in enclaved spaces such as Askari III and 
Clifton Block 7 (see for example Radha’s comment presented in the previous section), 
the fear of domestic workers, drivers or guards is heightened, especially as residents 
recognise that these were constant sources of interconnection between the secure ‘inside’ 
of enclaves and the violent city outside. Even if the presence of these outsiders was a 
constant cause of worry for residents of middle class enclaves such as Askari III and 
Clifton Block 7, residents found it difficult to live without such help. In these 
circumstances, the only route available for residents was to constantly check and monitor 
staff members. In doing so, as I have described in the previous chapter, the system of 
securitisation turned in on itself in Ballardian ways. Sarmad, a member of the Clifton 
Block 7 Residents’ Association revealed:  
The guards patrolling the neighbourhood are hired from private companies. However, we do 
check their registration and their ID cards and police records. We do monitor them. The guards 
for the park are CDGK employees, but we keep a check on them too. We monitor them by 
raiding the park at odd times—for example I might come to the park outside my usual visiting 
time to check what’s going on. We also ask the police to check the park at odd times. 
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Such comments demonstrate that insecurity is a self-perpetuating feature of enclaved 
spaces. Even though the job of private security guards is integral to upholding the 
enclave as an exclusive space, their very presence is generative of insecure circulations. 
Not only are their bodies deemed risky, but recalling Samina’s quote in the earlier 
chapter, their knowledge of people’s movements and constant surveillance is in itself 
considered problematic by residents. In light of these insecurities, the protective 
measures taken against such staff members and guards—which involve multiple 
background checks, registration with the police and the issuance of security IDs—are 
resignedly accepted by workers within the enclave. Such acts of securitisation marginalise 
workers and residents, and even though workers submit to them, they feel antagonised. 
Mudassar, a young domestic worker employed in Askari III mentioned: 
It’s scary. My heart races every time I hear that something valuable has gone missing, and I am 
always fearful of a robbery. I know they will suspect me and torture me. But what do we do? 
We are poor people, and we have mouths to feed. 
 
Figure 51: ‘Identify him if is the one who has robbed you’. Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents 
Association, 2012. 
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Mudassar’s fears were not ill founded, especially considering that the poor become 
victims of personal and structural violence as a consequence of such criminalisation. I 
heard various accounts from poor service providers within Askari III and Clifton Block 7 
who were threatened with abuse after being suspected of petty crime. Worse still, the 
privatisation of security governance and the criminalisation of the urban poor often lead 
to direct violence against the urban poor who become victims of acts of vigilante justice. 
For example, the Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association regularly detains ‘suspected 
criminals’ who are found loitering around the neighbourhood, trespassing, and in some 
cases are apprehended during attempted criminal acts (see figure 51 above).  
As the image above illustrates, captured suspects are often subjected to physical violence 
so that, as Adil stated, ‘they may be taught a lesson to never do this again, and so that 
everyone can see this is the fate of criminals trying to act in our neighbourhood!’ In some 
cases, the suspects are officially turned over to the police after being caught and beaten 
‘just to extend their punishment, or to get help in recovering any stolen goods’. At other 
times, the police are complicit and enable extra-judicial trials of suspects, knowing full 
well that there is little possibility of keeping the suspect in lockup, especially if there is no 
evidence that a crime has been committed.  
The poor are not only subject to direct violence, but certain populations within them are 
also racialised as criminals and hence made victim to extreme marginality, socio-political 
violence and state-terror in an enclaved urbanism. Such forms of violence are mostly 
cyclical, since they are the outcomes of insecurities relating to escalating terrorist and 
criminal violence in the city, which in turn are outcomes of structural violence in the 
megacity. For example, speaking in response to the fear evoked by a terrorist attack on 
Mehran Base (a military base in Karachi), Molly elaborated how an event elsewhere in 
Karachi reproduced insecurity within Askari III: 
A few weeks ago, just before or after the Mehran base attack—I don’t remember now, some 
Pashtun men came into the compound in a rush. They took a look round the place and went 
away. That was scary; we wondered why they came, and who they were. After that threat, there 
were steps to increase security by calling in police mobiles and setting up check posts. 
Similarly, in describing problems in ensuring security within Clifton Block 7, Azim, a 
senior member of the Residents’ Association, remarked: 
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We have briefed our guards to stop young men on motorcycles, as they are usually involved in 
muggings, and also these wild Pashtuns who are poor and are usually looking to make money 
from crime.  
In describing the suspicious and potentially threatening visit from outsiders to Askari III, 
Molly matter-of-factly made reference to the identity of the suspects as Pashtun. Her 
words were reflective of the wider racialisation of the Pashtun, and the conflation of 
Pashtun and terrorist identity. Similarly, Amir too attributed criminal activity to Pashtuns, 
calling them ‘wild’ and making reference to their marginality as a reason for their criminal 
intent. While I have already elaborated how processes of filtering circulation in Askari III 
and Clifton Block 7 subjugate poor urban workers and discursively produce criminalised 
identities, I will now showcase how the figure of the Pashtun is particularly singled out as 
dangerous, why this is so, and how this affects urban socio-political relations in the 
enclaved city more generally. 
As terrorist attacks in the city are increasing, the ‘Taliban’ identity is placed on new 
migrants hailing from the tribal hinterland (Chinoy, 2009; Curran, 2009). The discourse is 
spurred on by media reports that link the recent Pashtun migrants to Karachi from 
Quetta, Swat and Waziristan to threats to law and order in the city (Craig, 2014; Wash, 
2010a). The MQM, threatened by the swelling numbers of Pashtuns in Karachi, 
perpetuates this discourse by publicly warning urban governors of an impending 
‘Talibanisation’ of Karachi (Mehdi, 2008; The Express Tribune, 2013c). Although the 
labelling is unfair, as some of these migrants are actual victims who have been displaced 
by the war, it is widely taken up by ordinary residents. Even, Gul, himself a Pashtun 
resident in Sultanabad, described the new migrants by refusing to call them Pashtun and 
at the same time conflating their actions in Sultanabad with performative constructs of 
Taliban identity: 
They are not Pashtun! Look at this park. [These Wazirs] have destroyed it—they are 
illiterate, uncivilised. They have changed the environment and made it so it mirrors their own. 
Like a dirty, barren land. This area was very peaceful—it was an exemplar. We are patient 
with them, but they are really destroying these areas. Since they’ve come, there has been an 
increase in petty crime, theft, cutting of electricity wires. If you yourself see their neighbourhoods, 
you’ll wonder how these people are living. This park was so beautiful; it was an example for the 
whole city! They have uprooted the trees, pulled out benches, the rail around the park has 
disappeared, it’s as if they are detonating bombs in the park!  
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In Chapter 6, I also elaborated how, in the same settlement, Imam justifies enclosing the 
Balti Mohallah as a response to the ‘gun toting Taliban’ abundant in Sultanabad. Viewing 
identity formation as the articulation of a more dynamic process of representation, 
signification and performativity which is intertwined with the material conditions of 
everyday life (Keith and Pile, 1993; Fincher and Jacobs, 1998), the racialisation of 
Pashtuns in Karachi as Taliban can be therefore be considered the outcome of present 
day insecurity events in Karachi. Yet, the same critical perspectives on difference lead 
one to understand how relational processes of enclavisation construct racialised and 
criminalised identities of both people (as safe or unsafe) and enclaved spaces (as targets), 
and that such identification marginalises populations who are securitised and politicised 
as potentially violent.  
The evidence I have shared thus far suggests that processes of securitisation in enclaved 
spaces racialise ethnic Pashtuns as violent, irrational, uncivil and anti-modern. This 
racialisation is a related to the fact that Pashtuns hail from the north-west frontier regions 
of Pakistan, which have been famous for armed resistance to authority since colonial 
days.18 Countless narratives construct Pashtun identity as fierce, belligerent and self-
determining, essentialising their identity as both honour driven and militant (Caroe, 2011; 
Khan, 2007). Yet, such forms of racialisation are productive of structural violence against 
Pashtuns in Karachi. For example, I heard countless recent Pashtun migrants in 
Sultanabad bemoan their inability to find jobs in Karachi because of racial discrimination. 
Zakir, a middle aged man who had recently moved to Sulatanabad with his family from 
the tribal region of Parachinar, shared his ordeal:  
I am trained as a guard. I know how to handle firearms, and I have experience protecting people 
and their properties. I’ve been looking for a job for three months, but nobody wants to hire me 
because I am Pashtun. I have even tried going to a security agency but they too say they can’t 
hire me because they can’t provide a security check for me. 
Such accounts resonate with Fincher and Jacob’s (1998) argument that processes of 
identification—which are grounded in institutions, structures of governmentality and 
                                                 
18 Even in contemporary times, many Pashtun areas remain ‘tribal belts’, and juridico-political systems in 
these areas are not incorporated into the Pakistani state. Tribal Pashtuns have played significant roles in 
global politics as freedom fighting mujahedeen fighting alongside the Taliban in the 1988 Afghan War, and 
as members of the Taliban today, 
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relational frameworks of power—not only create subjectivities, but also determine their 
rights and privileges. In the context of the empirical evidence presented thus far, since 
enclaved spaces are established through relations of governance, social control and 
power, enclaved spaces can be considered identity producing processes. Following from 
this, it becomes possible to conceive enclaves as agential and political spaces that 
enhance the marginalities of vulnerable groups such as domestic workers and Pashtuns, 
who become victim to structural violence and vigilante justice. In the next section, I will 
further elaborate on how enclaves are productive of the perpetuation of urban violence 
in Karachi by focusing on the ways in which processes of enclavisation exacerbate 
marginalities and inequalities. 
Relational Processes of Enclavisation, Marginality and Violence in Karachi 
In this section, I will argue that in Karachi relational processes of enclavisation are 
reflective of structural violence and that this form of urbanism, i.e. enclaved urbanism, 
exacerbates existing marginalities and perpetuates various forms of urban violence. 
Previously, I have highlighted how enclaves such as Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and 
Sultanabad are each outcomes of a crisis of urban governance and spiralling urban 
insecurity. Yet, given the relational nature of urbanism (Massey, 2005), enclavisation is a 
self-perpetuating process. As I elaborated in Chapter 6, premium infrastructural 
development and exclusive resource allocations to army enclaves such as Askari III 
create shortages and infrastructural failures in other parts of the city. In this environment, 
middle-class urban residents, organised in enclaves such as Clifton Block 7, successfully 
engage the city government and attract an undue share of public resources from the 
sympathetic city government. In this context, residents of katchi abadis such as Sultanabad 
are left to their own devices in solving problems of community development and 
security.  
Furthermore, as I explained in Chapter 6, each enclave also crystallises differentiated 
forms of state-society relations in Karachi. In the socially polarised megacity, 
enclavisation is made possible through devolved forms of state power, fragmented urban 
governance and particular rationalities of governance which allow flexibilities to some 
citizens and not others. In Askari III, enclavisation is tied to the instantiation of a state of 
exception from the civil state by the military. The enclave offers a refuge for residents 
who are disaffected from the public sphere and wish to retreat from civic life. In rejecting 
the disorder of the city outside, residents chose to live behind walls in an enclave 
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developed and overseen by the military. In Block 7, enclavisation embodies a revanchist 
(Smith, 1996) appropriation of public spaces and public services by the urban middle-
class. Residents of the enclave have organised themselves and actively engaged with a 
sympathetic state so as to protect themselves and their communal interests. On the other 
hand, the various enclaves in Sultanabad emerged as a response to an otherwise negligent 
state, whereby residents formed their own structures of governance, justice and political 
action in order to navigate everyday life in a violent environment. Even though the 
physical form, political space and socio-political processes through which each enclave 
comes into being may vary, each of these enclaves has cemented over time in response to 
increasing urban insecurity and recurrent crises of urban governance.  
Recalling these relational processes of enclavisation is important because it helps 
contextualise the rationalities of governance in Karachi through which these enclaves 
were born. Here, I would argue that Karachi’s enclaves are spatial outcomes of market-
driven strategies of neoliberal governance, which exacerbate inequalities and existing 
differences in citizenship (Holston and Appadurai, 2003; Ong, 2000). In a severely 
polarised city such as Karachi, such strategies of governance are similar to what Ong 
(2000) describes in the case of South East Asia, whereby states govern populations 
according to ethno-racial differences in relation to market calculations. In Karachi’s case, 
this is not so much a function of ethno-racial difference as of social class. As I 
highlighted in the introductory chapter, interviews with state officials suggest that 
citizenship rights are granted or restricted in accordance with the class and socio-
economic standing of residents. State officials in Karachi reveal that socio-political rights 
associated with enclavisation—i.e. political activism, privatisation of space, rights of 
enclosure and self-governance—were readily conferred on affluent urban residents, while 
similar practices were criminalised and violently suppressed in the marginal katchi abadis.  
Such differential attitudes towards enclavisation—where it is tacitly approved of in well-
to-do neighbourhoods and severely opposed in slum settlements—are reflective of 
governmental attitudes towards ensuring that the everyday life and economy of Karachi 
continues uninterrupted in an environment of insecurity and uncertainty. Relatedly, by 
virtue of their value within the financial and economic life of Karachi, affluent urban 
residents are considered actors who need protection. Meanwhile, the urban poor—even 
though they are similarly integrated into the global economy—are deemed less significant 
urban actors, and as I have elaborated in the previous section, risky and criminal bodies. 
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Discourses of insecurity and fear of crime highlight how katchi abadi residents are both 
criminalised and made ready culprits of the city’s problems (Inskeep, 2011: 175). Such 
attitudes have become more deeply entrenched with the escalation of ethno-political, 
criminal and terrorist violence in Karachi. In this environment, previously ordinary katchi 
abadis such as Sultanabad are gaining local and international media attention as spaces 
where Taliban groups have entrenched themselves, swelling the ranks of existing criminal 
and mafia groups (Khan, 2013; Walsh, 2010a; Zaman and Ali, 2013).  
However, interviews with residents of Sultanabad and the neighbouring Hijrat Colony 
and Railway Colony (all katchi abadis) reveal that such neighbourhoods are spaces of 
marginality (Perlman, 2009) and those living in them are often victims of everyday 
violence and state brutality. Interviews with residents of Sultanabad and neighbouring 
katchi abadis reveal that such settlements house migrants who came to Karachi in 
successive waves, escaping disaster and conflict in their homes elsewhere in Pakistan or 
in Bangladesh, Afghanistan or India. Residents were often hard working people who 
provided essential labour and services to affluent enclaves that were deemed integral to 
the functioning of the ‘global city’. Yet, the reputation of such katchi abadis as hotbeds of 
political, ethnic, sectarian, criminal and everyday violence caused much anxiety to the 
neighbouring middle-class residents of Askari III and Clifton Block 7 (such as Adil, 
Azim, and Major), who conveyed their prejudices about such spaces and their residents, 
viewing them as sources of insecurity in an already violent and unpredictable urban 
environment. This spatial proximity of well-to-do spaces with katchi abadis within Clifton 
and Defence (see figure 52 on the next page) has therefore propelled processes of 
enclavisation in spaces such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7. Anwar, a resident of 
Clifton Block 7 explained this in detail: 
Criminals used to come into our neighbourhood, commit crimes, and make off into the katchi 
abadi on the other side. I once went with the police after my maid stole my wife’s jewellery but we 
couldn’t catch her. They [the residents] came out in droves, violently pushing the police away. 
The only way we have is to prevent crime in the first place. We are safer now—with our guarded 
barriers, 24 hour patrols and CCTV cameras! 
However, conversations with residents of katchi abadis show that practices which restrict 
‘outsiders’ from entering the katchi abadis are related to the high-handedness and forms of 
subjection tied to processes of enclavisation in affluent areas. Recalling the incident 
Anwar related, Mumtaz, a resident of Sultanabad who had previously worked as a maid 
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in Askari III, said that she stood by such tactics which bar outsiders and the police. 
Mumtaz and her family had been victims of police brutality at the behest of her previous 
employer, a housewife in Askari III, who had lost her diamond ring and immediately 
suspected Mumtaz:  
The police came after me the next day, even after I had cried and begged my innocence to master 
and mistress. They couldn’t take me away because I’m a woman and so they took my young son 
instead. He is only nineteen! They beat him up, and I pleaded with them to let him go, I was 
innocent. They found the ring after all. They recovered it from the other maid who was hired to 
wash clothes. It’s terrible that she stole it. Its actions like these that make us all look like 
criminals! 
 
Figure 52: Dense katchi abadis (outlined in red) are nested within affluent spaces (annotated) in Clifton 
and Defence. Source: Google Earth 
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Despite having suffered for her wrongdoing, Mumtaz sympathised with the other maid. 
She felt that many domestic workers are tempted into conducting petty crime, especially 
as they are exposed to the stark inequalities between their own lives and the luxurious 
lives of their employers. Mumtaz explained this by saying: 
Stealing is against my morality, but others justify it. The houses where we work, people leave 
food around and throw it out because they can’t eat it. They just have so much that they aren’t 
careful with their belongings. They are out of touch with us—they would understand us if they 
had lived our hard lives.  
Like Mumtaz, even though other katchi abadi residents were aware that the police were 
carrying out their responsibility to arrest criminal suspects, they loathed letting the police 
enter the settlement and dispense justice. Jugnu, a young resident of Sultanabad, 
elaborated his reasons for restricting police access to the neighbourhood by making 
reference to the brutal extra-judicial killing of Sarfaraz, a 19 year old resident of Hijrat 
Colony (a katchi abadi adjoining Sultanabad). ‘Yes, we don’t let the police in—for our 
own safety!’ he said. ‘You saw how the Rangers killed Sarfaraz? How can we let them in 
when they bypass justice to punish us on the behest of the rich?’  
 
Figure 53: Television coverage of Sarfaraz Shah seen begging for mercy before the Rangers shot him dead. 
Source: Khan, 2011. 
Sarfaraz was tragically killed by the Rangers (an urban police force) after he was caught 
attempting to mug a couple in a park in Clifton. The event sparked widespread public 
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outrage, especially as a mobile phone video released to the media showed the heartless 
shooting, where the young criminal was shot in cold blood while he begged for mercy 
(See Khan, 2011, and figure 53). On the one hand the event struck fear into the hearts of 
poor young men, who had always felt alienated by the policing and judicial system, while 
on the other hand it cemented the reputation of the already dreaded Rangers as a brutal 
police force that was callous and disrespectful of life. Overall, the event further polarised 
urban socio-political relations between the affluent and the poor, especially as some 
affluent residents said that the boy had got what he deserved. 
My initial impressions therefore led me to realise that the production of enclaves in 
Karachi—especially in areas south of the bridge—was a relational phenomenon. 
Interviews with residents living in affluent areas neighbouring katchi abadis revealed that 
such residents live with a magnified sense of insecurity caused by their spatial proximity 
to what many termed ‘unsafe places’. Meanwhile, conversations with residents in katchi 
abadis highlighted that they were victims of police brutality, vigilante justice and extreme 
marginality. They were left to cope with the insecurity brought about by everyday 
violence, but they were also extremely vulnerable to ethno-political violence and state 
terror. ‘We are the abandoned, the dispensable people’, said Jugnu describing the political 
situation of his co-habitants. ‘They have left us to fend for ourselves, while the city 
government and police are interested only in solving the problems of the “big people”’, 
he added.  
The obviously biased attitude of the police against Sultanabad’s residents has not only led 
to frustration and anger, but has also de-legitimised the authority of police force. As is 
common in other such marginal spaces (Ploger, 2006; Wacquant, 2008b), residents feel 
that they have no choice but to trust local strongmen. Mehran, a young Pashtun resident, 
explained his reasons for doing so: 
They (the police) are just a joke. They don’t have any interest in protecting us or solving our 
problems. They just come in to pick up as many people as possible […] with TV crews behind 
them. They arrest us indefinitely. Why would we go to them if we have any problems? They 
don’t do their jobs. They just want to make money off us (through bribes).We are better off 
trusting people like Niaz, who are real heroes, not afraid of anyone! 
In making reference to Niaz, Mehran was speaking of a resident political worker who had 
a reputation for working in the community’s interests. Niaz was a member of the ANP 
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militia, and was wanted by the police for killing an officer on duty, who had come into 
Sultanabad to arrest him. Despite his criminal record, many young men in Sultanabad 
look up to Niaz for his ‘loyalty to the community’, and for often being the ‘first one to 
rush to the scene to help people against the authorities’. Niaz’s protection became 
especially valuable after the escalation of terrorist violence in Karachi, following which 
police would conduct raids and arrest scores of young men from Sultanabad (see figure 
54 on the next page). Even though Niaz was considered a hero by young men, his 
activities were looked down upon by community elders such as Khattak: 
These young men are turning towards violence. This is not how we have managed things in 
Sultanabad—we have built dialogue with the police and the city government. We believe in 
negotiation, not bullets. Unfortunately, things are changing for the worse in Karachi, and these 
boys are getting frustrated. 
This perceived notion of state abandonment in the face of marginality was a common 
theme in most interviews. Similarly to what is common in other such spaces existing on 
the ‘margins’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Das and Poole, 2004), I found that processes 
of enclavisation in Sultanabad are tied to community cohesion, political consolidation 
and discursive construction of exception and lawlessness. Moreover, this form of 
enclavisation is tied to the de-legitimisation of state authority in much in the same way as 
is common in other fragile cities (Jaffe, 2013; Moser, 2009; Fregonese, 2012). In the 
ensuing enclave, protective policing, gang identities and alternative systems of justice and 
governance help residents negotiate everyday life in a tough urban environment. In this 
environment, relations between citizens and the state continue to change, especially as 
citizenship is mediated through associational membership or patronage and thus 
becomes tied to protection (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). As Alsayyad and Roy argue (2006: 
3), ‘such forms of citizenship substitute for or are even hostile to the state’. Through 
these examples, it becomes obvious that enclavisation in Karachi’s katchi abadis is not 
only an outcome of structural inequalities and violence produced through enclavisation 
in the city’s affluent areas, but also that such processes of enclavisation territorialise katchi 
abadis as no go areas i.e.as spaces that lie outside state control and that violently oppose 
state control. 
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Figure 54: Screen grab of a televised overnight operation in Sultanabad, 3 May 2013. The raid was 
televised on Samaa News 
Therefore, in this section, I have argued that processes of enclavisation across Karachi 
are tied to the differentiated experiences of insecurity between urban residents from 
various walks of life. Yet, I demonstrated that related activities of securitisation have 
compounded urban insecurity by generating identities of self and other, exacerbating 
material and political inequalities, and hence marginalising poor urban populations to a 
point where they are forced to retreat into their own territorial enclaves. In short, I have 
outlined how enclavisation in Karachi is a self-perpetuating process which is relational to 
structural violence: In the present environment of insecurity, the urban poor have 
become targets for vigilante justice and state terror, and in response have turned towards 
consolidating their political power through alternative means which include enclavisation, 
political engagement, and establishing parallel forms of authority. However, as I will 
outline in the final section of this chapter, such relational processes of enclavisation and 
insecurity are productive of concatenations of urban violence. Related processes of 
enclavisation rest on ensuring socio-political and ethnic homogeneity, a process that rests 
on strong political control over populations. Such processes of enclavisation make 
Sultanabad’s enclaves identifiable as a stronghold of particular ethno-political parties, 
thus attracting sectarian or ethno-political violence from opposing groups living within, 
or outside the settlement. Furthermore, in such enclaves, state legitimacy is eroded. As a 
consequence, violent non-state actors became appropriators of authority and legitimacy. 
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Khattak’s earlier comment served well to explain how, in these extreme circumstances, 
negotiation and dialogue becomes less popular. Instead, violence becomes a pervasive 
means of exhibiting power. In the final section of this chapter, I will extend the argument 
presented in this section and elaborate the relational processes of enclavisation and urban 
violence in greater detail. Before that, in the next section, I will elaborate how processes 
of enclavisation spatialise forms of governmentality and graduated sovereignties and with 
what violent effects.  
Governmentality, ‘Grey Zones’ and Violence 
Thus far, I have outlined that enclaved spaces both structure and mediate urban socio-
political relations and state-society relations. Moreover, enclaves seem to embody 
characteristics that perform sovereignty: They structure civil order, delimit citizenship 
rights, instantiate boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, and generate identities. In the 
cases of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, the structures of governance that 
underpin such enclaves hold political power over residents. In this way, enclaves are 
identified as agents of power which wield control over residents in ways that replicate the 
state’s authority. In this section, I will unravel the relations of power and politics in 
enclaved urbanism and interrogate issues of ethics, responsibility and regulation and the 
related forms of violence associated with such strategies of governance. 
This is especially apparent when considering that the checkpoint is often considered ‘a 
technology of government, the embodiment of a claim to sovereign power, the practice 
of sovereignty’ (Sidaway, 2003: 164). Bordering practices are attempts to establish local 
spaces of sovereignty (Sidaway, 2003; Jaganathan, 2004), and in this manner the 
processes of restricting circulation in Karachi’s enclaves—whether through physical 
infrastructures or other violent means—performatively reproduce the state’s bordering 
practices of de-limiting citizens from non-citizens. Yet, this task is not limited to 
interactions at the gates or the entry points of physically enclosed enclaves, but is also de-
territorialised through other mechanisms of de-limiting inside/outside relationships. For 
example, the rules that require maids to carry ID cards and residents to place stickers on 
their cars in Askari III, the requirement to pay a membership fee in Clifton Block 7 and 
the ethno-political registers of belonging in Sultanabad are all bordering practices which 
are reproductive of state-practices of conferring citizenship rights.  
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This is significant, because understanding enclavisation as a practice that seeks to control 
circulation and understanding circulation as ‘the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, 
or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things in 
the kingdom and possibly beyond its borders’ (Foucault, 2007: 325), it becomes possible 
to understand how power and politics are configured in enclaved cities and with what 
consequences. Keeping in mind Foucault’s example of the creation of the free market 
system in order to solve the problem of food security, circulation can be understood as a 
sort of freedom which is in fact a facet and dimension of apparatuses of security 
(Foucault, 2007: 49). It was also a mechanism whereby the state de-politicised the 
negative consequences of free market food shortages. In creating a system of governance 
through which the market would fix itself, circulation was itself a system of governance 
which made food shortages a problem that the sovereign could no longer be directly 
accountable for. Taking this forward, I would like to suggest that as a process tied to 
‘securing circulation’, the encouragement of enclavisation in affluent areas is not only a 
means of securing the economy of the city, but is also a governmental practice that de-
politicises the forms of violence associated with processes of ensuring security.  
Consequently, viewing enclaves as spaces that control circulation, as ‘moorings’ that 
make circulation possible (Urry, 2003), it becomes obvious that enclaved spaces do not 
denote the absence of state authority, but instead emerge as a system of governance that 
displaces responsibility from the state and places it on those systems, mechanisms or 
persons now governing enclaves. As found elsewhere (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Robins, 
2002), interviews with senior government officials in Karachi suggest that the state has 
sanctioned community policing and the privatisation of security in urban residential 
spaces in acknowledgment of its own limitations. The resulting enclaves spatialise new 
forms of governmentality, whereby urban spaces are regulated through policing, 
regulating or removing offensive behaviour or disruptive populations (Robins, 2002; 
Merry, 2001).  
Yet, emerging forms of spatial governmentality are highly problematic in Karachi. In 
producing security, justice and order in a city where all these are currently lacking, 
enclaves in Karachi are productive of authoritarian systems of governance that 
appropriate functions that traditionally belong to the state. This is not a problem in itself, 
but it becomes so when these structures of governance produce mob and vigilante justice 
and remain either unregulated or silently supported through governmental biases. This is 
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evidenced in the brutality of privatised policing in Clifton Block 7 and Askari III which I 
outlined earlier. However, the system of private policing has recently become more 
brutal. In a recent extreme case, a suspect was extra-judicially killed by police in Clifton 
Block 7 (Dawn News, 2014), and this trend has been escalating recently, and is spurred 
on by residents who encourage ‘no tolerance’ policing.  
 
Figure 55: ‘Anyone willing to give cash prize to police constable who killed robbers?’ Source: Clifton 
Block 7 Residents Association, 2014. 
In the aftermath of the extra-judicial killing, a few members of the Clifton Block 7 
association lauded the efforts of the police offer who killed the suspected offender, 
encouraging other members to offer him a cash prize (see figure 55). News of such 
incidents is not always made public, and when it is, reports are confused and mired with 
ambiguity over the circumstances of the killings (The News, 2014; Dawn News, 2014). In 
an enclaved city, where violence has become ordinary, the lives of residents have become 
more contingent and precarious. This precarity is compounded in a city where regimes of 
circulation are operationalised through notions of graduated sovereignty, a concept 
which Ong (2000) describes as a form of governance whereby populations are governed 
through different modes according to their strategic place within global markets. In a 
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system of governance organised through graduated sovereignty, socio-economic elites are 
given rights, freedoms and privileges which those less visibly integrated into the global 
economy do not enjoy. 
 However, such brutality is not just tied to graduated sovereignty, but also the notion of 
hybrid sovereignties which Fregonese (2012) explains as a form of sovereignty that is 
structured along a complex hybridisation between state and non-state actors. This 
concept is useful for contextualising the complex arrangements of power within Karachi 
as a function of state practice. Here, I would argue in Karachi, the state is complicit in 
allowing brutal disciplinary regimes to foster in affluent enclaves as well as in marginal 
enclaves such as Sultanabad. For this reason, the state is not weak or absent, but is 
present through its knowledge of such activities and allowing them to pass. Just as 
Alsayyad (2004) highlighted in the case of urban informality, the prevelance of such 
systems of governance are a function of governmentality, and allow the state with 
alternative ways of ruling populations and controlling subject groups.  
For example, senior government officers are aware that the unregulated Jirga system of 
dispute settlement, which I explained in Chapter 6, often metes out brutal punishments 
for crime within the settlement. ‘It is not our problem, until someone reports it or 
registers a case against it. Moreover, police officers are aware that the ‘elders are often 
reasonable people, with the best interests of the community at heart’, and hence trust 
their practices of regulating criminals from within the settlement and meting out fair 
warnings and justice. However, such disciplinary practices are often as brutal as they are 
in places like Clifton Block 7. For example, Aijaz, a young community leader in 
Sultanabad, spoke of ‘disciplining boys who people complain about, those who cause 
trouble in the neighbourhood’ through violence. In speaking of the ways he disciplines 
them, Aijaz nonchalantly stated:  
We could turn them in to the police. But we tell the police to let us handle our problems 
ourselves. Spending a night in jail will only harden them—they will see the system, meet other 
criminals, and come out ready for the next robbery. Instead, I discipline them. I found out that 
this one kid had just started mugging people around boat basin. I put a gun to his head, saying 
his mother will find his body in the dump if he continues.  
Such brazenly violent practices are only made possible by the ‘de-facto authority’ vested 
in enclave managers brought about by the collective understanding or ‘trust’ in such 
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figures of authority. Such relations are not peculiar to marginal settlements in Karachi. 
Jaffe (2012) imparts how ‘Dons’ in Kingston also enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of 
residents, as they often replace state-institutions as guarantors of security and order in 
enclaved spaces. Yet, in interviews with enclave residents in Karachi, it was evident how 
the stature of local elders or key community association members, as those who organise 
and govern life in enclaves, legitimises such practices. In the case of Sultanabad, for 
example, most residents commend Aijaz’s methods for keeping youths out of trouble, 
while interviewed members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association also support practices 
of violent defence. 
Borrowing the concept from Levi (1988), in such circumstances, processes of 
enclavisation may be tied to the production of a ‘grey zone’, a space of moral ambiguity 
which challenges perceived notions of right and wrong, legal and illegal. For example, in 
marginal enclaves such as Sultanabad, the state is both absent (from the provision of 
justice and security) while also being present (as a potentially violent actor). Processes of 
enclavisation here create conditions which improve residents’ security and safety, while 
also producing repression and violent methods of securitisation. On the other hand, in 
affluent enclaves such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7, processes of enclavisation allow 
conditions whereby ordinary residents uphold the law and punish transgressors with 
utmost violence. The state, although absent as a dominant actor in the violent act, 
remains present as a guarantor of this extra-state violence. 
The practices of securitisation and policing that accompany processes of enclavisation 
therefore work to exploit these grey zones with violent consequences. Alternative 
systems of governance in enclaved spaces perform state-like functions as they provide 
security, dispense justice and maintain a monopoly of violence in enclaved spaces. In 
such cities, urban political life is characterised through marginality, as ‘there is a gradual 
expansion of a “grey zone” between the order of inclusion (formality, legality, lawfulness 
and civility) and the order of exclusion (illegality, criminality and the “uncivil” society and 
political arena)’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009: 20). Such grey zones are managed by both 
state and non-state actors in ways which reproduce urban violence and conflict. Yet, 
studies of urban violence show that such forms of violence often perpetuate a continuum 
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004), or what Auyero et al. (2014) refer to as a 
concatenation, whereby one form of violence is generative of other forms. I will explain 
this in more detail below. 
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Enclavisation and the Continuum of Urban Violence  
In this concluding section, I will use the literature on violent megacities as a backdrop for 
analysing the relationship between enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi. Focusing 
on the politics of difference and issues of marginality and vulnerability, I will highlight 
how enclaved spaces and processes of enclavisation are tied to conditions that engender 
urban conflict and violence in the city. In such a city, violence is manifested by repressive 
politics of control, intolerance of other groups and the biased nature of urban 
governance. This is a relational process tied to a perpetual search for order, security and 
justice. At the same time, violence is an outcome of these same processes, as 
disenfranchised groups battle with elite enclaves in a bid to take on state and security 
forces and assert their power over urban spaces. 
Here, I will argue that processes of enclavisation across the urban landscape reproduce 
conditions of marginality and generate a continuum of violence. Various authors describe 
violence as a condition that emerges when voids in formal governance interact with the 
loss of the state’s political legitimacy or gaps in state authority (Koonings and Kruijt, 
2009; Agostini et al., 2007; Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009). Under such 
conditions, order is maintained through myriad political actors such as gangs, militias and 
community security practices (Moser, 2009; de Souza, 2014; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b). This 
literature also directs attention towards the reinforcing, self-perpetuating nature of urban 
violence. Not only does weakening state control over crime and insecurity in the city lock 
poor urban residents into a cycle of violence as they are pushed into a state of 
vulnerability at the hands of militias and gangs (DeSouza, 2006; Perlman, 2009), but 
residents in such spaces are often made the targets of state repression as the marginal are 
further militarised and marginalised (Wacquant, 2008a; Wacquant, 2008b; Auyero et al., 
2014). As a result, violence becomes pervasive and circulates as a continuum (Scheper-
Hughes and Bourgois, 2004; Auyero et al., 2014). In this section, I will elaborate this by 
reviewing the relational production of enclavisation and violence in Karachi. 
In Karachi especially, the intermingling landscapes of ‘everyday life’ and ‘international 
relations’ have spatialised governmentality and politics with violent consequences. In the 
aftermath of the War on Terror, various informal settlements in and around Karachi 
have come under scrutiny. Local and international news articles, academic journals and 
policy papers describe such spaces as breeding grounds for militant political activism and 
potential hiding places for Al Qaeda operatives (Thomas, 2000; Norton, 2003; Walsh, 
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2010a). Complimenting this stance, international development agencies also progressively 
foreground security as a prerogative that showcases ‘good governance’ (Dodds and 
Ingram, 2009; Abrahamsen, Hubert, and Williams, 2009). Such reports are mobilised by 
local political groups who are set to gain from militaristic action against katchi abadi 
dwellers either from the perspective of vote politics or through an alignment with middle 
class interests of revanchist urbanism. Despite personal political prerogatives, however, 
the resulting campaign for paramilitary operations in the city’s informal settlements is 
often disguised by discourses of global and urban security threats (Anwar, 2013). This 
provides an impetus for local governments to use the trope of security in order to invoke 
a special kind of urban governance where repression and states of exception are 
normalised.  
I argue that enclavisation in Karachi is directly related to these processes. Given the 
environment of increasing urban insecurity, municipal authorities and police departments 
allow middle class urban residents to organise private security themselves at the 
neighbourhood level. While most affluent enclaves are securitised through private 
security guards, the police continue to provide support and backup. Statistics show that 
there are approximately 50,000 registered private security guards in comparison to a 
police force of 30,000 men (Rehman, 2012). However, the actual figures for private 
guards should be much higher given the large number of unregistered private guards 
hired directly by families rather than through security companies. Similarly, the number 
of policemen on public duty is as low as 11,000, as 7,000 are deployed with VIPs, foreign 
missions or elite neighbourhoods, while 12,000 are assigned to administrative and other 
non-policing official duties (Rehman, 2012).  
Policing priorities and the thriving market for private security guards highlights the 
glaring gaps in security provision for the approximately half of urban residents who 
reside in katchi abadis. As explained in Chapter 6, in Sultanabad processes of enclavisation 
often came about directly a result of ways of managing the everyday insecurities of living 
in a precarious neighbourhood. Having lost confidence in the public provision of security 
and policing, residents resorted to their own mechanisms for ensuring peace and order. 
Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers (2009) elaborate how such relational practices of 
enclavisation are also evident in many Central American cities. 
Despite the fact that enclavisation in katchi abadis is related to that in affluent 
neighbourhoods, the government views enclavisation in low income areas negatively. An 
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interview with the Special Advisor to the Sind Government Home Office (which 
commands the Karachi Police) revealed that the process is widely regarded as a 
strengthening of non-state actors and mafia groups and hence as a threat to urban 
security. In low income settlements, local organisation is often the first step in political 
bargaining. Emergent community leaders often negotiate votes in exchange for public 
works in the settlement and the politics of patronage is often tied to political 
mobilisation. This situation is perceived as especially troublesome by state actors because 
urban conflict and violence in Karachi is inextricably linked to tussles over power 
between various political parties hoping to gain a majority vote in the city’s various 
constituencies (Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; Budhani et al., 2010). Violence is readily 
deployed within and between ethnic enclaves by heavily armed and politically charged 
residents, while in extreme cases such violence is used by political parties to bargain with 
the state (Yusuf, 2012).  
The fact that all such enclaves in Karachi create conditions where hostility towards the 
state is possible is largely ignored by the city’s government. As agents of governmentality, 
organisations which structure enclaved spaces come to wield considerable power within 
the community (Hansen, 2001). Fieldwork shows that, at present, processes of 
enclavisation are not legally regulated and the resulting enclosures and attempts to filter 
circulation remain heavily contested. The existing rationality of government, according to 
which policing is entrusted to citizens, creates conditions of severe marginality—in 
voluntarily giving up these functions in affluent enclaves, the government creates 
conditions of unequal citizenship (Holston and Appadurai, 2003). At the same time, the 
creation of ‘brokers’ between citizens and the state also re-structures the social contract 
in ways that exacerbate existing marginalities (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). Those considered 
‘outsiders’ to enclaved spaces—such as domestic workers in Askari III and Clifton Block 
7, non-members in Clifton Block 7 and ethnic minorities and those without the right to 
vote in the various mohallahs of Sultanabad—find themselves increasingly vulnerable. 
Moreover, when elite enclaves criminalise the urban poor, police brutality and state 
violence is pushed into low income settlements. As is common in many other cities, 
increased marginality and insecurity push poor urban residents towards protection 
racketeers or prominent elders who secure residents against a repressive state (DeSouza, 
2009; Mcllwaine and Moser, 2007; Wacquant, 2008a; Jaffe, 2012). In ethnically 
heterogeneous settlements, violence is exacerbated by the very political sociology of 
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enclaved urbanism. Community organisation, vote politics and ethnic affiliation all 
combine to form a mix that explodes in violence (Budhani et al., 2010). This is supported 
by evidence from cities such as Bombay and Rio de Janeiro which suggests that 
community associations can easily morph into violent, ethnocentric bodies (Hansen, 
2001; de Souza, 2014). Evidence from other cities further suggests that increasing 
marginality breeds inter-communal and inter-personal violence (Chatterjee, 2008; 
Appadurai, 2006), perpetuating structural and political violence in ‘chains, spirals and 
mirrors’ or the ‘continuum of violence’ (Scheper-Hughes, and Bourgois, 2004).  
These chains, spirals and concatenations of violence are often not limited to the city, but 
ripple beyond the urban sphere. In this thesis, I have focused on how state-power is 
devolved into enclaved spaces, and how these have restructured urban socio-political 
relations in ways which foster urban conflict and violence. However, it is also important 
to consider how socio-political processes of enclavisation influence conflict and violence 
at the municipal and national level. I have introduced this as a possibility in Chapter 4, 
where I described how contests between competing political actors who are in power at 
different levels of governance generally lead to ethno-political violence and civic conflict 
in the city (Gayer, 2014). However, such an investigation was beyond the scope of this 
study. Linking such forms of political violence with processes of enclavisation warrants 
further detailed research, and as I will elaborate in the concluding chapter, could be an 
avenue of future research. 
Conclusion 
In a city where ethnicity, language, religious belief and political affiliation are all 
potentially volatile markers of identity (Gayer, 2007; Gayer, 2012), the evidence 
presented in this chapter has demonstrated how processes of enclavisation add another 
dimension to identity construction in Karachi. Pashtun as terrorist, the affluent as safe 
and the poor as risky: these identities shape issues of rights and access within and 
between urban enclaves, as well as allowing a repressive and violent politics to be 
mobilised against weaker and marginalised groups. At the same time, conditions of 
graduated sovereignty combine with practices of spatial governmentality to produce a 
politics of space which marginalises those considered ‘deviant’ within enclaved spaces. 
Consequently, enclaves—seen as spaces in which discipline, governmentality and 
biopolitics are re-territorialised—re-structure power and politics in the city, often with 
violent consequences. While the changing landscape of urban security in Karachi is 
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responsive to wider global political processes, the state emerges as a biased entity which 
serves elite interests at the cost of poor urban residents, many of whom are forced to 
negotiate between a repressive state and violent militias. As a result, the enclaved city 
becomes wrought with violence and insecurity.  
Overall in this chapter, I have argued that processes of enclavisation are agential in 
perpetuating various forms of structural, social and political violence. I have 
demonstrated how structures of urban governance and related state-society relations 
become skewed in ways that displace state power, legitimacy and authority in enclaved 
Karachi. Moreover, I have illustrated how practices of securitisation tied to enclavisation 
in Karachi territorialise urban space, are generative of identities of self and other and 
spatialise hybrid sovereignties. Furthermore, I have elaborated how related changes in 
urban socio-political relations are productive of structural and political violence, vigilante 
justice and terrorism. Finally, by illustrating how enclaves in Karachi are relational to 
each other, and how it is impossible to separate the violent consequences of enclavisation 
from the conditions which propelled the process in the first place, I have argued that 
enclavisation is a self-perpetuating process that generates a continuum of violence.  
However, in conclusion I reiterate that in presenting the evidence in this chapter, even 
though I argue that the various expressions of urban violence in Karachi can be viewed 
as outcomes of processes of enclavisation, I do not attempt to claim that there is any 
linear relationship between enclaves and urban violence. If anything, as I will outline in 
the following concluding chapter, I would hope that my arguments could help 
policymakers and urban residents in Karachi change their current view of enclavisation as 
a suitable response to escalating urban crime and violence in their city. Moreover, I 
expect that the arguments presented in this thesis would be of extreme relevance to 
academics and policy makers alike, who could finally consider enclaves as geopolitical 
processes that are agential in generating conflict and violence in the city.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
As I outlined in the introductory chapter, in this thesis I set out to develop an 
understanding of enclaves and urban violence as relational processes. In this chapter, I 
will elaborate how I have achieved this aim through a nuanced analysis of spatial politics 
in Karachi, an increasingly splintering city. Furthermore, I will emphasise the important 
academic and practical contributions that I have made through my study of enclaves as 
processes. In the first section, I will highlight how each chapter in this thesis works 
towards the key aims and objectives of this project. In the second section, I will highlight 
this project’s theoretical, empirical and policy implications. Here, I will suggest how the 
concepts, arguments and empirical material presented within this project may be of 
interest to scholars working on various aspects of governance, politics and social 
relations in contemporary cities. Moreover, I will highlight how my findings open up 
possible avenues for future research which are tied to the key findings and arguments 
developed in this project. In conclusion, I will reiterate the significance of this project for 
academics and policymakers alike. 
Meeting Initial Aims and Objectives 
This project was inspired by my experiences in Karachi, a complex Pakistani megacity, 
where I found processes of enclavisation to be intensifying as a reaction to escalating 
urban crime and violence. While the city has gained a reputation for being one of the 
most dangerous cities in the world (Mercer.com, 2012), governmental failures to police 
Karachi and secure its citizens sit alongside a growing list of failures of urban governance 
in this highly polarised and splintered city. In this context, by way of managing insecurity 
and uncertainty in everyday life, differentially positioned urban actors have taken to 
governing neighbourhood security privately through enclavisation. In the starkly 
polarised megacity, I found that government officials tacitly support enclavisation in 
middle-class and elite residential neighbourhoods, while they vehemently oppose related 
processes of enclavisation in the city’s katchi abadis, where more than half of the urban 
population live. Despite this constraint, Karachi’s enclaves are distributed across both 
affluent and poor areas of the city, and are of varying forms, functions, and character. 
However, even though more and more urban spaces are being governed and securitised 
privately, urban crime and violence in Karachi continue to rise dramatically. This 
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observation led me to question whether current practices of enclavisation are merely 
responses to urban crime and violence or whether they are in fact also productive of 
these conditions. As a result, I set out to study how the transformation of Karachi into 
an archipelago of enclaves could perpetuate urban violence in the city. This research 
problematic was developed from my understanding of cities and urban space as dynamic, 
multi-scalar and relational constructs (Massey, 2005; Amin and Graham, 1999; 
McFarlane, 2011c). From this theoretical vantage point, I began to consider that enclaves 
and the city are related to each other, especially as they are co-constituted in multiple 
ways through socio-political relations tied to processes of enclavisation. This onto-
epistemological position (which I detail in chapters 3 and 5) allows us to consider 
enclaves to be agential political processes. 
Yet, a review of the urban studies literature on enclaves, coupled with my personal 
experiences and interviews in Karachi, led me to believe that the present uptake of 
enclavisation in Karachi defied these theoretical considerations. I found that the 
production of fortified enclaves in Karachi as a silver-bullet response to the need to 
ensure security denoted a form of environmental determinism, whereby policymakers 
and enclave managers believed that physical fortification, enclosure and visible security 
protocols would effectively distance the inside of enclaved spaces from the dangerous 
city outside. In reality, however, such enclaves remained highly interconnected with the 
rest of the city. To ensure both the production of enclaved space and the smooth 
organisation of everyday life within enclaves such as the Karachi Sheraton Hotel, Askari 
III and Clifton Block 7 it was necessary to admit maids, drivers, private security guards 
and many other people whom affluent residents deemed ‘risky’ in the first place. 
Therefore, my experiences of everyday life in Karachi’s enclaves demonstrated the 
impossibility of isolating and containing movement through physical architectures alone. 
It also revealed how the transformation of megacity landscapes into securitised enclaves 
created varied experiences and different forms of urban political life. A focus on 
interactions between urban residents thus promised to reveal the complex political 
negotiations relating to politics, security and governance that accompany enclavisation, 
and hence allow us to think through enclavisation and violence in complex cities such as 
Karachi as relational processes. It was this aspect of enclavisation which I felt needed to 
be highlighted, as it addresses key gaps in the current theorisation of enclaves and 
empirical studies on enclaved urbanism.  
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These experiences led me to consider that a relational analysis of the spatial politics of 
enclaved spaces would be important in understanding how enclaves influence urban 
socio-political life in ways that create marginality, vulnerability and identity of people and 
place. Yet, my initial attempts to understand how enclaves relate to urban political life in 
Karachi were frustrated by the broad generalisations found in the enclave literature. I 
found that the terms used to denote enclaves—such as gated communities, enclosed 
neighbourhoods, fortified enclaves and ethnic enclaves—are synecdochically used to 
refer to spatial forms that characterise phenomena attributed to enclaves and 
enclavisation. As a result, analysis often fails to progress as far as to develop a nuanced 
understanding or meaning of enclaves in and of themselves, or to conceptualise enclaves 
as agential processes that are both shaped by and shape urban socio-political relations in 
ways that may perpetuate urban violence. 
As I outlined in the introductory chapter, in light of these reflections and the gaps I 
identified in the scholarship, I developed my aims of objectives for this study. After 
reproducing these below, I will elaborate how I have met these throughout the thesis. 
Overall aim:  
 To develop an understanding of enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi as 
relational processes. 
Key objectives: 
 To highlight key gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism which currently 
inhibit the generation of an understanding of enclaves as spaces that are 
productive of urban violence.  
 To re-conceptualise residential enclaves as relational, dynamic, political and 
socio-material spaces that have flexible and negotiated boundaries and are always 
in process.  
 To develop an understanding of enclaves as agential spaces that restructure urban 
governance, politics and socio-political relations.  
 To present empirical evidence on enclavisation in Karachi in order to elaborate 
how processual enclaves intersect with complex urban systems to re-produce 
inequalities, marginalities and disjunctive forms of citizenship in ways that 
reproduce patterns of violence and victimisation in the city.  
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Key Gaps in Scholarship 
In Chapter 2, I presented a critical review of the scholarship on enclaves, enclaved 
urbanism and urban violence. The aim of doing so was to highlight conceptual and 
empirical gaps which currently limit the development of an understanding of enclaves as 
spaces that are productive of urban violence. After presenting a definition of urban 
violence and outlining key concepts and frameworks of analysis related to the 
phenomenon, I emphasised crucial weakness in the current conceptualisation of enclaves 
as follows. I argued firstly that methodological and conceptual weaknesses get in the way 
of understanding enclaves as agential and dynamic spaces. In urban studies scholarship, 
enclaves are synecdochically treated as spatial forms that characterise particular 
phenomena. Consequently, scholars do not problematise the descriptive features of 
enclaved spaces, and instead treat enclaves as the ‘place’ where urban political processes 
and social relations are played out (Low and Smith, 2006; Lemanski, 2007; Alsayyad and 
Roy, 2006). 
Secondly, and relatedly, I elaborated how overemphasis on physical enclosure and 
fortification develops an environmentally deterministic understanding of enclaves as 
encapsular or dis-embedded spaces (Rodgers, 2004; De Cauter, 2004). I argued that such 
understandings ignore circulatory life and the interconnected nature of urbanism. 
Overlooking the myriad circulations, interconnections and transgressions that are 
continuously taking place within and between enclaved spaces fails to consider the 
political agency of enclaves as spaces that produce contestations, identities of self and 
other and of space and place. 
Thirdly, I argued that in the urban studies literature on residential enclaves, the gated 
community is treated as a paradigmatic form of enclave. Scholars contributing to studies 
on residential enclaves do not present analysis of other variants of spaces such as ethno-
racial or cultural enclaves. This failure to look beyond the heuristic of the gated 
community produces biases regarding the type and function of gated communities, and 
hence supresses the idea that enclaves may be relational and self-perpetuating spaces that 
emerge in response to socio-political expulsions and exclusions in other enclaves. 
Fourthly, I criticised the lack of contextual focus in the scholarship on enclaved 
urbanism. I found that the literature on enclaves in cities of the global South often uses 
the North American gated community as a heuristic device to study varied types of 
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enclaved spaces elsewhere. This is problematic because it ignores the particular 
modalities of state power, the changing rationalities of urban governance and the 
complex interplay of socio-political relations in a postcolonial city. 
Finally, reviewing these critiques in light of the scholarship on urban violence, I argued 
that in order to understand enclaves as agential spaces that are productive of urban 
violence, it is essential to unblackbox enclaves as dynamic and contextual socio-spatial 
arrangements of governance, power and socio-political relations. Moreover, it is essential 
to move away from an environmentally deterministic review of enclaves as physically 
enclosed, capsular and fortified spaces, and instead pay equal attention to the socio-
political and socio-material characteristics of enclaved spaces. The arguments presented 
in Chapter 2 therefore led me to address the next key objective in Chapter 3, which I will 
detail below. 
Re-Conceptualising Residential Enclaves as Relational and Processual Spaces 
Following the arguments presented in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I set out to 
reconceptualise enclaves as dynamic, political and socio-material spaces that are always in 
process. My re-conceptualisation of enclaves rested on poststructuralist theories of 
relational space—whereby space is understood to exist through multi-scalar relations 
between various objects, events and processes (Massey, 2005; Amin and Graham, 1999). 
Moreover, I elaborated how the concept of ‘assemblage’ was suitable for understanding 
the complex and messy relations that both constitute enclaved spaces and are emergent 
from processes of enclavisation (McFarlane, 2011a; McFarlane, 2011c; Bennett, 2005). 
Once I had established the theoretical significance of concepts of relationality and 
assemblage, I turned towards outlining the relational and socio-material processes 
through which we can understand how enclaves are materialised, spatialised and 
assembled. I theorised enclaves as fluid and osmotic spaces which are discursively 
formed and are productive of identities of self and other. Moreover, I conceptualised 
enclaves as spaces of subjectivities that create binaries of inclusion and exclusion. In 
addition to this, I elaborated on how enclaves are juridico-political spaces that spatialise 
the sociology of exception. This re-theorisation of enclaved space was generated by 
applying the concepts of governmentality and biopolitics, performativity, bordering and 
identity. In concluding Chapter 3, I argued that the resulting re-conceptualisation of 
enclaves opens up opportunities to study the spatial arrangements of power, politics and 
identity in enclaved spaces and to review enclaves and violence as processes that are 
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relational to each other. Therefore, as I will elaborate further in the next section, such a 
reconceptualisation enables me to develop an understanding of enclaves as agential 
processes that restructure urban socio-political relations and the relations of power and 
politics in the city. 
Understanding Enclaves as Agential Spaces that Restructure Urban Socio-
Political Relations 
In Chapter 3, I argued that conceptualising enclaves as negotiated processes of securing 
circulation and spatialising governmentality allows us to understand how enclaves are 
agential in restructuring urban socio-political relations and relations of power and politics 
in the city. In Chapter 4, I extended this argument in more detail by contextualising the 
structural processes of enclavisation with relevance to Karachi and other cities of the 
global South. By presenting an understanding of how enclaves are relational to 
governance and politics in increasingly fragmented, contested and divided cities, I was 
able to highlight how enclaves emerge through complex arrangements of urban 
governance. In enclaved cities of the global South, state institutions favour urban elites 
and are oriented towards global capitalist interests, while the urban poor build ephemeral 
collaborative relations amongst themselves and with political patrons in order to navigate 
everyday uncertainty and insecurity (Simone and Fauzan, 2012; Ong, 2000; Dupont, 
2011; Falzon, 2004). As both products of such relations and processes of urban 
governance, enclaves both materialise through and spatialise differentiated forms of 
citizenship and multi-scalar relations of power and politics in the city. Moreover, using 
examples from Karachi and other postcolonial cities, I showed how processes of 
enclavisation both symbolise and perpetuate contests of control over different levels of 
governance. In this respect, I argued that enclaves are sites of contested urban 
governance through which various urban actors attempt to manipulate urban politics, 
access state power and/or manifest authority. By making these arguments in Chapter 4, I 
was able to demonstrate how processes of enclavisation restructure power and politics in 
the city, and how enclavisation and violence are closely linked, their linkage being a 
circular, self-perpetuating phenomenon.,  
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Presenting Empirical Evidence on Enclaves as Process: Space, Security, and 
Violence in Karachi  
The concepts and arguments that I presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4 provided a 
conceptual background for addressing my final research objective, which was to offer 
empirical evidence to illustrate how enclaves intersect with complex urban systems to 
generate inequalities, marginalities and disjunctive forms of citizenship in ways that 
reproduce patterns of violence and victimisation in the city. In Chapter 5, which dealt 
with methodology, I explained the methods I used to gather and analyse data in order to 
meet this research objective. Embedded in the onto-epistemology of ‘relationality’, I 
identified key relations and processes through which I could study propositions which 
had emerged from chapters 2, 3, and 4 (see table 5 in Chapter 5 for details). Having 
identified the relevant concepts for studying these, I proceeded to explain why 
ethnography was a suitable method for data collection and a case study a suitable 
research design. After elaborating on the rationale behind my case study selection of 
Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, enclaves of three different types, I outlined 
my means of data collection and my method of data analysis. Having dealt with the 
practical limitations of carrying out such fieldwork in Karachi, I went on to present my 
empirical analysis in Part II of the thesis. 
In Chapter 6, the first empirical chapter, I traced spatialised relations of governance and 
urban political life in Karachi in introducing Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad. 
By outlining the context of the processes through which each enclave was created, I 
signified how different types of enclaves in Karachi crystallise through variable relations 
of governance and differentiated political subjectivities in a city where urban governance 
is fragmented and substantive citizenship rights are unequal. Crucially, I highlighted that 
processes of enclavisation shift relations of urban governance and politics in ways which 
necessitate the production of other forms of enclaves in Karachi, thereby suggesting that 
enclaves are inter-linked and self-perpetuating processes. Moreover, I demonstrated how 
the governance structures that underpin enclaves disrupt existing state-society 
relationships by displacing the social contract.  
In effect, the detailed elaboration of relations and processes of enclavisation in each case 
study site presented in Chapter 6 provided insights into the ways in which Karachi’s 
enclaves are both produced through and productive of hybridising and exclusionary 
regimes of urban governance and varying forms of urban political life. Therefore, the 
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arguments presented in this chapter helped introduce the ways in which enclaves 
restructure state-society relations and relations of power and politics in the city, while 
also being productive of tensions in space, political subjectivities and marginalities. This 
evidence was essential for introducing urban residential enclaves as spaces that can be 
held accountable for wider problems of conflict and violence in the city, a project that I 
continued to develop in the following two chapters. 
In Chapter 7, I focused on the embodied relations of space, security and circulation in 
Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad. I provided detailed vignettes of socio-material 
processes of securitisation and bordering, and the resulting tensions and negotiations in 
space between enclave residents, workers and visitors. I paid particular attention to 
relations of power and identity which are tied to inside-outside relationships in each 
study site. Instead of conforming to existing conceptualisations of enclaves, which tend 
to view them as fixed as static panoptical disciplinary spaces that exist through sovereign 
exception (as the literature often assumes), I traced the practices, performances and 
processes of bordering and securitisation in enclaved spaces, which helped me to 
substantiate the arguments I had presented in Part I of the thesis. This allowed me to 
present a more mobile and fluid elaboration of Karachi’s enclaves, while also revealing 
their political nature.  
By focusing on practices, performances and processes of securitisation in Askari III, 
Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, I demonstrated firstly that circulation in enclaved spaces 
is often restricted through performative practices of securitisation and identity formation. 
This helped me to highlight how enclaves spatialise performative security. Secondly, I 
showed how the task of restricting circulation produces political subjectivities and 
exacerbates difference between different social groups. Paying attention to circulations 
and practices of bordering also led me to understand the complex inside and outside 
relationships that are often produced within seemingly homogenous enclaves. Thirdly, 
considering enclaves as performatively produced spaces also led me to highlight that 
enclaves are osmotic and dynamic spaces, the ‘boundaries’ of which are porous, 
constantly shifting and open to negotiation. Overall, these insights, coupled with the 
evidence presented in Chapter 6, helped illustrate how enclaves are processual spaces that 
are agential and political in nature.  
In Chapter 8, the final empirical chapter, I built on my earlier elaborated arguments to 
trace how processes of enclavisation are agential in perpetuating victimisation and 
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violence. In this chapter, I first highlighted how in a city where secure enclaves often 
become targets for terrorist violence, discursive security practices tied to processes of 
enclavisation racialise poor urban dwellers as potential criminals. Secondly, I demonstrate 
how the production of enclaved spaces—as spaces of governmentality and graduated 
sovereignties—exacerbate marginality and create structural conditions which encourage 
structural violence and vigilante justice. I highlighted how such practices are problematic, 
especially when considering the biased role of the state. Related to this, thirdly, I 
elaborated on how processes of enclavisation restructure urban socio-political relations 
and relations of urban power and politics in ways that produce concatenations of 
violence. As the urban poor become racialised and targeted as perpetuators of crime, a 
continuum of enclavisation and violence is created, especially as it becomes obvious that 
the violent consequences of enclavisation create conditions which allow non-state actors 
to acquire legitimacy and power in competition with the state. Thus, even though it is 
impossible to unravel the complex forms of urban violence in Karachi precisely (Zakaria, 
2012) in order to present straightforward causalities of violence, the analysis presented in 
this final empirical chapter makes crucial links between enclavisation and violence.  
Overall, through the arguments presented in the first half of this thesis and the evidence 
presented in the second half, I am able to meet the key aim of this project. I have been 
able to highlight how enclaves are self-perpetuating spaces which in their process of 
becoming continuously reshape structural conditions and socio-political relations in the 
city in ways that propagate marginality, vulnerability and various forms of urban violence. 
In the next section, I will highlight how this project has made significant theoretical and 
empirical contributions to scholarship on cities, security, violence and governance, and I 
will elaborate on the significance of this project for academics and policymakers alike. 
Key Contributions and Related Avenues for Future Research  
In this section, I will elaborate the key contributions made by this project, and its 
significance for academics and policymakers in understanding enclavisation, governance, 
insecurity and urban violence in cities of the global South. I will also suggest pathways 
for future research. 
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The Agency of Urban Space 
Firstly, while my research has bridged significant conceptual gaps in the scholarship on 
enclaved urbanism, fragmented governance and urban violence, my reconceptualisation 
of enclaves as relational processes has also contributed to inquiry into relational space, 
the agency of socio-material objects and infrastructural violence. By theorising enclaves 
as performative, agential and geo-political assemblages, I have demonstrated that 
enclaves are political spaces and shown that socio-material enclaves are not passive 
backdrops against which urban relations play out, but rather are dynamic spaces which 
actively shape urban socio-politics and experiences. Such a theorisation will be of interest 
to scholars such as Massey (2005) and Bennett (2010), who are interested in exploring the 
relational nature of urban space and the vibrant and agential nature of material objects. 
Moreover, this study would be of equal interest to Rodgers and O’Neill (2012), whose 
investigations of infrastructural violence aim to assign responsibility to infrastructures 
and spaces that are otherwise considered static and inert. 
Enclaves as Everyday Securitisation  
Secondly, by focusing on the instantiation of inside-outside relations through processes 
of bordering and restricting circulation, this research presents enclaves as paradigmatic 
spaces for studying everyday processes of securitisation. This is a central question in 
securitisation theory, which aims to understand security as a social construction and as 
the outcome of specific social processes (Balzacq, 2008; Buzan and Wæver, 2009). My 
emphasis on how everyday processes and practices of enclavisation generate identities of 
self and other and delimit rights and privileges between those considered ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ is therefore of special interest for scholars such as Huysmans (2011) who are 
interested in developing a ‘bottom up’ approach to understanding securitisation 
processes at the national level. Relatedly, a future project could extend the argument that 
I presented in Chapter 8, where I illustrated how referent objects of security are 
performatively constructed in an enclaved urbanism. Such a study would identify the 
ways in which everyday practices of security may shape identities of risk, danger and 
‘otherness’ in contemporary cities, and how these identities may produce broader 
discourses of insecurity across various scales of governance. 
Yet another future project might consider how the production of enclaved spaces ties 
with issues of governance, state-power and conflict at the national and global levels. 
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Although I have already elaborated how re-distributed relations of power between 
enclaved spaces and the state are productive of urban violence, the practical limitations 
of this project left me unable to develop an understanding of how similar relations of 
power are productive of civic, national or global conflict. In future research, I am 
therefore keen to investigate how processes and relations of governance tied to 
enclavisation are linked to issues of legitimacy, authority and state-power within 
globalising states, and with what effects. For example, in considering how state-power is 
often performative (Weber, 1998), it becomes possible to understand enclaves as ‘micro-
sovereignties’ where various actors and institutions appropriate significant power. In 
addition to this, considering that enclaves are seemingly ‘grey spaces’, in which 
boundaries between formality and informality, legality and illegality and protection and 
violence often blur (see chapters 4, 6, and 8), such an appropriation of power becomes 
problematic. Future research could focus on how enclaves may be agential geopolitical 
spaces which emerge as modalities of administration by national and global state and 
non-state actors. Such research would be of primary significance to scholars and 
policymakers working on violence, national and global security and global governance.  
Alternative Modalities of Urban Planning and Governance 
Thirdly, this project makes significant contributions to the literature on urbanism, urban 
planning and governance in the global South (Simone, 2010; Simone, 2013; Bayat, 2012; 
McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2009b; McCann et al., 2013). In outlining enclavisation in Karachi 
in relation to processes of urban governance and politics in the fragmented global city, 
this research responds to the call to develop detailed and contextualised research on 
governance and planning in cities of the global South (Watson, 2009; Lindell, 2008; Roy, 
2009b).  
Moreover, the evidence presented in this thesis also contributes to critical inquiry into 
urbanism in Karachi and other megacities. By foregrounding urban space as agential in 
perpetuating violence, this project helps shake off the typical notion of crises in 
megacities being predominantly tied to poverty, governmental failures and state fragility 
(Muggah, 2012, Moser, 2004; Davis, 2006). Such an emphasis can be helpful in providing 
a critique of scholarship on megacities, where ‘the megacity’ itself is considered a cause of 
conflict and dystopia (Davis, 2006; Norton, 2003). Instead, in illustrating how conflict 
and violence in Karachi is tied to processes that are generalisable across megacities and 
global cities, my research suggests that megacities are in fact ‘ordinary’ (Robinson, 2006), 
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and that urban conflict and violence in such megacities is tied to discursive practices of 
securitisation that are connected to the production of enclaves. 
Linked to this, this project presents empirical accounts of innovative forms of urban 
governance in crisis prone cities. While I have presented how processes of enclavisation 
shape urban interactions, experiences and urban political life in multiple ways, often with 
violent effects, I have also introduced enclavisation as a spatial response to residents’ 
vulnerability to urban crime, violence and crisis of governance. Focusing on enclaves as 
spatial outcomes of governing insecurity and uncertainty in a society where the state is 
unable to provide residents with order and security, the production of such spaces may 
be seen as an innovative modality of urban governance. Such an outlook takes up 
optimistic accounts of urban political life in megacities, considering them to be cities 
where inventive political technologies are played out in the face of uncertainties (Simone, 
2013). The resulting processes of enclavisation could be viewed by interested scholars as 
processual strategies that ameliorate hardships and uncertainties, or simply as processes 
that spatialise an ‘anticipatory urban politics’ (Simone, 2010). Such a focus would be of 
special interest for urban studies scholars such as Simone (2010), McFarlane (2012), 
Bayat (2012) and Roy (2011b). 
Following from this, this project has opened up clear pathways for future research on 
innovative ways of governing uncertainties in fragmented and divided cities such as 
Karachi. Yet, as my own research on enclavisation and violence suggests, any such 
research would beg important political questions. By what processes, actors, objects and 
institutions would such governance be structured? What are the ethics of governance and 
governmentality in cities orientated towards an anticipatory urban politics, and how are 
these set? What political outcomes would be related to such technologies of urban 
governance? 
Empirical Significance and Opportunities for Comparative Research 
Fourthly, as outlined in the introductory chapter, Karachi largely remains ‘off the map’ in 
research on urban space, security and governance. Therefore, as a case study, this 
research offers rich contextual material for scholars interested in comparative work on 
enclaves and violence more specifically, and on urban space, security, governance and 
politics more generally. 
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Moreover, this research also contributes to current scholarship on urban violence, 
governance and socio-political relations in Karachi. At present, various scholars, analysts 
and policymakers explain violence in Karachi as the outcome of political and institutional 
conflict, as a phenomenon tied to contests between state and non-state actors, ethno-
political groups and different levels of government who are vying for control of urban 
resources in the city (Budhani et al., 2010; Gayer, 2014; Esser, 2004).19 Moreover, 
scholars have effectively elaborated on how violence in Karachi is tied to processes of 
urbanisation and related issues of informality, ethnic politics and migrant settlement in 
the megacity (Gayer, 2007; Waseem, 1996; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013). While these are no 
doubt valid accounts, they do not consider the political and agential capacity of enclaves 
as processes that perpetuate urban violence. Furthermore, such accounts tend to describe 
informality, illegality and insurgent citizenship as issues that are exceptional to the lived 
experiences of Karachi’s urban poor. In contrast, the rich empirical evidence presented in 
this project suggests that such practices are equally tied to the ways that Karachi’s 
affluent residents navigate urban life in the megacity. Therefore, by presenting in-depth 
insights into conditions of widespread insecurity, fragmented urban governance, uneven 
spatial development and differential forms of citizenship in Karachi, this project adds a 
wealth of knowledge to the existing scholarship on urban geography, sociology, politics 
and governance in Karachi. 
Practical Implications 
Finally, this project reveals significant policy implications for enclaved cities such as 
Karachi, where state officials and urban residents problematically consider enclavisation 
as an appropriate response to urban insecurity and crime. As I elaborated in the 
introductory chapter, my interviews with urban security officials reveal a deep concern 
about the rapid escalation of crime and violence in Karachi. Government officials shared 
their alarm over the rising influence of gangs and violent ethno-political groups, 
acknowledging that institutional weaknesses in urban governance have led to a loss of 
state authority and failures in effective policing. Yet, as I outlined earlier, in an 
environment of escalating urban insecurity, government officials have condoned 
enclavisation as a stopgap strategy for providing residents with relief from living everyday 
                                                 
19 Interview, Arif Hasan Karachi, 29 June 2011; Interview, Parween Rehman, Karachi, 19 July 2011 
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life in an unpredictable and insecure environment. However, while enclavisation is 
especially encouraged in affluent residential areas, it is opposed in the city’s katchi abadis. 
In this context, the rationale for this project is, in fact, the paradox of increasing crime 
and violence in a city where processes of enclavisation intensify in response to prevailing 
insecurity. I therefore make my most significant contribution by presenting an 
understanding of how enclaves are self-perpetuating processes and how they are agential 
in escalating urban conflict and violence in Karachi. This has direct implications for 
urban governors and policymakers in Karachi and other similar cities, who may come to 
understand that enclavisation is not an adequate response to governing urban violence, 
especially since the conditions and processes tied to it merely exacerbate marginality, 
victimisation and terror.  
 
Figure 56: Karachi Airport in flames following a terrorist attack. Source: Bushaale.com (2014) 
Crucially, present day events in Karachi demonstrate the relevance of this project, while 
also serving as a warning for policymakers in Karachi and other similar cities. As I write 
this conclusion, another violent event has shaken Karachi to the core (see figure 56). At 
11:05pm on 9th June 2014, ten Taliban militants engaged in a violent siege of Karachi 
Airport—an archetypical enclave. Disguised in the uniforms of the Airport Security 
Forces (ASF), five heavily armed militants breached security at Fokkar Gate, one of the 
less guarded gates providing access for ground control and engineering staff working at 
the airport. Upon entering, the militants attacked the ASF guarding the gate, while 
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another team of five bombed the Cargo Gate. Both gates lead to the west side of the 
airport which serves cargo and VIP planes. In a matter of minutes, a violent skirmish 
ensued. Back-up security forces stormed the airport to assist the ASF in a protracted 
fight, lasting six hours. The battle left all ten militants dead (either killed or suicidally 
blown up), while 28 members of the security forces and airport staff were also killed.20 
The attack on Karachi Airport was reported as a militant backlash in the face of the 
suspended peace talks with the government, as well as a violent reprisal for the killing of 
Hakimullah Mehsud by a drone strike in Waziristan in November 2013 (Gul, 2014). As 
the battleground of the war along the Pakistan-Afghan border was brought to Karachi by 
the militants, it became obvious that the city had itself become a technology of war 
(Sassen, 2010). Meanwhile, the aftermath of the event demonstrated how the military 
authorities had shifted their focus onto the city’s enclaved spaces. I found that my 
arguments in Chapter 8 had come to life: Enclaves such as Karachi airport had become 
paradoxical sites of security and insecurity, while related criminalisation and racialisation 
had gradually worked to structure a form of securocratic warfare (Graham, 2010; 
Feldman, 2004) against the urban poor. Immediately after the airport attack, news articles 
hinted at the proximity of katchi abadis to the airport as points of entry or planning 
grounds for the militant operation, and of ‘militant infiltration’ in these settlements 
(Khan, 2014). Similarly, government responses in rounding up ‘Afghan suspects’ from 
neighbouring abadis demonstrated how new migrants into the city flocking into katchi 
abadis were made biopolitical targets. Once more, the city’s many katchi abadis came to be 
viewed as sources of urban insecurity, while poor Pashtun migrants were made referent 
objects of security (Dawn News, 2014). 
This violent event once again demonstrated the relevance of this research project in 
developing an understanding of how urban insecurity and violence relates to processes of 
enclavisation. As I outlined in Chapter 8, just as securitised enclaves attract insecurity 
events such as terrorist bombings, the urban poor continue to be racialised as criminals 
and hence themselves practice enclavisation in response to their increased vulnerabilities. 
And so continues the continuum of enclavisation and violence in the megacity.  
                                                 
20 Various news articles, including Hasan (2014b); Ayub and Haider (2014); Boone (2014); Quinn (2014). 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the significance of my research. By understanding 
enclaves in process and explicating the relational processes of enclavisation and violence, 
I reveal the agential and geopolitical nature of urban enclaves. Moreover, by offering a re-
conceptualisation of enclaves as socio-material and socio-political assemblages, this 
project opens up discussion about the agency of enclaves and the politics of enclaved 
urbanism. Overall, this project has made significant contributions and has opened up 
important pathways for future research on enclaved urbanism, securitisation, urban 
governance and critical urban studies. Moreover, the arguments presented in this project 
are crucial for academics and policymakers alike, who would benefit from considering 
how processes of enclavisation restructure power and politics in the city (and beyond) in 
ways that cause instability, insecurity, violence and conflict. 
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